

Олимпиада для студентов и выпускников вузов – 2013 г.

Демонстрационный вариант (стр. 1-45) и методические рекомендации (стр. 48-57)
по направлению «Менеджмент»

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ДЕМОНСТРАЦИОННЫЙ ВАРИАНТ

Время выполнения задания – 180 мин.

Выберите и выполните только один из блоков заданий в соответствии с выбранной вами программой магистерской подготовки.

Блок 1. «Маркетинг»

Прочитайте статью¹ и сделайте ее критический анализ на русском языке.

Word of mouth (WOM) has reemerged as an important marketing phenomenon, and its use as a customer acquisition method has begun to attract renewed interest (*e.g., Godes & Mayzlin 2009; Iyengar, Van den Bulte & Valente 2011*). Traditionally, WOM's appeal has been in the belief that it is cheaper than other acquisition methods. A few recent studies have documented that customers acquired through WOM also tend to churn less than customers acquired through traditional channels and that they tend to bring in additional customers through their own WOM (*Choi 2009; Trusov, Bucklin & Pauwels 2009*). Villanueva, Yoo and Hanssens (2008) further suggest that customers acquired through WOM can generate more revenue for the firm than customers acquired through traditional marketing efforts.

Customer Referral Programs

Customer referral programs are a form of stimulated WOM that provides incentives to existing customers to bring in new customers. An important requirement for such programs is that individual purchase or service histories are available so the firm can ascertain whether a referred customer is indeed a new rather than an existing or a former customer.

In most referral programs, the reward is given regardless of how long the new referred customers stay with the firm. Such programs are prone to abuse by customers. Although the firm does not commit to accept every referral, the incentive structure combined with imperfect screening by the firm creates the potential for abuse in which existing customers are rewarded for referring low-quality customers. This kind of moral hazard is less likely to occur with WOM campaigns that do not involve monetary rewards conditional on customer recruitment.

Hypotheses

Because referral programs are a customer acquisition method, an important metric to assess their effectiveness is the value of the customers they acquire. Additional insights come from investigating differences between referred and nonreferred customers in contribution margins and retention rates, the two main components of customer value (*e.g., Gupta & Zeithaml 2006; Wiesel, Skiera & Villanueva 2008*).

¹ Статья составлена по: Schmitt P., Skiera B., Van den Bulte C. Referral Programs and Customer Value. // *Journal of Marketing*, Vol. 75(1), 2011.

Differences in Contribution Margin

Social dynamics in human networks (e.g., *Van den Bulte & Wuyts 2007*) imply that referred customers may match up with the firm better than other newly acquired customers. One source is reciprocity. Because referring customers receive a reward, norms of reciprocity may make nonopportunistic customers feel obliged to bring in new customers who they think may be valuable to the firm (*Gouldner 1960*). This process explains Neckerman and Fernandez's (2003) finding that referrals for which the referrer claimed a fee had lower turnover than referrals for which no fee was claimed.

Acquisition through referral can also result in informational advantages, making referred customers more profitable than other customers. Referred customers are likely to have discussed the firm's offerings with their referrer. As a result, they are likely to use its products more extensively than novice customers who take a more cautious approach in building involvement. Also, the firm is able to serve the referred customer in a tailored way early on, something that takes time to learn for other newly acquired customers. Because of this informational advantage, the firm should be able to generate a higher contribution margin from referred customers at the beginning of the relationship.

However, the advantages of better matching and better information should gradually vanish. As nonreferred customers accumulate experience with the firm, they should become equally well informed about the firm's offerings and procedures. Likewise, the firm should be able to use the purchase and service history of the nonreferred customers to serve them better. Furthermore, nonreferred customers who are not a good match for the firm are more likely to leave. Consequently, both revenues and costs of referred and nonreferred customer should converge, eliminating the difference in contribution margin over time. Thus:

H1: (a) The average contribution margin of a customer acquired through a referral program is higher than that of a customer acquired through other methods, but (b) this difference becomes smaller over time.

Differences in Retention

Social enrichment is another mechanism that may increase the value of referred customers. The argument is that the relationship with the firm is enriched because a family member or friend is a customer of the same firm (*Castilla 2005; Fernandez, Castilla & Moore 2000*). Having a person close to oneself in a similar position (i.e., being a customer of the same firm) should increase the person's trust in the firm and strengthen his or her emotional bond with it, as both balance theory and social closure theory predict (*Van den Bulte & Wuyts 2007*). So, referred customers are likely to have a stronger sense of commitment and attachment to the firm. This implies that referred customers are less likely to churn than nonreferred customers, provided that their referrer does not churn either. The latter condition is likely to hold: Referrers typically have a greater longterm likelihood of staying, which is why intention to refer is frequently used as an indicator of loyalty (*Gupta & Zeithaml 2006*).

Although the informational advantage of a referred customer decreases over time as direct experience substitutes for social learning, there is no reason to expect erosion in the affective bonding underlying the social enrichment mechanism. Consequently, the erosion of the differential expected in contribution margin need not apply to retention. Therefore, we state the following:

H2: (a) The average retention of a customer acquired through a referral program is higher than that of a customer acquired through other methods, and (b) this difference does not become smaller over time.

Differences in Customer Value

If H1 and H2 hold and if the erosion of contribution margins does not outweigh the initial difference in margins and the persisting difference in retention, the following should hold as well:

H3: The average value of a customer acquired through a referral program is higher than that of a customer acquired through other methods.

H3 can hold even when H1 and H2 do not, because it is possible for the differences in both margins and retention to be small but for their combined effect to be sizable and significant. Another reason to test H3 on customer value, in addition to H1 and H2 on margins and retention, is that customer value is what managers should care about most.

Although we base our prediction on sound theoretical arguments, the posited effects are not as obvious as they may seem because there are several competing forces at work. First, the prospect of earning a referral fee may induce referrers to pressure their peers to become customers without giving much consideration to whether the firm actually matches their peers' needs. Second, the relationship between the referred customer and his or her referrer, which is necessary for social enrichment to operate, comes with an inherent risk: When referrers defect, the customers they brought in may become more likely to leave as well. Although it seems unlikely that referrers as a whole are more prone to churn than the average customer, the risk of contagious defection should not be ignored altogether. Third, an abuse of the referral program by customers who are interested only in the monetary reward is probably the most important reason for practitioners' skepticism. This is illustrated by TiVo's termination of its referral program as a result of frequent abuses (*Zatz Not Funny 2008*).

Research Methods and Setting

The research is based on customer database of a leading German bank. The data capture all customers acquired through the bank's referral program between January 2006 and December 2006 and a random sample of customers acquired through other methods (e.g., direct mail, advertising) over the same period. The observation period spans from January 2006 to September 2008 (33 months), and the data on each individual customer include the day of acquisition, the day of leaving the bank (if applicable), the contribution margin in each year, and some demographics. In total, we have data on 5181 referred and 4633 nonreferred customers. Because the referral program was used only in a business-to-consumer context, all customers are individual people.

The referral program was communicated to existing customers through staff and flyers in the branches and through mailings². Proprietary information of the bank shows that its customers are similar to those of other leading European banks. Regarding the usage of its referral program and the response of its customers to it, no differences with other firms are apparent either.

Dependent Variables

Daily contribution margin is the individual contribution margin on a daily basis. It is the total contribution margin the customer generates in the observation period, divided by the total number of days the customer was with the bank (duration). The contribution margin equals revenue (interest and fees) less direct costs (e.g., interest expenses, sales commissions, brokerage, trading costs). The acquisition costs are not subtracted from the contribution margin. We also compute a time-varying version of daily contribution margin by dividing the contribution margin generated by the customer in a particular year (2006, 2007, 2008) by the number of days the customer was with the bank in that year.

Duration is the total number of days the customer was observed to be with the bank. It is the basis for analyzing retention.

We calculate two measures of customer value, one based only on observed data and the other based on both observed data and predictions. Observed customer value is the present value of all actual contribution margins the customer generated during the whole observation period (e.g., 33 months for retained customers acquired in January 2006). This metric is affected by both contribution margin and retention because a customer generates no margins after leaving the bank. Our second metric, customer lifetime value, is the present value of all contribution margins, both actual and predicted, of the customer within the six-year span following the day of

² The procedure was straightforward: Every existing customer who brought in a new customer received a reward of 25 euros in the form of a voucher that could be used at several well-known German retailers.

acquisition. For customers who churned during the observation period, customer lifetime value equals observed customer value because their predicted value is 0. The formulas are as follows:

$$(1) \text{ Customer Lifetime Value}_i = \text{Observed Customer Value}_i + \text{Predicted Customer Value}_i$$

$$(2) \text{ Observed Customer Value}_i = \sum_{s=1}^{Dur_i} \frac{OM_{is}}{(1+r)^{s/12}} \quad \text{and}$$

$$(3) \text{ Predicted Customer Value}_i = \delta_i \sum_{s=Dur_i+1}^{72} \frac{PM_{is} \times PA_{is}}{(1+r)^{s/12}}$$

where OM_{is} is the observed monthly contribution margin of customer i in the s th month after acquisition (calculated from the observed annual contribution margin and the observed duration), Dur_i is the customer's observed lifetime with the bank in months, δ_i is a dummy censoring variable that indicates whether the customer was still with the bank by the end of the observation period, PM_{is} is the predicted monthly contribution margin of customer i in the s th month after acquisition, PA_{is} is the predicted probability that customer i is still "alive" (i.e., with the bank) in that month, and r is the firm-specific annual discount rate of 11.5%³. The present value reflects what the customer is worth at the day of acquisition.

Independent Variables

The independent variable of central interest is referral program, a binary indicator that takes the value 1 for referred customers (i.e., those who were acquired through the referral program) and 0 for nonreferred customers. To improve the comparability of referred and nonreferred customers, we control for the demographic variables age, sex (dummy variable, with women coded as 1 and men coded as 0), and marital status (dummy variables for married, divorced/separated, single, and widowed, with no answer as the base category). We also control for the customer's month of acquisition (11 dummy variables for each month, with December 2006 as the base category).

Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 (appendix 1) presents the means, standard deviations, and the correlation matrix for the purified sample of 9495 customers. As the nonzero correlations between the referral program variable and the various demographic and time of acquisition variables indicate, the groups of referred and nonreferred customers are not perfectly matched on demographics and time of acquisition. Thus, it is desirable to control for these differences.

Figure 1 plots the average daily contribution margin for the referred and nonreferred customers of the purified sample, for 2006, 2007, and 2008. Referred customers tend to generate higher margins, and the margins tend to erode more quickly among referred customers, such that the margin differential is narrower in 2008 than in 2006 (8 cents versus 18 cents per day). Similarly, as Figure 2 shows, after about a year, the retention rate of referred customers is higher, and this is the case regardless of duration. However, controlling for differences in demographics and time of acquisition is necessary to draw conclusions more confidently.

³ We base the discount rate on the capital asset pricing model. We assume a risk-free interest rate of 4.25% (Svensson 1994), a 5% market risk rate based on the Institute of German Accountants, and a firm-specific beta of 1.45 based on Thomson Financial Datastream.

FIGURE 1
Average Values of Daily Contribution Margin for Referred and Nonreferred Customers by Year





FIGURE 2
Probability That Referred and Nonreferred Customers Have Remained with the Firm (Kaplan–Meier Estimates of Survivor Functions)



Statistical Models

To estimate the difference in contribution margin between acquisition modes (H_{1a}), we use a regression model with the following specification

$$(4) \quad DCM_i = \alpha + \beta_1 RP_i + \sum_{k=2} \beta_k X_{ik} + \varepsilon_i,$$

where i indexes the customer, DCM is daily contribution margin over the observation period, RP is the binary variable representing the referral program, X represents the control variables, and the errors ε_i have a mean of zero and are independent of the included covariates. We use ordinary least squares to estimate the coefficients and compute Huber–White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (Breusch–Pagan test, $p < .001$). The size of our sample implies that we do not need to assume that the random shocks are normally distributed for statistical inference using t - and F -statistics (e.g., Wooldridge 2002). To test whether difference in margin decreases the longer the customer has been with the bank (H_{1b}), we use a fixed effects specification estimated with ordinary least squares:

$$(5) \quad DCM_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta_2 T_{it} + \beta_3 RP_i \times T_{it} + \eta_t + \varepsilon_{it},$$

where i indexes the customer; t indexes the year ($t = 1, 2, 3$); DCM_{it} is the daily contribution margin of customer i in year t (i.e., the total contribution margin generated by customer i in year t divided by the number of days the customer was with the firm during year t); T_{it} is the cumulative number of days customer i had been with the bank by the end of year t ; η_t is a year-specific fixed effect; and the customer-specific intercepts α_i are not constrained to follow any specific distribution but capture all individual-specific, time-invariant differences, including the effect of acquisition through the referral program (RP) and that of the control variables X . The errors ε_{it} have a mean of zero and are independent of the covariates. The β_3 coefficient captures the proper interaction effect because the β_1 effect of RP is now captured through the fixed effects.

To test $H3$ and assess the difference in customer value, we again use the regression model in Equation 4, but now with observed customer value as the dependent variable. Theoretical claims can be subjected to empirical validation or refutation only by comparing hypothesized effects with actual data. As a result, the truth content of $H3$ can be validly tested using the observed customer value as the dependent variable but not customer lifetime value, which itself is based on predictions. Still, given the right censoring of our data and the hypothesized erosion of the margin differential over time, it is informative also to perform a similar analysis with the six-year customer lifetime value as the dependent variable. To calculate the predicted values entering the customer lifetime value metric, we use (1) predicted annual contribution margins from a fixed-effects model, such as that specified in Equation 5, but one in which we allow all parameters to vary between referred and nonreferred customers, and (2) predicted annual

survival rates from a parametric Weibull hazard model because the nonparametric baseline hazard of the Cox model does not allow for forecasts.

Results

Is the Contribution Margin of Referred Customers Higher? In accordance with H_{1a} , referred customers are, on average, 4.5 cents per day more profitable than other customers (Mann–Whitney test, $p < .001$). The difference is even larger after we control for differences in customer demographics and time of acquisition, variables on which the two groups of customers are not perfectly matched. The first column of Table 2 (Appendix 2) reports the coefficients of Equation 4, controlling for age, sex, marital status, and month of acquisition. Whereas the average contribution margin of nonreferred customers in our sample is 30 cents per day, customers acquired through the referral program have a margin that is 7.6 cents per day or 27.74 euros per year higher ($p < .001$), an increase of approximately 25%. Among the covariates, older age and being widowed are associated with a higher contribution margin, whereas being married is associated with a lower contribution margin. The pattern in the monthly coefficients suggests that the bank was more successful in acquiring profitable customers in some months than in others. The R-square is low, indicating that important elements other than acquisition method, acquisition time, and demographics drive customer profitability. Although the large unexplained variance depresses the power of statistical tests and thus makes it more difficult to reject the null hypothesis, H_{1a} is strongly supported.

Does the Contribution Margin of Referred Customers Remain Higher? H_{1b} predicts that the difference in contribution margin erodes the longer a customer stays with the bank. The results support this. Column 2 of Table 2 reports the coefficients of the fixed-effects model in Equation 5. There is a significant, negative interaction between referral program and the number of days the customer has been with the bank. The difference in daily contribution margin between referred and nonreferred customers decreases by 23.1 cents per 1000 days, or 8.4 cents per year. The individual-level fixed effects (intercepts) in the model capture the expected daily contribution margin when the included covariates equal zero (i.e., on the day of acquisition in 2006). Regression of these 9495 fixed-effects estimates on the referral program and control variables indicates that a referred customer has an expected contribution margin on the first day of joining the firm that is 19.8 cents higher than that of a nonreferred customer with similar demographics and time of acquisition.

Is the Retention of Referred Customers Higher? The results reveal that the association between referral program and churn (i.e., nonretention) is significantly negative and sizable. Use of only referral program as the explanatory variable shows that at any point in time, customers acquired through the referral program who are still with the firm are approximately 13% less likely to defect than nonreferred customers who are still with the firm. As the survival curves in Figure 2 show, the probability of being an active customer (i.e., a nonchurning customer) after 33 months is 82.0% for referred customers and 79.2% for nonreferred customers. Age is associated with a higher churn rate, whereas the opposite holds for being widowed. There is also a trend in the monthly coefficients, indicating that customers acquired late in 2006 (especially in September and later) exhibit more churn than those acquired earlier. This trend is a cohort effect and not duration dependence, which is captured in the nonparametric baseline hazard.

Does the Retention of Referred Customers Remain Higher? We also assess whether the difference in retention varies over the customer's lifetime (H_{2b}). To do so, we extend the Cox model with an interaction between the referral program variable and the natural logarithm of the customer's duration with the bank (see Column 4 of Table 2). The interaction is not significant, and the model fit does not improve significantly ($p > .05$). So, although there is an eroding difference between referred and nonreferred customers in contribution margin, there is no such erosion for customer retention.

Are Referred Customers More Valuable? Using the observed customer value, we find that, on average, referred customers are 18 euros more valuable (Mann–Whitney test, $p < .001$). After we control for demographics and month of acquisition, the difference increases to 49 euros (Column 5 of Table 2; $p < .001$). A referred customer is approximately 25% more valuable to the

bank than a comparable nonreferred customer, within the observation period. If we take into account the difference in acquisition costs of approximately 20 euros, the difference in customer value is nearly 35%. These results strongly support H₃. Because the margin differential of referred customers erodes over time even though the loyalty differential does not, the question arises whether referred customers remain more valuable beyond the observation period. Repeating the analysis for the six-year customer lifetime value, we show that referred customers indeed remain more valuable. The average customer lifetime value of referred customers is approximately 6 euros higher than that of other customers (Mann–Whitney test, $p < .001$). After we control for differences in customer demographics and time of acquisition, the value differential is approximately 40 euros (Column 6 of Table 2; $p < .001$). Because the average customer lifetime value of a nonreferred customer is 253 euros, a referred customer is approximately 16% more valuable to the bank than a comparable nonreferred customer over a horizon of six years. If we take into account the difference in acquisition costs of approximately 20 euros, the difference in customer lifetime value is approximately 25%. This value differential is quite considerable. Overall, the acquisition through a referral program is associated with higher customer value for the majority of customer types, but not for all. These results suggest that using referral programs might not be beneficial in all customer segments.

Conclusion

Contribution margin, retention, and customer value all were significantly and sizably higher for referred customers. In short, referred customers are more valuable in both the short and the long run. Yet we also find that the effect is not uniform across all types of customers and that the referral program was less beneficial when used to acquire older customers or low-margin customers.

In our application, the value of referred customers in the six years after acquisition was 40 euros (or 16%) higher than that of nonreferred customers with similar demographics and time of acquisition. Considering the initial reward of 25 euros given to the referrer as an investment, this implies a return on investment of approximately 60% over a six year span. This is a conservative estimate because it does not take into account that the total acquisition costs of referred customers are approximately 20 euros lower than those of other customers.

Questions for your consideration

1. What is the main research question of the article?
2. Which research approaches and (or) methods you consider to be controversial or not quite suitable for this research? Why?
3. What are the limitations of current research?
4. Do you consider the results of this research useful for our marketing managers?
5. Do you consider the research questions of the article relevant for Russian companies?

TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics

	Units	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	
1. Referral program	0-1	.53	.50	1.00																						
2. Observed customer value	Euros	210.66	336.15	.02	1.00																					
3. Customer lifetime value	Euros	255.75	338.95	.01	1.00	1.00																				
4. Daily contribution margin	Euros per day	.33	.50	.04	.98	.98	1.00																			
5. Duration	Days	751.05	119.48	-.17	.18	.21	.09	1.00																		
6. Age	Years	42.90	17.47	-.20	.10	.09	.10	-.01	1.00																	
7. Female	0-1	.54	.50	.07	.01	.01	.01	.01	.05	1.00																
8. Married	0-1	.39	.49	-.15	-.02	-.03	-.02	-.03	.43	.01	1.00															
9. Single	0-1	.44	.50	.16	-.05	-.04	-.05	.01	-.65	-.10	-.70	1.00														
10. Divorced	0-1	.10	.30	.00	.03	.03	.03	.02	.13	.06	-.26	-.29	1.00													
11. Widowed	0-1	.05	.22	-.05	.11	.11	.10	.03	.36	.14	-.18	-.20	-.07	1.00												
12. Acquired January 2006	0-1	.03	.17	-.17	.07	.08	.03	.31	.02	.00	.01	-.03	-.00	.04	1.00											
13. Acquired February 2006	0-1	.03	.18	-.18	.02	.03	-.01	.27	.05	-.02	.04	-.04	-.00	.01	-.03	1.00										
14. Acquired March 2006	0-1	.06	.24	-.18	.04	.04	.01	.29	.07	-.01	.05	-.04	-.00	.00	-.04	-.05	1.00									
15. Acquired April 2006	0-1	.06	.23	.02	.04	.04	.02	.24	-.01	-.00	-.03	.02	.02	.01	-.04	-.05	-.06	1.00								
16. Acquired May 2006	0-1	.07	.26	.03	.03	.04	.01	.22	-.02	-.01	-.01	.02	-.01	-.02	-.05	-.05	-.07	1.00								
17. Acquired June 2006	0-1	.08	.28	-.01	.02	.02	.01	.14	.02	.02	-.01	-.01	.00	.04	-.05	-.06	-.08	-.07	1.00							
18. Acquired July 2006	0-1	.10	.30	.00	.01	.01	.01	.08	.02	-.00	.00	-.02	.03	-.00	-.06	-.09	-.08	-.09	-.10	1.00						
19. Acquired August 2006	0-1	.11	.31	.06	-.00	-.00	-.00	-.01	-.08	.00	-.06	.05	.02	-.02	-.06	-.09	-.08	-.09	-.10	1.00						
20. Acquired September 2006	0-1	.08	.27	.07	.00	.00	.01	-.08	-.06	.01	-.03	.04	-.00	-.02	-.05	-.06	-.07	-.08	-.09	-.10	1.00					
21. Acquired October 2006	0-1	.12	.33	.04	-.03	-.04	-.01	-.22	.01	.01	.02	-.00	-.01	-.01	-.07	-.07	-.09	-.10	-.11	-.13	-.13	1.00				
22. Acquired November 2006	0-1	.12	.33	.04	-.05	-.06	-.02	-.31	-.00	-.03	.01	-.01	-.01	-.00	-.07	-.07	-.09	-.10	-.11	-.13	-.13	-.14	1.00			
23. Nonretail customers	0-1	.12	.32	-.03	.27	.27	.27	-.00	.03	.00	.01	-.01	-.03	.00	.02	-.00	.01	-.04	.00	-.01	-.02	-.02	-.03	1.00		

Notes: N = 9495. All correlations with absolute value of .02 or higher are significant at the 5% level. Differences in observed duration across customers are strongly affected by differences in the month of acquisition. As a result, the zero-order correlations of duration with other variables that are also correlated with month of acquisition can be misleading. For example, the correlation between duration and referral program changes from -.17 to .03 after we control for month of acquisition.

TABLE 2
Main Results for Differences in Daily Contribution Margin, Churn (i.e., the Converse of Retention),
Observed Customer Value, and Customer Lifetime Value

	H _{1a}	H _{1b}		H _{2b}	H ₃	H ₃
	Daily Contribution Margin	Daily Contribution Margin (Time Varying)	H _{2a} Churn	Churn (Time Varying)	Observed Customer Value	Customer Lifetime Value
Referral program	.076*** (.010)	— ^a	-.198** (.059)	.917 (1.479)	49.157*** (7.096)	39.906*** (7.152)
Age	.003*** (.000)	—	.011** (.002)	.011*** (.002)	1.879*** (.283)	1.626*** (.285)
Female	-.009 (.010)	—	-.034 (.056)	-.034 (.056)	-4.459 (6.902)	-3.376 (6.958)
Married	-.078* (.033)	—	-.027 (.166)	-.028 (.166)	-52.798* (22.427)	-52.258* (22.563)
Single	-.040 (.033)	—	-.163 (.167)	-.163 (.167)	-27.306 (22.573)	-24.035 (22.706)
Divorced	-.016 (.037)	—	-.176 (.183)	-.177 (.183)	-12.278 (24.776)	-7.656 (24.933)
Widowed	.111* (.046)	—	-.470* (.212)	-.470* (.212)	76.085* (31.128)	87.249** (31.355)
Acquired January 2006	.172*** (.039)	—	-1.828** (.201)	-1.833*** (.201)	228.228*** (31.589)	247.960*** (31.666)
Acquired February 2006	.063* (.031)	—	-1.365** (.160)	-1.369*** (.159)	127.706*** (24.172)	133.591*** (24.411)
Acquired March 2006	.089** (.026)	—	-1.155** (.126)	-1.157*** (.126)	136.393*** (19.103)	135.755*** (19.280)
Acquired April 2006	.084** (.027)	—	-1.215** (.140)	-1.208*** (.140)	124.793*** (18.753)	123.153*** (18.895)
Acquired May 2006	.082** (.025)	—	-1.529** (.150)	-1.524*** (.150)	114.302*** (16.791)	119.426*** (16.909)
Acquired June 2006	.066** (.022)	—	-1.016** (.122)	-1.013*** (.122)	91.090*** (14.326)	92.643*** (14.475)
Acquired July 2006	.062** (.021)	—	-1.026** (.122)	-1.023*** (.122)	79.574*** (12.717)	84.200*** (12.839)
Acquired August 2006	.059** (.020)	—	-.841** (.119)	-.838*** (.119)	69.213*** (12.111)	73.167*** (12.233)
Acquired September 2006	.077** (.022)	—	-.679** (.126)	-.676*** (.126)	72.213*** (13.199)	76.352*** (13.335)
Acquired October 2006	.037 (.020)	—	-.434** (.108)	-.432*** (.108)	36.602* (11.133)	39.391*** (11.257)
Acquired November 2006	.021 (.019)	—	-.217* (.105)	-.215* (.105)	19.252 (10.497)	20.551 (10.632)
Year 2007 (dummy)		-1.306 (.732)				
Year 2008 (dummy)		-2.259 (1.258)				
Cumulative Days (in thousands)		3.513 (1.994)				
Cumulative days (in thousands) × referral program		-.231** (.085)				
Log(duration) × referral program				-.176 (.232)		
Constant	.154*** (.040)				66.250* (26.742)	120.949*** (26.937)
Observations	9495	28,353	9495	9495	9495	9495
R ²	.025	.350			.040	.040
Log-pseudo-likelihood			-11,715.6	-11,715.4		

* $p < .05$.

** $p < .01$.

*** $p < .001$.

^aCaptured by customer-specific fixed effects.

Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

Блок 2. «Маркетинговые коммуникации и реклама в современном бизнесе»

Прочитайте статью⁴ и сделайте ее критический анализ на русском языке.

Advertising on the internet began in the middle of the past decade, when the first banner advertisements were placed in commercial websites (*Zeff & Aronson 1999*). Although there are several forms of internet advertising, such as banners, interstitials and popup windows, banner ads are the most prevalent. Banner ads have dominated web advertising and become the standard advertising format on the internet (*Cho et al. 2001*).

Banner advertisements are rectangular displays on a web page that serve a leadin to the visitor to find out more by clicking on the banner (*Raman & Leckenby 1998*). Clicking on the banner takes the visitor from the current web page to the advertiser's web page. In this manner, banner ads are used as vehicles to bring prospective customers to a site, offering an automated link to the advertiser (*Briggs & Hollis 1997; Bellizzi 2000*). Clickable banner ads are believed to be the first gateway to entering the world of interactive electronic markets (*Shamdasani et al. 2001*).

A widely used measure for evaluating the effectiveness of banner advertising is the clickthrough rate, that is, the proportion of viewers who click on a banner to visit the advertiser's web site (*Hanson 2000*). It should be noted, however, that the advertising industry also uses alternative, well established measures of banner success, such as acquisitions, branding and image change. The attraction of the clickthrough variable lies in its behavioural nature, measurability, and that it indicates immediate interest (*Briggs & Hollis 1997*). It is worth noting that the pricing of internet advertising is often based on clickthrough rates because advertisers demand results oriented pricing and question the pricing model of traditional media, which is based on mere impressions; rather, they insist on paying for direct response results (*Hofacker & Murphy 1998; Cho et al. 2001*). It has been suggested that there is an explicit shift in online advertising strategy that favours deriving behavioural response from selected target audiences over providing exposure to many audience groups (*Yoon & Kim 2001*). These trends increase the importance of a banner's ability to induce direct responses and emphasise the problem of effective creative design and media planning (*Shamdasani et al. 2001*).

Tracking direct response results on the internet is simple since response information is electronically captured and reported through the ad serving process as well as by tracking visitors' activity once they have reached a site. In this manner, direct response data offer a great opportunity to empirically establish ad effect relationships (*Broussard 2000*).

However, clickthrough rates vary owing to various and largely unknown factors related to design, execution and context of banner campaigns. Therefore, knowing about such determinants can help to improve campaign performance.

In the early days of the internet, it was suggested that creative characteristics and, in particular, animation, cryptic messages, and clichs such as 'click now' or 'free' tend to increase response rates (*Hofacker & Murphy 1998*). Now, the effectiveness of such simple ways on improving response rates is questionable, since over time the internet audience has gained considerable experience of banner ads. Perhaps more importantly, the impact of other design and media factors of the banner campaign remains empirically unexplored.

Despite the importance of the topic, very little empirical work has been done on the structure of banner effectiveness and, in particular, the effects of advertising related factors. The purpose of this study is to consider the effects of particular creative and media factors on the effectiveness of banner ads, drawing upon real response data. The paper is organised as follows. The subsequent section presents the dataset and develops an analytical framework for the empirical identification of banner effectiveness relationships. This is followed by analysis and discussion of the findings. Implications for advertising practitioners and researchers are considered next. A concluding section summarises the paper.

⁴ Статья составлена по: Baltas G. Determinants of Internet Advertising Effectiveness. An empirical study. // *International Journal of Market Research*, Vol. 45, No. 4, 2003.

Research methodology

Data on objective characteristics and actual response rates (see Table 1) were collected from a sample of 259 banner ads. The data were kindly made available by the 18 advertising and media agencies that agreed to participate in the study. This convenience sampling procedure was used for two reasons. First, there is no sampling frame (i.e. a comprehensive listing) of banner ads from which to draw a standard random sample. Second, given the highly proprietary nature of such data, it is quite impractical, if not impossible, to ensure data availability for the elements of a standard random sample. Therefore, we had to be more modest in our objectives and adopt an implementable sampling approach. The variables are presented in Table 1.

To examine the effect of creative and media factors on banner effectiveness I estimated a regression model in which the actual clickthrough rate is the dependent variable and ad characteristics are the explanatory variables. However, product category may influence consumers' propensity to interact with the banner ad (*Shamdasi et al. 2001*). Therefore, intrinsic intercategory heterogeneity in clickthrough rates should be isolated in order to identify the net effects of specific banner characteristics. Let me illustrate this point. The standard regression model assumes, in essence, that the effects of unobserved category differences are independent of observed response rates and randomly distributed. As alluded to earlier, this may not be a realistic approximation of the empirical structure because it assumes away differences among categories. To deal with intercategory heterogeneity, I generalised the standard regression model to accommodate category specific effects by means of an analysis of covariance model. More formally, the generalised regression model takes the form

$$y_i = a_m + \sum_j \beta_j \chi_{ij} + u_i$$

where y_i is the actual clickthrough rate of the i ad, β_j is the coefficient of the j ad characteristic, χ_{ij} is the j characteristics of the i ad, a_m represents effects barring to category m and u_i is a standard random term accounting for unexplained variation in observed response rates. The model can be estimated as a random effects regression model for panel data (*Greene 1997*). The estimation procedure is available in the last version of Limdep, which is specialised econometric software for panel and qualitative variables (*Greene 1999*).

Results and discussion

The generalised model (1) is applied to detect the effects of creative and media factors. Estimates for the effects of creative factors are reported in Table 2. The Rsquared value of 0.24 suggests that the model is highly effective in explaining differences in clickthrough rates using creative characteristics.

The coefficients in Table 2 reveal several interesting patterns. The positive coefficient of the banner size variable (BSIZE) indicates that bigger ads are more effective in attracting attention and triggering response. Using the Interactive Advertising Bureau terminology, full banners (468 60mm or larger) are more effective than smaller types, such as half banners (234 60 mm), vertical banners (120 240 mm), and various buttontype ads (125 mm 125 mm or smaller). It seems that bigger ads are good at driving up direct response (*cf. Gotham 2002*).

The number of words variable (MLENGTH) has a negative coefficient suggesting that lengthy messages reduce direct response. It appears that concise messages stimulate consumer clicking. Long messages involve paying close attention, which visitors are rarely inclined to do (*Krishnamurthy 2000*).

The parameters of the number of frames variable (FRAMES) yield a similar implication. The negative sign indicates that as the number of frames increases the clickthrough rate falls. From a theoretical viewpoint, long messages and multiple frames increase ad complexity. However, complexity can have a negative effect on the attitude toward the ad and the response to the ad (*Stevenson et al. 2000; Bruner & Kumar 2001*). As a practical matter, the number of frames can also slow down page loading times. For example, commercial research by

BannerTips.com has suggested that a multiframe banner can have a lower clickthrough ratio than a visually similar non animated banner due to longer download time. Many visitors will never get a chance to see a slow loading multiframe banner because they have clicked off to some other page before the banner even appears.

A significant negative effect is also found for the company or brand logo (LOGO) variable. It has been suggested that the practice of running 'unbranded' banners may yield higher clickthrough rates (*Briggs & Hollis 1997*), however, there is no previous research on the role of this factor in banner ads. One may reasonably suggest that banners displaying logos fail to generate interest because the viewer knows what the banner is about. Only people primarily interested in the specific brand or company will click on such ads. The rest of the audience may simply be uninterested or think that they already know everything and so not click on the ad.

Of equal interest are the three variables regarding widespread message tactics (i.e. CLICH, PUZZLE and PROMOTION) that are not significant. In the early days of internet advertising, stereotypical phrases or words (clichs) were used as a means to induce consumer response. In the light of the present empirical evidence, however, it seems that such approaches are not effective. In a similar vein, enigmatic messages do not have significant effects on the response rates of the examined banner ads. Perhaps more importantly, promotional incentives are found to be unable to produce superior consumer response. We know that most people and, in particular internet users, have become expert, sceptical processors of advertisements; the old attention generating tools seem to be less effective at the present stage of internet development (*Briggs 2001; Gallagher et al. 2001*).

We now turn to consider the effects of media and execution factors on banner effectiveness, the results are reported in Table 3. More specifically, the parameter of the campaign length variable (TIME) is both negative and significant, indicating that audience response falls over time. This is a quite intuitive relation because it seems unlikely that people would visit a site and choose to click the same advertisement repeatedly. Instead, it seems more likely that internet users would choose the banner once, if at all (*Stevenson et al. 2000*). It has been suggested that people tend to click on banners during the early stage of the campaign and that, over time, response rates decline significantly (*Hofacker & Murphy 1998; Broussard 2000*). This important pattern has been empirically detected in the present research.

Another important variable is the number of sites that host the banner ad. The positive and significant coefficient of the SITES variable suggests an inverse relationship between number of sites and ad effectiveness. Dispersion is indicative of less careful selection of internet advertising vehicles, and consequently imprecise targeting of specific audiences. This relationship explains the current trend that favours deriving behavioural response from a small number of selected target audiences over providing exposure to many audience groups (*Yoon & Kim 2001*).

The media cost of banner ads is usually measured by the cost per thousand impressions (CPM). For purposes of empirical implementation, the variable has been divided by one thousand to reflect cost per impression. Table 3 reports a positive and significant parameter of the CPM variable, indicating that relatively less expensive media produce better response rates. A similar relation is identified between ad production cost (PCOST) and clickthrough rates. Cost increases because of high quality human and technical input and thorough processes. In conclusion, the results reveal an explicit tradeoff between the overall cost of the ad and its response generating ability.

Finally, an interesting negative relation is found between the simultaneous use of traditional media and the effectiveness of banner ads. It has been speculated that the presence of offline media can boost the performance of internet ads (*Broussard 2000*). In the light of the present empirical evidence, however, it is apparent that the concurrent use of offline media decreases response rates. It seems therefore that people would exhibit less interest in a campaign that they are already aware of.

Implications

The results offer several directions for the design and execution of effective banner campaigns. The creative characteristics of effective banners are of a greater size in terms of

pixels, short messages, few frames and absence of company logos. Traditional banner message tactics are found to be incapable of affecting audience response. This stresses the importance of fresh and innovative message tactics. In principle, to distract users from the site itself, the message in the banner should appeal to their needs. The more relevant the message, the better the chance that the banner will grab the viewer's attention and stimulate response (*Strauss & Frost 2001*). The results also demonstrate that audience response falls over time. In this respect, response data require close, continuous monitoring. A reasonable policy is to cancel campaigns that from the outset fail to reach minimum target rates, since, progressively, response rates decline. The results also show that site selection is important. In particular, using a small number of selected host sites is generally more effective than dispersion. In addition, campaign cost affects effectiveness and planners should carefully consider the tradeoff between ad cost and ad effectiveness. Finally, the concurrent use of offline media decreases the effectiveness of online ads. In this respect, offline media should be used to reach offline audiences not as a means to boost the performance of banner ads.

Directions for further research

Certain limitations of the present study that provide opportunities for further research should be emphasised.

Firstly, we have examined banner effectiveness as measured by clickthrough rates. The latter is an important and well established measure of banner effectiveness, however, a single measure cannot provide an integrated picture of internet advertising. Online ads may work not only as direct marketing vehicles but also as branding tools. A banner ad can improve consumer awareness or affect attitude towards the brand (*e.g. Briggs & Hollis 1997; Brackett & Carr 2001; Dahlen 2001*). Clearly, such branding effects are not captured by direct response data.

In particular, it has been suggested that clickthrough data are unrelated to important branding success measures such as ad awareness, brand awareness, brand imagery, and intent to buy (*Briggs 2001*). Therefore, clickthrough rate is poor measurement for branding campaigns, which attempt to integrate a product's message into the consumer's consciousness so that when the time is right, the consumer is more likely to buy the product (*Briggs 2001b*).

In addition, one has to consider alternative important measures of direct response. In particular, many people are looking at acquisitions rather than clicks and cost per acquisition rather than cost per click (*Strauss & Frost 2001*). To put it another way, the findings should be interpreted with caution as they relate to a specific measure of internet advertising effectiveness, which is not indicative of every ad effect.

Secondly, it should be realised that direct response to banner ads is a complex phenomenon that is partly determined by different factors from those examined here. In this respect, it would be instructive to examine the effects of context and audience related factors in the light of actual response data.

Thirdly, cross category differences have been treated in a purely econometric manner using an analysis of covariance model to isolate intercategory heterogeneity. This technique accounts for category effects but does not measure specific category differences. In case one is interested in identifying specific category differences, an alternative research design is required that could be generated by drawing a stratified sample and modelling variation of clickthrough rates over categories.

Concluding comments

This empirical study investigated effects of banner characteristics on audience response. The results provided some empirically determined insights into the structure of advertising effectiveness on the internet. The relationships detected here offered several practical implications for the effective creation and execution of banner campaigns. As is always the case in empirical work, there is considerable scope for further research and thus some important extensions have been suggested. The structure of advertising effectiveness on the internet is a new and largely unexplored issue, about which too little is currently known.

Table 1

Variables

Variable name	Description	Explanation
Creative factors		
Bsize	Banner size	Dummy for full banner 480 × 60mm or larger
Mlength	Message length	Number of words in the message
frames	Number of frames	Nonzero values indicate animation
Promotion	Promotional incentives	Discount or gift incentive to respond
CLICHÉ	Use of stereotypical action phrases	Message includes phrases such as 'click here' and 'click now'
PUZZLE	Enigmatic message	Banner displays enigmatic message
LOGO	Company or brand logo	Banner displays company or brand logo
Media factors		
TIME	Campaign length	Duration of banner campaign
SITES	Media dispersion	How many sites host the banner ad
CPM	Cost per thousand impressions	Media cost of banner ad
PCOST	Log of banner production cost	Cost of developing the banner ad
OFFLINE	Offline media	Concurrent use of offline media

Table 2

Results for creative factors

Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error
Bsize	0.490*	0.251
Mlength	-0.107*	0.029
frames	-0.179*	0.045
Promotion	-0.174	0.199
CLICHÉ	-0.142	0.207
PUZZLE	-0.076	0.206
LOGO	-0.973*	0.233
R-squared	0.24	

*significant at the 0.05 level

Results for media factors

Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error
TIME	-0.040*	0.019
SITES	-0.028*	0.013
CPM	0.013*	0.002
PCOST	0.481*	0.192
OFFLINE	-0.436*	0.155
R-squared	0.20	

*significant at the 0.05 level

Questions for your consideration

1. What are the key problems discussed in the research article?
2. Which author statements concerning Internet as ad carrier do you agree (and disagree) with?
3. What other methods of empirical data analysis you could suggest to deal with the problems posed by the author?
4. Do you agree with author interpretation of the advertising effectiveness? What is your understanding of advertising effectiveness concept?
5. Why the CPM indicator is widely used in advertising media analysis? What other advertising rates parameters are used in advertising practice?
6. What communication theories and advertising models do you find relevant to describe marketing activities using Internet?
7. What opportunities for brand promotion are being opened for practitioners with the processes of digitization, convergence Internet, TV and other media?

Блок 3. «Стратегическое и корпоративное управление»

Прочитайте статью⁵ и сделайте ее критический анализ на русском языке.

I. Introduction

The balanced scorecard has been heralded as one of the most significant developments in management accounting (*Atkinson et al. 1997*)⁶. This management tool has evolved considerably over the past two decades. Early writings on the balanced scorecard emphasized the importance of using multiple measures to provide a balanced perspective of firms' performance, and established one of the most salient features of balanced scorecards: the grouping of measures into four distinct categories of performance (financial, customer, internal processes, and learning and growth) (*see Kaplan & Norton 1992*). More recently, balanced scorecard proponents have focused on the need to tie measures together into a causal chain of performance, and to test the validity of these hypothesized effects to guide the development of strategy. Kaplan and Norton (2001) argue that one of the primary benefits of the balanced scorecard is its use in gauging the success of strategy.

Archival and field research has yielded mixed results on the benefits of balanced scorecard usage for strategy-evaluation purposes. One potential factor limiting the benefits of scorecard usage in some settings is the propensity of decision makers' reasoning to be influenced by their motivations. Research in psychology suggests that this "motivated reasoning" begins with the manner in which evidence is assembled and evaluated (*Kunda 1990; Gilovich 1991; Ditto & Lopez 1992; Ditto et al. 1998; Dawson et al. 2002; Ditto et al. 2003; Dawson et al. 2006a*). Settings where evaluators have preferences to arrive at certain conclusions, and where information is noisy, ambiguous, or complex, provide fertile ground for motivated-reasoning processes, because evaluators can more easily rely primarily on preference-consistent information while maintaining an appearance of objectivity. A balanced-scorecard environment provides just such a setting, with emphasis on the use of multiple (noisy) measures of performance, and where evaluators often have an active role in the selection of strategy. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of involvement in the selection of strategy on subsequent evaluation of that strategy using the balanced scorecard, and investigate features of the scorecard implementation process that can mitigate the impact of strategy-selection involvement.

This paper uses an experiment to examine whether managers involved in the selection of a strategic initiative will succumb to motivated reasoning when using a balanced scorecard to evaluate the success of the new initiative. I further investigate methods to help offset the impact of motivated reasoning on strategy evaluation. First, I examine whether simply framing the scorecard as a causal chain, rather than merely as a balanced set of measures, can help limit the effect of motivated reasoning on strategy evaluations. If the scorecard is framed as a causal chain, managers may be less susceptible to motivated reasoning because success becomes more clearly defined: an initiative must not only improve the measure on which it should have a direct effect (such as customer satisfaction), but must also improve the measures on which it should have an indirect effect (such as sales). This more structured view may reduce managers' latitude to perceive unsuccessful initiatives they selected as successful (*Kunda 1990*).

Next, I investigate whether managerial involvement in measure selection increases the effectiveness with which a causal-chain framing of the scorecard offsets tendencies to assess outcomes too favorably. Managers with involvement in measure selection will be motivated to perceive a measure they selected as a good one (*Kunda 1990*). If the scorecard is framed as a causal chain, managers will want to see that the measure they selected is a good predictor of

⁵ Статья составлена по: Tayler W.B. The Balanced Scorecard as a Strategy-Evaluation Tool: The Effects of Implementation Involvement and a Causal-Chain Focus. // *The Accounting Review*, May 2010, Vol. 85, No. 3, pp. 1095-1117.

⁶ A recent study by Bain & Company indicates that 53 percent of firms worldwide use the balanced scorecard, including 61 percent of large firms and 49 percent of firms in North America (*Rigby & Bilodeau 2009*).

performance further down the causal chain, increasing attention to these linkages. If managers cannot find sufficient evidence to support their preferred belief regarding the measure they were involved in selecting, this may also cast doubt on the quality of the strategic initiative they selected, which was expected to impact performance further down the causal chain.

In my experiment, MBA students with a basic understanding of balanced-scorecard concepts play the role of managers who are evaluating a new strategic initiative at their firm. Participants are provided with balanced-scorecard data upon which to base their analyses, and answer questions regarding the success of the initiative and the process they used to perform their assessment. In all experimental settings, scorecard data indicate that the new initiative has a strong effect on customer satisfaction, but that neither the initiative nor customer satisfaction has an effect on financial performance. This structure provides latitude for participants to form conclusions consistent with their preferences. Participants with motivation to perceive the strategic initiative as successful can focus on the strong effects of their initiative on customer satisfaction and deemphasize or ignore the lack of effects on financial performance.

The experimental design consists of two levels of scorecard framing crossed with three levels of scorecard implementation involvement (creating six between-subjects conditions). The scorecard is framed either in the traditional “four groups” format, which groups performance measures into the four classic scorecard perspectives (*Kaplan & Norton 1992*), or in a “causal chain” format, which emphasizes hypothesized causal linkages (*Kaplan & Norton 1996b, 2000*). The three levels of scorecard implementation involvement are cumulative in nature, with some participants making no decisions regarding strategic initiatives or scorecard measures, some selecting the strategic initiative to be pursued but not the scorecard measures, and some selecting both the initiative and a measure of performance tied to that initiative.

Consistent with prior research on motivated reasoning, results indicate that managers who are involved in initiative selection are more likely to recommend rolling out the initiative firm-wide, holding constant initiative performance. Results further suggest that merely framing the balanced scorecard as a causal-chain is not sufficient to diminish motivated-reasoning processes, even in this simple setting. However, framing the scorecard as a causal chain and involving managers in measure selection mitigates the effects of motivated reasoning related to managers’ involvement in initiative selection.

Debriefing data help to establish the process underlying these effects by providing insight into what information participants emphasized in their evaluations. Participants with greater motivation to perceive the initiative as successful (those who are involved in the selection of the initiative) place less emphasis on scorecard data indicating otherwise than participants who are not involved in initiative selection. This differential focus on preference-inconsistent information partially mediates the primary results of the paper.

These results contribute to research on the balanced scorecard in multiple ways. First, the study demonstrates the effects of a causal view of the balanced scorecard in a strategy-evaluation task. Proponents of the balanced scorecard emphasize the importance of tying performance measures to strategy and hypothesizing a testable causal chain of performance (in part, to ensure that important indirect results follow the more direct successes (*Kaplan & Norton 2001*)). However, empirical evidence suggests that firms often do not explicitly state causal chains (*Ittner & Larcker 2003; Malina & Selto 2004*). My study provides evidence that a causal view of the scorecard, in conjunction with involvement in scorecard measure selection, helps overcome psychological forces that are likely to limit the effectiveness of the scorecard.

Second, this study provides insights on the balanced-scorecard implementation process. Scorecard proponents have begun to address issues that arise when trying to implement scorecards, such as which parties should be involved with the selection of scorecard measures (*Frigo & Krumwiede 2000; Niven 2002; Kaplan & Norton 2006*). Scorecard proponents often focus on managerial “buy-in”, suggesting that involvement in measure selection by those affected by the scorecard will increase the impact of the scorecard (*e.g., see Cokins 2005*). My study suggests that another important benefit derived from increased managerial involvement in the selection of scorecard measures is that it counters motivated reasoning, and thereby reduces the likelihood that managers will view unsuccessful strategies as successful.

Third, this study provides insights on the use of the scorecard for strategy-evaluation purposes. Scorecard proponents have emphasized that the scorecard is not just for performance evaluation, but is also a tool for developing and evaluating strategy (*Kaplan & Norton 2000, 2001; Niven 2002; Buytendijk et al. 2004; Kaplan & Norton 2004a, 2004b, 2006*). However, most prior balanced-scorecard research has focused solely on managers' use of the scorecard for performance evaluations. My study focuses on the scorecard as a tool for defining and refining strategy.

Finally, my study contributes to psychological research on motivated reasoning by demonstrating how the effects of motivated reasoning can be diminished through the introduction of additional motivations. This "fighting fire with fire" approach essentially accepts motivated reasoning as given, but adds motivations through adjusting decision-maker involvement in the task to help balance prior motivations to arrive at certain conclusions (*see Bonner 2007*) for a discussion of the importance of investigating the effects of conflicting motivators in accounting).

The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides the background and hypotheses. Section III describes the experimental design and related procedures. Section IV discusses results. Section V summarizes results and discusses implications, limitations, and directions for future research.

II. Background and Hypotheses

The Balanced Scorecard

Early writings on the balanced scorecard focused on the ability of multiple measures to provide a more balanced perspective of firms' performance (*Kaplan & Norton 1992*). Under this view, the four scorecard categories (financial, customer, internal processes, and learning and growth) keep managers from focusing solely on financial-performance measures. The majority of early research on the balanced-scorecard has focused on the "balance" of the scorecard, investigating how managers use scorecard measures to evaluate performance (*Lipe & Salterio 2000; Lipe & Salterio 2002; Ittner et al. 2003b; Banker et al. 2004; Libby et al. 2004; Roberts et al. 2004; Dilla & Steinbart 2005*)

Recently, scorecard proponents have shifted their emphasis from balance to strategy, arguing that the scorecard serves as a tool for defining strategic objectives and communicating them throughout the organization, identifying initiatives to achieve those objectives, and evaluating whether those objectives have been achieved (*Kaplan & Norton 2000, 2001; Niven 2002; Buytendijk et al. 2004; Kaplan & Norton 2004a, 2004b, 2006*). 2 Scorecards are tied to strategy through the "strategy map" (*Kaplan & Norton 2000*), also called a "value driver map" (*Ittner & Larcker 2003*). Strategy maps translate expected results into testable hypotheses to enhance "strategic learning," the process of using the strategically aligned scorecard measures as a way of measuring the success of strategy (*Kaplan & Norton 2001*). If linkages in the hypothesized causal chain of performance prove spurious, the scorecard, or the strategy that drives it, can be adjusted.

In conjunction with scorecard proponents' shift in emphasis from balance to strategy, research on the balanced scorecard has begun to look at the use of the balanced scorecard in strategy development (*Malina & Selto 2001; Ittner et al. 2003a; Ittner & Larcker 2003; Campbell et al. 2008*). Malina and Selto (2001) provide field evidence indicating that scorecards do not always have explicitly defined causal linkages. Ittner and Larcker (2003) corroborate this finding with survey data showing that less than 30 percent of firms that use the balanced scorecard have explicitly-stated causal chains, and that when strategy maps are used, managers often fail to test the hypothesized causal chain. In their study, only 21 percent of firms with explicitly-stated causal chains actually test the validity of effects suggested by the causal chains. Campbell et al. (2008) provide field evidence from one firm that appears to have successfully tested the hypothesized causal chain and adjusted its strategy accordingly.

Further, balanced-scorecard implementation issues have received increased emphasis in recent years (*e.g., see Niven 2002; Kaplan & Norton 2006*). Viewed narrowly, scorecard implementation involves (among other things) the selection of measures, the collection of

scorecard-related data, the formatting of scorecard reports, and the dissemination of scorecard information. When the scorecard is viewed as a tool for defining, executing, and measuring strategy, scorecard implementation also involves the allocation of decision rights regarding strategy selection and plans for achieving strategic objectives. Kaplan and Norton (1996a) recommend that scorecard development be a joint effort of unit managers and upper management. Cokins (2005) suggests that manager involvement in scorecard implementation generates “buy-in and ownership of the scorecard and key performance indicators”, which will increase the impact of the scorecard on the organization.

Though scorecard proponents have begun to address scorecard implementation, little academic research has been done on balanced-scorecard implementation issues. However, limited empirical evidence indicates that manager involvement in scorecard implementation varies between firms. Kaplan and Norton (2001) cite evidence of heavy involvement in initiative and measure selection on the part of unit managers; but Malina and Selto (2001) provide evidence suggesting that some firms impose scorecards on units without seeking input from those affected. Lipe and Salterio (2000) point out that scorecard-related judgments may be influenced by evaluator involvement in the implementation process.

Motivated Reasoning

Prior research in accounting has demonstrated that judgments tend to be influenced by motivations to arrive at particular conclusions. Cuccia et al. (1995), Cloyd and Spilker (1999), and Kadous et al. (2008) provide evidence that tax professionals’ evaluation of evidence and information search are driven in part by their clients’ preferred conclusions. Other studies have focused on the effect of client preferences on auditors, demonstrating the biasing effects of auditors’ motivations on their judgments (*Hackenbrack & Nelson 1996; Bazerman et al. 1997; Bazerman et al. 2002; Phillips 2002; Beeler & Hunton 2002; Wilks 2002; Kadous et al. 2003; Han et al. 2006; Moore et al. 2006; Nelson 2006*). These studies suggest the motivation to arrive at clients’ preferred conclusions is one of the reasons “why good accountants do bad audits” (*Bazerman et al. 2002*). Additional studies have demonstrated this bias also persists among analysts (*Hunton & McEwen 1997*), investors (*Hales 2006; Seybert & Bloomfield 2009; Thayer 2009*), and management accountants (*Boiney et al. 1997; Bloomfield & Luft 2006*).

Research in psychology has helped clarify the process behind the effects of motivations on judgments, showing that individuals tend to evaluate and interpret data in ways consistent with their preferences. This pervasive tendency has come to be known as “motivated reasoning” (*Kunda 1990*).

Gilovich (1991) proposes that motivated reasoning is driven by the way in which evaluators approach evidence. When encountering a disagreeable proposition, people tend to ask “Must I believe this?” and pursue information in an attempt to disconfirm or cast doubt on the validity of the bad news (*Ditto & Lopez 1992; Ditto et al. 1998; Dawson et al. 2002; Ditto et al. 2003; Dawson et al. 2006a*). This high standard for acceptance leads to a more thorough information search and a stringent interpretation of evidential weaknesses, thus increasing the likelihood that an individual will find and accept evidence disconfirming the bad news. However, when encountering an agreeable proposition, people ask “Can I believe this?” and pursue information in an attempt to validate the good news. This more permissive acceptance standard allows for a more superficial evaluation of evidence (*Ditto et al. 1998; Dawson et al. 2006a; Dawson et al. 2006b*), biased compilation of data (*Lord et al. 1979; Dunning et al. 1989*), and earlier truncation of information search (*Ditto & Lopez 1992; Ditto et al. 1998; Ditto et al. 2003; Dawson et al. 2006a*). However, the acceptance of preference-consistent information is constrained by the reasonableness of the data (*Kunda 1990*). Even when succumbing to motivated reasoning, decision-makers attempt to maintain an “illusion of objectivity” (*Pyszczynski & Greenberg 1987*) by “attempt[ing] to be rational and to construct a justification of their desired conclusion that would persuade a dispassionate observer” (*Kunda 1990*).

A number of institutional features of the balanced scorecard produce fertile ground for motivated-reasoning processes. A common criticism of the balanced scorecard revolves around its emphasis on nonfinancial performance measures, which are typically more noisy, subjective,

and ambiguous than traditional financial measures (*Ittner & Larcker 2003*). This decrease in precision and clarity provides managers with additional latitude in their interpretations of evidence. Further, even the most basic of performance-measurement systems provides multiple forms of performance feedback. The balanced scorecard is no exception. A manager in search of preference-consistent information has multiple potential sources of agreeable data. Once a reasonable amount of supportive data are accumulated, managers are likely to stop searching, disregard disconfirming evidence, or completely overlook or reinterpret conflicting data.

Managers who use balanced-scorecard feedback to evaluate a strategic initiative they selected would prefer to discover that their selected initiative is successful. Holding constant actual scorecard performance, if scorecard evidence is ambiguous or sufficiently complex or noisy to allow different assessments of the success of the strategic initiative, managers with different preferences will likely reach different conclusions. Thus, I predict that managers who are involved in the selection of a strategic initiative interpret balanced-scorecard data as indicating that the initiative is more successful than do managers who are not involved in the selection of the initiative.

H1: Managers using a balanced scorecard to analyze the success of a questionable initiative will perceive the initiative as more successful if they were involved in the selection of the initiative.

Causal Chain

One potential method for reducing motivated reasoning among balanced-scorecard evaluators is to increase emphasis on the hypothesized causal chain. Framing the scorecard as a causal chain may decrease motivated reasoning by focusing managers' attention on the need to test hypothesized linkages between scorecard components in making an assessment of the success of a strategic initiative, thereby reducing the latitude managers have to reasonably perceive data in a manner consistent with their preferences (*Kunda 1990*). Additionally, providing managers with a predicted causal model may reduce the cognitive complexity of evaluation tasks where multiple measures of performance are available for use (*Morecroft et al. 2002; Malina & Selto 2004; Krishnan et al. 2005*). This may reduce ambiguity in feedback and restrict managers' ability to see only what they want to see in the data. Further, when managers understand all of the anticipated cause-and-effect linkages that follow from a strategic initiative, they may be less persuaded by individual instances of apparent success (e.g., an increase in customer satisfaction) when other hypothesized effects do not follow (e.g., an increase in financial performance). Because decision makers who succumb to motivated reasoning are constrained in their acceptance of good news (and their rejection of bad news) by their ability to maintain an "illusion of objectivity" (*Pyszczynski & Greenberg 1987; Kunda 1990*), a clearly defined causal chain may limit evaluators' ability to arrive at a preference-consistent conclusion if linkages deriving from an initiative they were involved in selecting prove spurious.

H2a: Managers involved in initiative selection will be less likely to perceive a questionable initiative as successful if the scorecard is framed as a causal chain of performance.

Involvement in Measure Selection

A major aspect of the balanced-scorecard implementation process is the selection of performance measures. Niven (2002) calls scorecard measures the "centerpiece of the scorecard system." Frigo and Krumwiede (2000) emphasize the importance of involving middle management in measure selection, noting that "departments know their key performance measures and key success factors better than anyone else ... and, therefore, they are in the best position to develop their own scorecards".

Just as managers who are involved in the selection of an initiative are motivated to perceive the initiative as successful, managers who are involved in measure selection are motivated to perceive that their choice of a performance measure is a good one. With a causal-chain framing, one important feature of a good measure is that it can be used as a predictor of performance further down the causal chain. Thus, involvement in measure selection should increase attention to these causal linkages. For example, if a manager who believes that customer

satisfaction is causally linked to financial performance elects to monitor customer satisfaction through a measure of customer retention, the manager would prefer to discover that increased customer retention leads to improvements in financial performance, and will look for this relationship. Thus, the motivated reasoning generated by manager involvement in measure selection has the potential to mitigate the effects of managers' motivated reasoning tied to their involvement in initiative selection by influencing the body of evidence evaluated by managers. Many initiatives have strong direct effects on performance but fail to drive performance further down the causal chain. For example, an initiative can improve customer satisfaction (a direct effect) without increasing financial performance (the ultimate, indirect goal). If managers in this setting are motivated to perceive an initiative they selected as successful, but are also motivated to find that the performance they opted to measure drives financial performance (for example), their evaluation of the evidence is more likely to uncover the (disappointing) disconnect in the causal chain.

Managers succumbing to motivated reasoning are constrained in their ability to arrive at preference-consistent conclusions by the availability of sufficient evidence to reasonably support such an inference (*Pyszczynski & Greenberg 1987; Kunda 1990*). Thus, the inability to support a preferred belief of a causal link between the selected measure and performance further down the causal chain will cast doubt not only on the quality of the measure, but also on the viability of an initiative that was expected to affect performance further down the causal chain. Importantly, this is only true if managers have an understanding of the causal chain and managers are motivated to evaluate evidence in light of this tool because of their involvement in measures selection.

H2b: Managers involved in initiative selection will be less likely to perceive a questionable initiative as successful if the scorecard is framed as a causal chain and managers are involved in measure selection.

III. Method

Task and Design

Participants played the role of managers over Paladin Pizza, a fictitious pizza chain (hereafter referred to as the "firm"), whose task was to use balanced-scorecard data to evaluate a new strategic initiative to determine whether that initiative should be rolled out firm-wide. The experimental materials provided all participants with background information for the firm and indicated that the firm was considering two different initiatives for implementation: 1) the "side order strategy," in which stores give a free side order for every five pizzas purchased, and 2) the "quality ingredients strategy," in which stores use high-quality ingredients (relative to current quality) for pizzas. Participants were also told that the firm was considering two different measures relating to the new initiative: 1) the "customer survey score", which is based on a customer survey measure of customer intentions to return to order pizza, and 2) the "returning customer score", which is based on the actual number of return customers (based on credit card data).

The experiment crossed two types of scorecard framing with three levels of scorecard implementation involvement. To manipulate scorecard framing, participants in the "four groups" (FG) scorecard-framing setting received background information that described the scorecard as being composed of four categories of performance (financial, customer, internal processes, and learning and growth), and participants in the "causal chain" (CC) scorecard-framing setting received background information that expanded on this description, emphasizing hypothesized cause-and-effect relationships between scorecard components. To reinforce the written description of the scorecard-framing manipulation, background information also provided a graphical depiction of the four groups or casual chain, similar to Banker et al. (2004).

Scorecard implementation involvement was manipulated at three levels. Participants in the "low involvement" condition received case materials that presented the two initiatives under consideration, followed by a sentence indicating that top management had decided to pursue the "quality ingredients strategy". Next, case materials presented participants with the two measures under consideration, followed by a sentence indicating that the accounting department had

decided to use the “returning customer score”. This “low involvement” condition provides a baseline setting where participants make judgments absent involvement in scorecard implementation. Thus, judgments in this setting are not affected by motivated reasoning tied to involvement in the selection of the strategic initiatives or scorecard measures.

Participants in the “initiative selection involvement” condition received identical information as the “low involvement” participants, except that following the presentation of the two initiatives under consideration, case materials indicated that the final decision regarding which strategic initiative to pursue was theirs. Participants were then asked to select which of the strategies they believed the firm should pursue by placing a checkmark next to their choice and providing a brief explanation for their selection.

Participants in the “initiative and measure selection involvement” condition received identical information as the “initiative selection involvement” participants, except that following the presentation of the two measures under consideration, case materials indicated that that the final decision regarding which measure to implement was theirs. Participants were then asked to select which of the measures they believed the firm should use by placing a checkmark next to their choice and providing a brief explanation for their selection.

Procedure

Participants began the session by filling out an informed-consent form. They then read brief instructions and were directed to open an envelope containing case materials. Participants then read background information for the firm and information regarding the initiatives and measures under consideration (with some participants selecting their preferred initiative and/or measure, depending on the scorecard-implementation-involvement condition to which they had been randomly assigned).

Next, case materials directed participants to open another envelope containing background information on the balanced scorecard for the firm. Case materials directed participants to one envelope in the “low involvement” condition, but directed participants in the “initiative selection involvement” condition to open one of two envelopes (based on their initiative selection), and directed participants in the “initiative and measure selection involvement” condition to open one of four envelopes (based on their initiative and measure selections), so that the scorecard-component labels reflected participants’ actual scorecard-component choices. However, the background information contained in all envelopes and scorecard-implementation-involvement conditions was held constant, varying only in the labels applied to the scorecard components to be consistent with the initiative or measure selected (e.g., a participant who selected the “returning customer score” would see this label reflected on the scorecard, rather than “customer survey score”). For simplicity, only the customer perspective had a stated objective (“delight the customer”) beyond that implied by the perspective title and associated measures. Also, for simplicity, each perspective had only one measure of performance.

After reading background information regarding the firm’s scorecard, participants received balanced-scorecard data from 14 restaurants. To avoid a feedback confound, scorecard data were identical regardless of experimental condition, initiative choice, or measure choice (aside from the labels applied to the specific scorecard components). Scorecard data for an entire calendar year following initiative implementation were presented, along with results as a percentage of the previous year’s results. Participants were told that the new initiative was implemented on a trial basis at only 7 of the 14 restaurants and that “strategy consultants have indicated that any effects of the new strategy will be visible well within the first year of implementation”.

After reviewing the balanced-scorecard data, participants were asked to rate the success of the new initiative on a scale of 0 to 100. Because no definition of “success” was provided in the study, participants were also asked the less-ambiguous question of how likely they would be to recommend rolling out the new initiative in the remainder of the restaurants (on a scale of 0 to 100). Participants then responded to debriefing and demographic questions.

Participants

Students in an MBA-level management accounting course at a Business Week top-20 MBA program participated in the study as part of an in-class exercise. Prior to data collection, participants had all participated in class sessions dealing with the use of management-accounting data in decision making, and had been exposed to the balanced scorecard and some of its basic features (e.g., the division of performance measures into four perspectives). Participants were not taught in class about cause-and-effect relationships among scorecard components until after they had taken part in the experiment. Thus, participants represented an ideal subject pool for the current study due to their limited exposure to some of the specific features of the balanced scorecard (specifically, strategy maps), the provision of which was manipulated in the experiment. This approach follows a tradition of using classroom instruction to control for knowledge (*Butt 1988; Nelson 1993; Nelson et al. 1995; Bonner et al. 1996; Bonner et al. 1997; Nelson & Tayler 2007*).

In all, 135 participants provided data during three successive sections of the same accounting course. Three participants opened the wrong envelope (based on the initiative and/or measure selection they checked), meaning that these participants received data for a different initiative or measure than the one they selected, potentially contaminating the scorecard-implementation-involvement manipulation. Thus, data from these participants are omitted from analyses, leaving 132 independent observations. On average, participants had 5.3 years of work experience and were 28.4 years old. Sixty percent of the participants were male.

IV. Conclusion

This paper reports the results of an experiment that shows that the combination of involving managers in the selection of scorecard measures and framing the balanced scorecard as a causal chain can mitigate optimistic assessments of strategies. When managers use balanced-scorecard data to evaluate the success of a strategic initiative that they were involved in selecting, managers perceive the initiative as more successful than managers who were not involved in the initiative-selection process. However, managers who are also involved in measure selection and who are provided the predicted causal chain of performance appear less affected by their involvement in initiative selection when assessing the effectiveness of the initiative. These results highlight the importance of a causal-chain framing of the scorecard, which balanced-scorecard proponents emphasize but practitioners often fail to implement, as well as potential benefits of manager involvement in measure selection.

I find no evidence that simply framing the balanced scorecard as a causal chain is sufficient to overcome managers' motivated reasoning in a strategy-evaluation task. This non-effect suggests that, even in this simple setting, merely framing the scorecard as a causal-chain does not provide enough guidance to overcome motivated reasoning. It seems unlikely that it would do so in more realistic settings, in which greater complexity would allow managers even more flexibility to interpret results favorably. However, involving managers in the selection of performance measures provides a strong countervailing form of motivated reasoning that, when managers have a causal-chain focus, is able to improve strategy evaluation. Future research could examine whether the effects of framing the scorecard as a causal chain (absent involvement in measure selection) are stronger when managers are provided with additional causal-chain-related data (e.g., correlations), or when managers are given additional training on using the causal chain.

Results from my experiment suggest that motivated reasoning affects managers' emphasis on preference-inconsistent information, but information acquisition and information reliance (given information acquisition) could both drive these results. Future research could more closely examine the process through which managers' motivated reasoning works, examining whether involvement in measure selection coupled with a causal-chain framing increases managers' reliance on preference-inconsistent information they encounter or their acquisition of that information. In general, arriving at a better understanding of the motivated reasoning process can help refine methods (e.g. decision aids) used to mitigate the effects of motivated reasoning in specific settings.

Results from this paper speak to the use of the balanced scorecard as a tool for engendering a longer-term focus in managers. In their early work on the subject, Kaplan and Norton (1996) suggest that emphasizing leading measures, in conjunction with lagging measures, may curtail some of the managerial myopia seen in practice, where all that counts is today's bottom line. Results indicate that manager involvement in initiative selection will lead to more emphasis on the direct results these initiatives have on leading performance indicators.

However, the results also indicate that care must be taken (through manager involvement in measure selection and framing the scorecard as a causal chain) to ensure that motivated reasoning doesn't lead to another form of myopia, where only preference-consistent evidence is examined in performance analyses.

Another take on the results is that, if judgments are impaired by initiative selection unless managers are also involved in measure selection and the scorecard is framed as a causal chain, why involve managers in initiative selection to begin with? Where this solution is an option, it is clearly worth consideration. However, due to information asymmetries, in most cases managers will have important insights regarding local needs and the wisdom of specific strategic actions (*Frigo & Krumwiede 2000*). Further, involvement in initiative selection will enhance buy-in by those charged with carrying out the strategy (*Cokins 2005*).

This study has multiple limitations. First, I investigate only two types of scorecard implementation involvement in investigating the effects of motivated reasoning on strategy-evaluation judgments. Manager involvement in the assignment of performance targets, the selection of strategic objectives, or the development of the hypothesized causal chain itself will also likely influence these judgments. Second, my experiment held constant that scorecard feedback indicated a strong direct performance link and no indirect link. Alternate feedback realizations could potentially lead to different interactions with motivated reasoning processes. Third, participants in my study make judgments individually. Thus, results may not speak accurately to settings where strategy evaluation is done in groups. Evidence from psychology suggests that results may intensify with group decision making (*e.g., see Schulz-Hardt et al. 2000*), though different levels of involvement in initiative and measure selection among group members could mitigate these effects (*Schulz-Hardt et al. 2006*). Fourth, participants in my study were students with little experience using the balanced scorecard. Though this feature of the subject pool allows for a more powerful manipulation of participants' understanding of the causal chain, it potentially calls into question inferences from the study relating to more experienced scorecard users. However, research in psychology suggests that even experts fall prey to the effects of motivated reasoning (*Cuccia et al. 1995; Hackenbrack & Nelson 1996; Cloyd & Spilker 1999; Phillips 2002; Beeler & Hunton 2002; Wilks 2002; Kadous et al. 2003; Han et al. 2006; Moore et al. 2006; Nelson 2006; Kadous et al. 2008*), suggesting that results from this study are likely generalizable to more experienced managers.

This study contributes to accounting research by providing important insights into the balanced-scorecard implementation process. Prior empirical research on the balanced scorecard has focused primarily on scorecard usage, holding constant issues relating to scorecard implementation. This study explicitly manipulates manager involvement in the scorecard implementation process, and shows how motivated reasoning impacts evaluations when managers are involved in the selection of scorecard initiatives. Further, results suggest that a causal view of the scorecard, in conjunction with involvement in scorecard measure selection, helps mitigate these effects. Finally, unlike the majority of empirical research on the balanced scorecard, this study focuses on the use of the scorecard for developing and evaluating strategy, currently a major emphasis among scorecard proponents (*e.g., see Kaplan & Norton 2001*).

Вопросы для размышления

1. В чем суть такого инструмента как «Система сбалансированных показателей», ССП (Balanced scorecard, BSC)?
2. Какие основные проблемы рассматриваются в настоящем исследовании?
3. Насколько корректна приведенная методология исследования, каковы границы ее применимости в изучении данной проблемы?
4. Прокомментируйте основные результаты исследования.

Блок 4. «Управление проектами: проектный анализ, инвестиции, технологии реализации»

Прочитайте статью⁷ и сделайте ее критический анализ на русском языке.

“I know I’m not really supposed to, but I tend to...”

Hearing such statements repeatedly from competent, experienced practitioners should provoke concern and curiosity in academics and researchers. Concern since it implies that the guidance, techniques, processes and practices codified in texts and advocated by professional bodies appear inadequate or inappropriate. This in turn suggests that the underlying theory and assumptions need to be revisited, at the very least to understand why such deviations or anomalies might occur.

Over the last 50 years, project management, as a formal management discipline, has transcended its origins in engineering, aerospace and defence and is now used in most sectors to undertake myriad change initiatives (*Morris 1994*). Traditional tools and techniques are largely drawn from operations research, have been augmented by topics such as procurement, team development, stakeholder management and project leadership. Professional associations (PMI, APM), have been formed and have grown rapidly.

The term project is now applied to the management of whole product life cycles.

The extensive use of projects has brought with it a perceived need to coordinate and balance their diverse interests and priorities, to deploy resources effectively, and to develop new capabilities and infrastructure incrementally towards the achievement of strategic goals and aspirations. Programmes and programme management in their many guises have emerged to fill this need. Programme management has been seen as a mechanism for coordinating and directing related projects (*Ferns 1991; Gray 1997*). Maylor et al. (2006) suggest that programmes and portfolios facilitate managerial sense-making and control in complex organisations where projects are the principal units of work. Others have advocated the concept of enterprise programme management – structures and processes creating tight linkages between organisational strategy and the totality of its projects and related change activity (*Williams & Parr 2004; Gaddie 2003*).

Programmes and programme management have been used to do more than coordinate projects. Acquiring, developing, maintaining and enhancing a capability has been called a program(me) in the Aerospace and Defence (US). Programme management has long been used for major systems development in IT. More recently, programmes and programme management are being cast as the management approach for bringing about societal change and organizational transformations (*OGC 2003, 2007*). P2M says that programme and programme management is a “practical capability” to respond to external changes, which allows flexibility and copes with ambiguity, complexity, uncertainty and expandability (*P2M 2008*). Pellegrinelli (1997) attributes to programmes a broader role and meaning encompassing the initiation and shaping of projects and a process for the realisation of broader strategic or tactical benefits (*Murray-Webster & Thiry 2000*).

Central to project management professional bodies’ conceptualisations of programmes, though, is the coordination of projects and related non-project activities. The PMI Body of Knowledge defines programmes as: “a group of related projects managed in a coordinated way to obtain benefits and control not available from managing them individually” (*PMI 2008a*). The APM Body of Knowledge defines programmes as the “coordinated management of related projects, which may include related business as usual activities that together achieve a beneficial change of a strategic nature for an organisation” (*APM 2006*). This latter definition taps into a growing tendency to view programmes as vehicles for bring about complex change. Some common features can be distilled from literature and normative guidance on programmes and programme management. Most of this literature uses notions and definitions of projects and

⁷ Статья составлена по: Pellegrinelli S. What’s in the name: Project or programme? // *International Journal of project management*, 29 (2011), pp. 232-240.

project management as benchmarks or comparators for describing programmes and programme management. Benefits, stakeholders, and governance are more prominent. The shift from outputs to outcomes is cited along with far greater emphasis on understanding, and actively seeking to realise, the anticipated benefits. Thus, those involved in programmes need to appreciate strategic context and drivers, and to balance ‘business as usual’ with bringing about change. The programme team needs to communicate, consult and involve those involved in or affected by the change. Programme interdependencies and factors that could affect, constrain, block or influence the outcome(s) need to be identified and addressed. The latest edition of UK’s Office of Government Commerce’s publication, *Management Successful Programmes (OGC 2007)*, positions programme management as able to accommodate high levels of complexity, ambiguity and risk, and recognises a degree of emergence: the possibility of temporal indeterminacy, reframing boundaries and re-planning.

Advocates of a distinct programme management discipline have sought to distinguish it from project management, staking out programme ‘ground’ and urging programme practitioners to approach their work differently. Sceptics argue that programme management reflects a narrow conception of project management, disconnected from the lived experiences of competent practitioners. A very large project is sometimes explicitly conceived as a programme form – the mega-projects (*e.g. P2M 2008*). Implicitly, component project is analogous to work package and project manager to work package manager. The argument put forward is that managing a mega-project has much in common with managing a programme (or another form of programme).

There has been, widespread view that programme management is part of, or an extension of, project management. The themes, concepts, language and techniques in many texts (*e.g. PMI 2008b; OGC 2007*) have large been drawn, extrapolated and adapted from project management. In the construction sector, for instance, the distinction between project management and programme management, and their relative merits, is neither fully understood nor appreciated. Sometimes the words project and programme are used interchangeably (*Stretton 2009*). So what’s in a name?

2. Labels and their implications

The naming or labelling of a phenomenon or entity, whether already ‘in existence’ or to be ‘initiated’, has profound consequences that most practitioners do not fully appreciate. The name or label invokes a set of assumptions and constructs that shape how we conceive of the phenomenon, our perception, understanding and actions.

That we may routinely construe projects as inherent features of our organisational or societal landscape, with a well established body of theory and practice, is a testament to how successfully they have been naturalised. Drawing on the work of Foucault (1972) in which he demonstrates that we create the object of study and then, over the course of time, forget that it is our creation and treat it as an external, objective aspect of reality, Hodgson and Cicmil (2006) argue that the concept of a ‘project’ and the discipline of project management have been socially constructed. Projects management’s purported capability to harness the skills and energy of otherwise (relatively) autonomous knowledge workers and deliver, in a controlled and efficient way, complex customized solutions has been valued with organisations facing rapid and unpredictable change. A functionalist, instrumental rationality dominates practitioners’ and researchers’ conceptions of project management.

The study and framing of project management within a paradigm drawn from the physical and natural sciences is understandable given project management’s intellectual roots in operations management and engineering. In many instances, it has served well and generated significant organisational and societal value. Labelling an initiative, set of activities or working arrangement as a ‘project’, implies that the prevailing project management model, namely a coherent set of prescribed processes and techniques as encapsulated in bodies of knowledge and management texts, is perceived as a reasonable approach for dealing with the challenges and needs of the situation. Such models form part of wider institutions – symbolic frameworks that guide behaviour and lend stability, regularity and meaning to social life (*Scott 2001*). Institutional elements, whether regulative, normative or cognitive-cultural, constrain as well as

guide social behaviour. Institutional isomorphism (*DiMaggio & Powell 1983*) generates certain shared expectations of behavior and performance, and discourages criticism, deviation and non-conformity. Project management standards, influenced by the physical and natural sciences' ideals of theory – explicit, universal, abstract, discrete (i.e. context independent), systematic, complete and predictable (*Flyvbjerg 2001*), risk assuming the status of universal laws rather than pedagogical aids. The dominance of this view of projects and project management deters deconstruction and critique, marginalises other voices and exerts unacknowledged coercive forces (*Hodgson & Cicmil 2006*). Even the sceptics have to believe in and apply the project management model: they may know what they are supposed to do, but...

Project management failures have been attributed to poor execution, a lack of maturity, inadequate skills and expertise or external factors, rather than a fundamental shortcoming of the project management model. Its logical coherence is difficult to challenge and its pervasiveness suggest a local shortcoming or anomaly.

Yet others, in the face of repeated failures, have pointed to an over reliance on an unquestioned rationalist paradigm (*Williams 2005; Hodgson & Cicmil 2006*). Some researchers have risen to the challenge and have adopted fundamentally different perspectives (*e.g. Cicmil 2006; Engwall 2003; Manning 2008 etc*). From an academic perspective, a greater plurality of ontological and epistemological commitments has informed research over the last two decades. In academia at least, the dominance of the rational instrumental tradition is slowly being eroded.

Nonetheless, many practitioners have absorbed, internalized and apply the functionalist, instrumental model of project management. They believe it delivers the results desired by senior managers and stakeholders. For many managers, the functionalist, instrumental model of project management is an extension of established management practices and complements other disciplines. Despite acknowledged imperfections and challenges, it has performed well. New insights are often selectively absorbed, oblivious to their ontological and epistemological bases, sometimes extending but rarely challenging their taken-for-granted views of the world. Whether the work is called a project or a programme, this model is the natural(ised) choice and is applied. In some cases this may lead to failure (*Pellegrinelli & Partington 2006*). Moreover, adherents of the functionalist, instrumental model may be expecting, advocating or even foist the norms, processes and behaviours on others. In the absence of a well articulated alternative, isomorphic pressures are difficult to resist. Project management and programme management become conflated, or any differences relegated to issues of subtle nuance or arbitrary terminology.

What are the implications of labelling an initiative a programme rather than a project?

Pellegrinelli et al. (2010) contend that projects and programmes, are part of a wider field of purposeful and structured change, but that there are qualitative differences between projects and programmes. While programme management emerged from project management it now encompasses, theories and techniques from other fields. It has evolved to cope with purposeful and structured change beyond even an inclusive, holistic conception of project management (*Morris 2009*): programmes are better at addressing contexts of change characterised by environmental uncertainty and/or ambiguity, complexity, embeddedness and sheer scale. Projects and programmes, sometimes, in choosing to define a change as a project rather than a programme, a trade-off is made between focus, control, efficiency etc. described as project characteristics, and flexibility, accommodation and staged benefits realisation, describe as programme characteristics. Where projects are components of programmes, project and programme management approaches are complements not substitutes.

Labelling an initiative as a programme, and differentiating clearly between a programme and a project, affords the opportunity to adopt a different model: a set of constructs, conceptions, given the content and context of the initiative, are more likely to be insightful, useful and supportive. The assumptions inherent in a functionalist, instrumental paradigm can be relaxed or replaced with others.

3. Towards a becoming or social constructionist model of programmes

Lineham and Kavanagh (2006) argue that a particular weakness of the prevailing conception of projects is a 'being' ontology (*Chia 1995*) that casts projects as discrete, concrete

entities. A being ontology privileges a reified conception of a project – separation, definitions, and boundaries – given form, expression and substance by the documents produced by the project team. The project is independent of the observer. ‘Becoming’ (*Chia 1995*) ontology draws attention to the social processes that initiate and sustain a project. Rather than a static construct crystallised in progress reports, a becoming ontology brings to the fore the dynamic, evolving nature of projects. Cicmil’s (2006) research has highlighted how project managers engage with organizational members to accomplish cooperative activity, cope with multiple voices and ambiguous goals. Project managers continually negotiate direction and plans, think on their feet and understand the social and political context in which they work. They experience and deal with emotions, reflect and balance the rational objectives with considerations of legitimacy and equity. Cicmil’s research offers us a counter-balance to the more conventional conception of project managers as “rational technicians”.

Notable empirical research in relation to programmes and programme management has been grounded in a becoming or related social constructionist ontology (*Berger & Luckmann 1966; Weick 1995*). For instance, competence (*Partington et al. 2005*) indicates that programme management’s leading exponents have qualitatively different conceptions of and approaches to work compared to their project counterparts. There found four qualitatively distinct conceptions (theories-in-use). Lower-order conceptions are grounded in a conventional model of project management and focused on the delivery of scope. Higher-order conceptions incorporate socio-political dimensions and the need to embrace uncertainty, ambiguity and the possibility of failure and focus on organisational or societal goals and benefits, which can transcend the scope and horizon of the programme itself.

The being ontology and instrumental rationality, deemed a weaknesses in conceptions of project management, appear even more unsuitable for an approach intended to facilitate transformational change in organisations or society (*Tsoukas & Chia 2002*).

Assuming related social constructionist ontology for programmes draws our attention to other aspects of, and presents another way of studying programmes and programme management (*Cicmil et al. 2006*). We can draw upon theories and perspective form other disciplines to ground or inform our research (*Pellegrinelli et al. 2010*). Qualitative, interpretive research methods can give us access to otherwise tacit, contextual aspects of the work of those involved in programmes.

Drawing upon and extending what we know about programme management practice, we can infer and speculate on how guidance to practitioners might change if it were grounded in a becoming or social constructionist ontology. For instance, in relation to an organisational transformation the notions of programme management might feel very different from the way they are currently described:

A programme is an organisational construct brought into existence to become a nexus of sense-making, evaluative and political processes and resource allocation decisions associated with the realisation of a change that may be vaguely defined, ambiguous and/or contested. A programme is essentially emergent in nature, inspired by a vision or outcome, yet sustained and shaped through on-going interaction and negotiation within its community of interest. Beyond its formal organizational form, a programme acts as a visible symbolic representation of (a desire for) change.

A programme is enacted by its principal players and by a diffuse range of contributors and collaborators, drawing upon their diverse expertise, conceptions and repertoires of action strategies. These outcomes are derived and continually revised through dialogue and negotiation, reconciling technological constraints, aspirations, business imperatives etc. The programme players should reflect a consensually desired trajectory yet retain the openness and flexibility commensurate with the complexity, ambiguity and instability of the business environment.

Some programme activities, such as projects, may have prescribed forms, definitions and boundaries. Projects, within the construct of the programme, are thus deliberate crystallisations of intent that permit the application of structured techniques and approaches towards the efficient realisation of (predominantly) tangible deliverables. Other activities, such as processes of engagement, communication, consultation etc. are by their nature more improvised. The aim is

for all programme activities and practices to be seamlessly interwoven and integrated within the on-going fabric of the organization to facilitate the absorption, adaptation and practical evolution of new capabilities. Cumulatively, programme work should actively strive to address the shifting strategic priorities and desired outcomes.

Prevailing power structures and relationships strongly influence formal governance arrangements. The inclusion and contributions of the community of interest sustain the legitimacy of the programme and motivate effort. Permeability of a programme's boundaries enables reciprocal influence, through information exchange, advocacy, sense-making and sense-giving.

Transformational organisational change entails new behaviours, attitudes, and ways of working, and the programme's principals need to recognise and embrace the emotions such changes evokes.

For some practitioners the guidance above may be disconcerting. The ontological security of a defined entity with a fixed goal, a formal hierarchy and structure is replaced by a fluid, almost ethereal, construct subject to constant negotiation and redefinition. The very notion of management, with its connotation of planning, directing and controlling, is replaced by the notion of enactment within a diffuse set of relationships and ambiguous power structures. Seasickness at the thought of an undulating relativism, stretching into an indeterminate horizon and devoid of fixed references or solid ground, is understandable.

For other practitioners, though, it will be a reflection and an articulation, of their lived experiences – what they often see and tend to do. Most organisations today, seem to face dramatic and unpredictable economic, social and environmental change. Networks of partners, suppliers and contracted service providers, and self-directed teams made up of relatively autonomous knowledge workers, are making organisations far more fluid and the need for engagement and consensus far more pressing. The absence of clarity and certainty is not an impediment to action, but a call for it – to 'get on'. Social reality for them feels malleable and changing, amenable (at least to some degree) to their influence.

Assuming a becoming or constructionist ontology does not mean slipping into a pure subjectivism or solipsism where the world is a creation of the mind and truth claims are beyond challenge or critique (*Burrell & Morgan 1979*). As with any model, its application will and should be characterised by re-interpretations, compromises, contextual adaptations and evolution. We would need to learn more about how the conscious adoption of such a model might unfold in practice and what guidance could be offered to practitioners.

4. Labels: choice or complements

The co-existence of two models for effecting purposeful and structured change implies an opportunity or need to choose. Our lenses influence what we observe and how we account for it.

But, practitioners have pragmatic concerns – what are they to do? They bring into existence, at some level, and undertake projects and programmes. A becoming or constructionist model of programme management offers a distinct conceptual and practice-oriented alternative to the functionalist, instrumental model of project management rather than a variant or extension of it. If the dominant project management model is as entrenched and yet flawed as some commentators suggest (*e.g. Williams 2005; Hodgson & Cicmil 2006*), acceptance and use of an alternative model for programme management within an organisation would offer greater flexibility and choice. It would offer alternative perspectives with which to frame and shape an initiative, set of activities or working arrangement. It would also seem a reasonable conjecture that individuals, alone and collectively, would use their knowledge and understanding of the models as cognitive resources in simultaneously shaping and matching initiatives to their models (*Martinsuo & Lehtonen 2006; Giddens 1984*).

A clearer distinction between project and programme management would not only facilitate a choice between them but also their complementary co-existence. Adoption of a (becoming or constructionist) model of programme management would encourage different ways of thinking and acting such as: embracing change, fostering inclusion, blurring boundaries, iterating, deferring decisions, building in redundancy. If knowledge and acceptance of the model

were widely diffused within the organisation, these notions and practices would be accepted practice in a programme context. The isomorphic pressures to act in a programme context according to the functionalist, instrumental model of project management would be reduced. Practitioners, who instinctively (seek to) mould their ambiguous and changing social reality, could draw a sense of empowerment and legitimacy for their views and actions. Yet, cosseted within a programme, component projects (can) become islands of relative order, stability and predictability focused on the delivery of tightly defined objectives. In Sergi's (2009) terms the component project is a more bounded becoming: the programme can effectively circumscribe and partially insulate the work of the project from the on-going stream of activities and sense-making. Some degree of structure and order can effectively be created or imposed. Rational instrumentalism in such circumstances may be pragmatically warranted or acceptable. The smaller scope and shorter duration, the more rational instrumentalism would appear appropriate. The strengths of the traditional project management approach are leveraged. Projects, along with non-project activities, deliver concrete changes, and give shape and form to the programme. In such circumstances, the two approaches are mutually dependent and supportive. Those practitioners for whom the undulating relativism of programme management is uncomfortable can still work in more structured fashion on projects and so generate significant value.

Such a pragmatic reconciliation would finesse the need for practitioners consciously to consider, chose between or declare ontological commitments, but more simply to gravitate towards and operate within the constructs of one or other model (or yet other models still to be determined). It might also go a long way to addressing the tensions experienced by programme (and project) practitioners in relation to the organisational factors perceived to help or hinder the performance of their work (*Pellegrinelli et al. 2006*).

5. Final thoughts

Project management has evolved as a result of and in response to the demands placed on its practitioners, and has proven its value in many settings. The contention is that, despite recent forays by researchers adopting interpretive or critical perspectives, much of the literature and most of the professional standards and guidance in project management has remained rooted within a functionalist, instrumental paradigm. The extension of this paradigm to programme management threatens to reduce this approach to an extension or variant of project management. Obviously concepts and techniques can be refined and adapted. Yet, initiatives can consciously or unconsciously be shoehorned into the taken-for-granted, functionalist ways of working. This can lead to compromises, shortfalls in performance and/or missed opportunities (*Pellegrinelli & Partington 2006*). At some point a different model proves to be more fruitful.

The central argument of this paper is that a programme management model, grounded in a becoming or social constructionist ontology and practised by reflective, context sensitive and value/ethically aware practitioners provides both an alternative way of shaping and undertaking change initiatives. It complements and facilitates mutual support and co-existence with traditional project management approaches within an organisation. Distinctiveness of the two models offers comparison, choice and flexibility – virtues in this increasingly ambiguous, turbulent and unpredictable world.

A pragmatic reconciliation is proposed to facilitate the co-existence of distinct paradigms underpinning the models of project management and programme management. While debates on paradigm commensurability or incommensurability may interest few practitioners, they matter within an academic and researcher community. True to our own ontological and epistemological commitments, our research can enrich our knowledge and understanding. We thus contribute to the elaboration of models that guidance practitioners and inform practice. In particular, we need to understand and share with the practitioner community where these models serve well, where they overlap and their limitations. Otherwise, we engage in purely an academic exercise.

Вопросы для размышления

1. В чем, на ваш взгляд состоят различия между категориями «проект» и «программа»? В чем необходимость использования термина «программа» наряду с термином «проект»? Обоснуйте ответ и приведите примеры.
2. В чем заключается противоречие между существующими моделями проектного и программного менеджмента в рамках инструментальной концепции? Требуется ли совершенствование моделей? Почему?
3. В чем состоят изменения подхода к управлению проектами в условиях возрастающей неопределенности среды? Может ли и каким образом управление программой быть использовано в условиях нарастания неопределенности и стратегических изменений?
4. Как, на ваш взгляд, новая концепция программного менеджмента и в ее рамках проектного менеджмента может быть использована на практике? К каким существенным изменениям это может привести?

Блок 5. «Управление человеческими ресурсами»

Прочитайте статью⁸ и сделайте ее критический анализ на русском языке.

One significant development in understanding leadership in the past decade has been the emergence of theories of charismatic and transformational leadership (e.g., Bass 1985; Conger & Kanungo 1987; House 1977; Locke et al. 1991). Although the terms charisma and transformational leadership are often used synonymously, Bass (1985, 1990) separates them, with charisma forming a part of transformational leadership. Within Bass's approach, transformational leadership includes charisma (providing a vision and a sense of mission, and raising followers' self-expectations), intellectual stimulation (helping employees emphasize rational solutions and challenge old assumptions), and individualized consideration (developing employees and coaching); transformational leadership also goes beyond transactional leadership (or contingent reward, i.e., the exchange of rewards for efforts) in elevating leaders and helping followers achieve higher levels of organizational functioning. In addition, the relationship between transformational and transactional leadership is clarified in the augmentation hypothesis, which is that charisma contributes unique variance to performance after the effects of contingent reward are considered (Waldman, Bass & Yammarino 1990). Bass's transformational leadership theory is now generating increasing levels of conceptual and empirical interest.

Several studies now document significant correlations between transformational leadership facets and organizational functioning. For example, subordinates' satisfaction with their supervisors is associated with the extent to which supervisors manifest transformational leadership (e.g., Hater & Bass 1988; Koh, Steers & Terborg 1995). Higher levels of transformational leadership are also associated positively with subordinates' organizational commitment, irrespective of the commitment measure used (Bycio, Hackett & Allen 1995; Koh et al. 1995), organizational citizenship behavior (Koh et al. 1995), and performance (Bass 1985; Howell & Avolio 1993). Similarly, a school principal's transformational leadership is associated indirectly with student performance (Koh et al. 1995). In a somewhat different context, shop stewards' transformational leadership was associated with rank-and-file members' commitment to, and participation in, the union (Fullagar, McCoy & Shull 1992; Kelloway & Barling 1993). Added support for the importance of transformational leadership comes from Howell and Avolio's (1993) findings that branch managers' transformational leadership (defined as charisma, intellectual stimulation, and individual consideration) predicted consolidated business unit performance 1 year later. Methodologically, their study improved on previous studies in that they used longitudinal data and did not rely on single-source data.

At least two studies using experimental designs have also indicated the importance of transformational leadership as a precursor to performance. Howell and Frost (1989) found that student participants working under charismatic leaders demonstrated higher task performance than those working under considerate leaders. Importantly, the effects of charismatic leadership emerged regardless of the productivity norms.

Kirkpatrick and Locke (1996) conducted a laboratory simulation with business students, in which they manipulated (by using trained confederates) three core aspects of charismatic leadership, namely, vision, vision implementation through task cues, and communication style. Only vision and vision implementation affected performance outcomes and attitudes, with the exception that leaders' charismatic communication style influenced followers' perceptions of charisma.

Nonetheless, the utility of transformational leadership cannot be gleaned adequately without a demonstration that changing leadership styles is both possible and likely to result in changes in subordinates' perceptions, attitudes, or performance. Some evaluations of the effects of transformational leadership training have been reported. For example, Popper, Landau and Gluskinos (1992) described a transformational leadership training program for infantry cadets in

⁸ Статья составлена по: Barling J., Weber J., Kelloway E.K. Effects of transformational leadership training on attitudinal and financial outcomes: A field experiment. // *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 81(6), 1996, pp. 827-832.

the Israeli army. Popper et al. argued that the training was successful because it helped participants crystallize their roles and their intention to implement what they had learned. However, although interesting, these data are grounded primarily on reaction outcome criteria and hence are limited. Even when quantitative data were reported, one-item scales were used, and no inferential statistics compared the effects of transformational programs with what Popper et al. described as traditional leadership programs.

In this study, we used three different levels of outcome criteria in assessing the effectiveness of training branch-level managers in transformational leadership. First, if the training is effective, subordinates would see changes in their managers' leadership behaviors; no change would be manifested if there was no training. Second, where transformational leadership is enhanced, subordinates' commitment to the organization would change (*e.g.*, Koh et al. 1995; Mathieu & Zajac 1990). Third, if transformational leadership is enhanced and subordinates' commitment to the organization increases, financial performance of the unit in question may be enhanced (Howell & Avolio 1993). To our knowledge, there do not appear to be any published empirical evaluations of training programs based specifically on transformational leadership theory that use "hard" outcome criteria. The aim of the current study was to provide such an analysis. In doing so, we conducted a field experiment in which bank branch managers were assigned randomly to either a training or control condition. Our use of a true experimental design allows us to extend the current literature by assessing the causal influence of transformational leadership on subordinates' perceptions, attitudes, and performance.

Method

Participants and Setting

The study took place in one region of one of the five largest banks in Canada. There were 20 branches in the region, each with its own manager. We classified branches by size according to the number of full-time employees. There were three large branches (between 40 and 60 full-time employees), eight medium-sized branches (15-39 full-time employees), and nine small branches (14 or fewer full-time employees).

The managers of each of the branches, which were geographically isolated from each other, were randomly assigned to either the control or the training intervention. In the training group, there was one manager from a large branch, four from medium-sized branches, and four from small branches. The training group had five male and four female managers; the control group had six male and five female managers. At the same time that each manager was initially approached, they were asked to nominate five employees who reported directly to them to complete the relevant questionnaires. Where numbers allowed (*i.e.*, in large, medium, and some small branches), managers were asked to provide names of employees who reported to them directly. In some smaller branches this was not always possible, and all available employees were asked to participate.

Questionnaires

There were three different outcome variables, namely, subordinates' perceptions of their branch managers' transformational leadership, subordinates' own organizational commitment, and two indices of branch-level financial performance.

To assess the dependent variables, we used the Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ)—Form 5 (Bass & Avolio 1990) for subordinates' rating of their managers' leadership. Through the MLQ-Form 5, we obtained measures of three aspects of transformational leadership: (a) charisma, obtained by combining idealized influence ("makes me proud to be associated with him/her") and inspirational motivation ("has a vision that spurs me on"); (b) intellectual stimulation ("enables me to think about old problems in new ways"); and (c) individualized consideration ("gives personal attention to those who seem neglected"). Ratings of transactional leadership and laissez-faire leadership can be obtained but were of no conceptual interest and were thus excluded because they would only have increased the family-wise error rate (*i.e.*, Type I errors), which was a concern given the relatively small sample size. The reliability of these subscales was satisfactory in Bass and Avolio's (1990) samples ($\alpha > .77$). As

measured by subordinates' perceptions, these scales were internally consistent at both pretesting and posttesting: Intellectual stimulation and individualized consideration were .96 at both time periods, and charisma was .98 and .97 at pretesting and posttesting, respectively.

Subordinates completed the nine-item short form of the Organizational Commitment Questionnaire (Mowday, Porter & Steers 1982). (Mowday et al. showed that the internal consistency of this shortened form is equal to that of the full questionnaire.) In our study, the internal consistency for all subordinates was highly satisfactory ($\alpha = .96$ at both testing periods). We used two variables to assess financial performance at the branch level. Because transformational leadership might influence sales performance (Jolson, Dubinsky & Yammarino 1993), we used the number of personal loan sales, as well as the number of credit card sales. The data for both these variables were taken from the region's regular records, and we chose these two specific variables because they may be responsive to branch managers' transformational leadership, which would presumably raise employee expectations, clarify the mission, challenge old assumptions about unproductive performance methods, and coach employees. Moreover, these particular measures were thought to be responsive to leaders' behavior within the time frame of the current study as opposed to other measures of financial performance (e.g., overall profitability) that would be less responsive to individual behaviors in the short term. Financial-outcome data were weighted by the number of full-time staff employed in each branch to control for branch size.

Subordinates completed the MLQ and Organizational Commitment Questionnaire 2 weeks before the training program commenced and 5 months thereafter. Measures of branch-level financial performance were taken at the same time.

Training Intervention

There were two different aspects involved in the training program. A 1-day group-based training session was held for all branch managers in the experimental group, and this was followed by a series of four individual booster sessions.

Group-based training program. The purpose of the 1-day training session was to familiarize participants with the central concepts of transformational leadership and to discuss and roleplay how transformational leadership might be implemented in their work context. In the first segment, participants were asked to identify sequentially the characteristics of the best and worst leaders they had ever encountered. The characteristics identified were placed in the context of transformational, transactional, and laissez-faire leadership (i.e., the workshop facilitator related each identified characteristic to the relevant leadership theory). Thereafter, participants were introduced in a more formal manner to transformational, transactional, and laissez-faire leadership and to research findings demonstrating correlations with relevant outcomes.

The second segment was designed to help participants take the conceptual constructs and apply them to their own work situations. Participants were first introduced to the notion of goal setting (Locke & Latham 1984), specifically the notion that performance is maximized when goals are specific and difficult but attainable. Participants were placed in groups and assigned various exercises; the initial exercises focused on assigning goals for themselves concerning their own transformational leadership (e.g., encouraging employees to generate their own solutions rather than merely providing them with solutions). Other exercises included the role playing of changed leadership behaviors and identifying specific leadership behaviors that would be consistent with their organizational mission statement. On completion of each exercise, plenary sessions were held for group discussions.

Individual booster sessions. The first individual session took place the day after the group training. Each manager in the training group met individually with the first author. The purpose of this initial session was two-fold. First, feedback on the managers' leadership style was provided based on data from the self-report and subordinate questionnaires. Second, specific personal action plans for the following month were developed for each manager. Goals were then set together with the individual managers relevant to achieving their own action plans. In all

cases, participants were reminded of the importance of setting specific, attainable goals. In addition, the importance of their maintaining any changes in their own behavior over time was emphasized. In the subsequent three sessions, the implementation of these leadership plans over the prior month was considered and modified as appropriate.

Two additional points about the training program should be mentioned. First, primary emphasis was placed on the notion of becoming intellectually stimulating: This was invariably the lowest transformational score at pretesting for both the control and intervention groups. Arguably, intellectual stimulation is easier to change than charisma. Because this score was the lowest for everyone, there is less likelihood of scores having been influenced by a ceiling effect. Effecting any changes in subordinates' perceptions of leaders' charisma and individualized consideration may take longer than directly challenging their assumptions.

It would be consistent with recent calls for organizational leaders to generate ideas and novel approaches in the organization (*e.g.*, Drucker 1995). Second, managers in the training group were encouraged to discuss ideas and experiences with other members of the group but to refrain from having similar discussions with managers in the no-training control group or subordinates in either of the two experimental groups. (Although managers in the trained group were told that there was a second comparison group, the nature of the experimental design and hypotheses were not revealed until after the study had concluded.)

Results

Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations for all attitudinal variables at pretest and posttest are presented in Table 1. We began by assessing group differences on the pretest scores using a multivariate analysis of variance. A significant multivariate effect was obtained, $F(4,76) = 5.24$, $p < .01$. However, none of the follow-up univariate analyses of variance (ANOVAs) attained significance, although one (subordinate ratings of charisma) approached significance, $F(1,79) = 3.75$, $p < .06$. To further explore pretest differences, we conducted a series of Roy-Bargman stepdown analyses. The three measures of leadership were assessed first in the order in which they were emphasized in the training program (*i.e.*, intellectual stimulation, individual consideration, and charisma). Organizational commitment was entered on the last stage of the stepdown analyses. Only one significant effect emerged: Subordinates' pretest ratings of charisma were higher in the control group than they were for the training group, $F(1,77) = 19.43$, $p < .01$.

Table 1
Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations of Attitudinal Variables at Pretest and Posttest for the Intervention and Control Groups

Variable	Intervention		Control		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD								
Pretest												
1. Intellectual stimulation	2,45	0,78	2,61	0,84	--							
2. Individualized consideration	2,59	0,89	2,74	0,92	.92*	--						
3. Charisma	2,63	0,78	2,94	0,81	.93*	.96*	--					
4. Organizational commitment	5,3	1,28	5,59	1,09	-0.05	-.03	-0.01	--				
Posttest												
5. Intellectual stimulation	2,83	0,73	2,62	0,9	.84*	.78*	.78*	-0.04	--			
6. Individualized consideration	2,82	0,87	2,69	0,89	.86*	.82*	.84*	0.1	.91*	--		
7. Charisma	2,8	0,83	2,78	0,87	.89*	.82*	.84*	-0.05	.94*	.95*	--	
8. Organizational commitment	5,85	0,81	5,58	1,06	0.15	0.11	0.16	0.05	0.14	.15	.17	--

Note. $n = 9$ for training group managers, and $n = 11$ for control group managers.

* $p < .01$

To assess the effects of leadership training, we conducted a multivariate analysis of covariance using the posttest subordinate ratings of transformational leadership as the dependent measure, the pretest ratings as the covariate, and group membership as the independent variable. Significant multivariate effects were obtained for the covariates, $F(16,220) = 12.06$, $p < .01$. The pretest measures were related to posttest measures of intellectual stimulation, $F(4,75) = 52.50$,

$p < .01$, $R^2 = .74$; individual consideration, $F(4,75) = 68.39$, $p < .01$, $R^2 = .79$; charisma, $F(4,75) = 78.56$, $p < .01$, $R^2 = .81$; and organizational commitment, $F(4,81) = 2.51$, $p > .05$, $R^2 = .12$.

A significant effect also emerged for training, multivariate $F(4,72) = 6.88$, $p < .01$. To assess the training effects on individual variables we conducted a series of univariate ANOVAs and a Roy-Bargman stepdown analysis. Significant univariate effects emerged for all four dependent measures: intellectual stimulation, $F(1,75) = 16.32$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .156$; individual consideration, $F(1,75) = 12.76$, $p < .01$, $r^2 = .142$; charisma, $F(1,75) = 7.54$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .069$; and organizational commitment, $F(1,75) = 5.72$, $p < .02$, $\eta^2 = .057$. However, in the stepdown analysis, which accounts for the intercorrelations among the dependent variables, only two effects were retained. Subordinates of the trained leaders reported significantly more positive perceptions of leaders' intellectual stimulation, adjusted $M = 2.92$ vs. 2.53 , $F(1,75) = 16.32$, $p < .01$; comparable levels of both individual consideration, $F(1,74) = 1.55$, $p > .05$, and charisma, $F(1,73) = 1.34$, $p > .05$; and significantly higher organizational commitment, adjusted $M = 5.96$ vs. 5.47 , $F(1,72) = 6.63$, $p < .02$, than subordinates of untrained leaders.

To assess the effects of leadership training on financial outcomes, we conducted a series of univariate analyses of covariance controlling for pretest financial information (because financial data are based on the branch, the amount of available data did not permit a multivariate approach to these data). Given the limited number of data points available, we adopted a level of significance of less than .10 for these tests. Training effects were significant for the number of personal loan sales, $F(1,17) = 7.69$, $p < .02$, $\eta^2 = .193$, M_s adjusted for branch-level size: .73 vs. .48, and marginally significant for the number of credit card sales, $F(1,17) = 3.32$, $p < .09$, $\eta^2 = .143$, M_s adjusted for branch-level size: 1.10 vs. .87, in the presence of substantially reduced power. As shown in Table 2, the effects were in the expected direction with the branches in which managers participated in the training reporting better financial outcomes than those in the control group.

Table 2

Means Adjusted for Branch-Level Size for the Number of Credit Card and Personal Loan Sales in The Experimental and Control Groups

Variable	Experimental				Control			
	Pretest		Posttest		Pretest		Posttest	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Credit Card Sales	1.12	0.28	1.07	0.3	1.27	0.48	0.89	0.3
Personal Loan Sales	0.52	0.14	0.72	0.21	0.54	0.26	0.49	0.32

Discussion

The results of this study suggest the effectiveness of training managers in transformational leadership. Using a pretest-posttest control group design, ANOVAs showed that the subordinates of managers receiving training perceived their managers as higher on intellectual stimulation, charisma, and individual consideration than subordinates of managers in the no-training control group. In addition, the training program exerted significant effects on subordinates' organizational commitment, whereas some support emerges for the notion that branch-level financial indicators might be affected.

This study advances our understanding of transformational leadership in three main ways. First and foremost, this study extends previous correlational results, and together with Kirkpatrick and Locke (1996) and Howell and Frost (1989), it provides experimental evidence that transformational leadership can result in changes in subordinates' perceptions of managers' leadership behaviors, subordinates' own commitment to the organization, and some aspects of financial performance. Moreover, this study has extended the experimental findings by demonstrating that a training and goal-setting intervention is able to change leaders' transformational behaviors in the expected direction. Second, this study extends Howell and

Avolio's (1993) findings based on longitudinal data and provides some indication that changing transformational leadership can exert some effects on financial performance.

The fact that the bank's records were used to generate these outcome variables supports the external validity of this finding. However, because the findings were based on small samples, this conclusion remains somewhat tentative. Third, because outcome data were based on branch-level financial performance, subordinates' perceptions of leadership behavior, and subordinates' organizational commitment, common source bias inherent in previous research is minimized.

Further research on the effects of enhancing transformational leadership might benefit from a focus on a number of areas. First, future research should expand the focus of outcomes considered. We need to know what employee attitudes other than organizational commitment (e.g., job satisfaction) might be affected, as well as whether other financial outcome criteria can be affected. The issue of financial outcome criteria is especially important, as the limited sample size used for the analyses of financial outcome ($n = 20$) mitigates against significant findings in this study. The limit emerges from our focus on unit-level financial performance indicators. Future research could profitably include individual-level performance indicators. Doing so would allow researchers to (a) address the statistical limitations of the current study as well as to (b) address the more conceptually important question of the appropriate level of aggregation (i.e., unit vs. individual) for assessing the effects of leadership on performance.

In a similar vein, it is possible that financial performance is an indirect effect of training in transformational leadership, mediated by changes in employees' perceptions of leaders' behaviors and attitudes (i.e., organizational commitment). Thus, the process by which transformational leadership influences performance is worth investigating for several reasons: (a) There are suggestions that the perception of leadership reflects an attributional process resulting from performance (*Lord & Maher 1991*); (b) Kirkpatrick and Locke (1996) found some support for a causal linkage model of leadership effects; and (c) the results of the present study should be replicated and extended.

Second, the feasibility of including an attention placebo control group (which would control for the Hawthorne effect) and a postintervention manipulation check, both of which would address issues about internal validity (*Cook & Campbell 1979*), should be considered. Third, future research might contrast the role of the group-based training program with the individual-based booster sessions and analyze their unique effects. Fourth, research might be conducted to assess whether the effects of transformational leadership training extend to other contexts such as unions (*Barling, Fullagar & Kelloway 1992*). Fifth, while the present analyses showed that the effects of the transformational leadership training program endured for 5 months, future research might investigate whether the benefits are maintained over a longer period of time.

Sixth, in this study we focused primarily on increasing leaders' intellectual stimulation and, to some extent, individualized consideration. A more comprehensive analysis of the effects of transformational leadership must include an attempt to enhance leaders' charismatic behaviors (e.g., *Kirkpatrick & Locke 1996*). Without such an intervention, it is possible that our findings underestimate the effects of transformational leadership. In this regard, we also note that while our intervention dealt primarily with intellectual stimulation, the empirical data showed strong correlations between the three dimensions of transformational leadership we assessed. Future research needs to be directed at the development of nonredundant measures of these conceptually distinct constructs. Seventh, we chose to study the effects of transformational leadership on performance 5 months after the initial training took place; however, this might not reflect the optimal amount of time required for leadership training to exert its effects. Although the plausibility of this argument is questioned by the significant findings obtained, future theorizing and research should focus on identifying more precisely when significant effects are expected to emerge.

In conclusion, although the present results must be replicated using, for example, larger samples, different outcome criteria, and different contexts, this study suggests that training managers in transformational leadership may well exert significant effects. If such replications are successful, the usefulness of transformational leadership would be extended.

Вопросы для размышления

1. Каковы основные проблемы, рассматриваемые в статье?
2. Какие из приведенных в статье исследовательских методов и выводов по результатам исследования представляются вам спорными, недостаточно обоснованными? Почему?
3. Каковы ограничения проведенного исследования?
4. Каковы направления использования HR-менеджерами результатов этого исследования?
5. Являются ли рассмотренные в статье проблемы актуальными для российских организаций?

Блок 6. «Экономика впечатлений: менеджмент в индустрии гостеприимства и туризме»

Прочитайте статью⁹ и сделайте ее критический анализ на русском языке.

The success of tourism destinations in world markets is influenced by their relative competitiveness. The contention is that destination competitiveness has "... tremendous ramifications for the tourism industry and is therefore of considerable interest to practitioners and policy makers." (*Ritchie & Crouch 2000*). Dwyer, Forsyth and Rao (2000) reinforce this view, stating that it is "...useful for the industry and government to understand where a country's competitive position is weakest and strongest..." and hence that it is important to know how and why competitiveness is changing.

Crouch and Ritchie's approach to destination competitiveness extends previous studies that focused on destination image or attractiveness (*see Chon, Weaver & Kim 1991; Hu & Ritchie 1993*). Such studies are part of a long tradition of destination image research (*Gallarza, Saura & Garcia 2002*) and, in keeping with that tradition, have concentrated on those attributes that are seen to attract visitors, such as climate, scenery, and accommodation. Whilst tourism services in general are recognised as being important elements of destination image or product (*Murphy, Pritchard & Smith 2000*) it is less common in destination image research to pay explicit attention to the firms that supply the services and to the factors that may affect the competitiveness of these firms. Buhalis (2000) recognises the importance of suppliers and the multiplicity of the individually produced products and services that help make up the overall tourism product, but is more concerned with the difficulties this raises for marketing issues than for destination competitiveness.

Building on the prior conceptualisations of Crouch and Ritchie (*see also Ritchie & Crouch 2001*), this paper argues that a proper understanding of destination competitiveness requires, in addition to destination or tourism-specific factors, the inclusion of such factors that affect the competitiveness of firms and other organisations involved in producing the tourism "product". In other words, a destination is competitive if it can attract and satisfy potential tourists and this competitiveness is determined both by tourism-specific factors and by a much wider range of factors that influence the tourism service providers.

The objective of this study, therefore, was to advance this broader approach to destination competitiveness by adding generic factors of competitiveness, that are applicable to any industry, to the mainstream factors of destination attractiveness, and to operationalise this combination in such a way as to obtain quantitative measures of competitiveness. In doing so, the study attempts to marry the concepts of two literatures in order to generate a broader, and hence more comprehensive, model of tourism destination competitiveness.

Towards a comprehensive model of tourism destination competitiveness (TDC)

In developing their conceptual model of TDC, Crouch and Ritchie (1999) build on Michael Porter's (1990) well-known framework of the "diamond of national competitiveness". Porter's framework postulates that success in international competition in a given industry depends on the relative strength of an economy in a set of business-related features or "drivers" of competitiveness, namely "factor conditions"; "demand conditions"; "related and supporting industries", and "firm strategy, structure, and rivalry".

Porter's framework, or variations thereof, has been used in a number of studies of industries and of individual economies. In more recent conceptual developments, Enright, Scott, and Dodwell (1997) proposed an alternative framework that divides the drivers of competitiveness into six categories, namely "inputs", "industrial and consumer demand", "inter-firm competition and cooperation", "industrial and regional clustering", "internal organisation and strategy of firms", and "institutions, social structures and agendas".

⁹ Статья составлена по: Enright M.J., Newton J. Tourism Destination competitiveness: a quantitative approach. // *Tourism Management*, Vol. 25, Iss. 6, Dec. 2004.

Crouch and Ritchie (1999) have incorporated concepts of such generic models to derive a model that postulates that TDC is determined by four major components: “core resources and attractors”, “supporting factors and resources”, “destination management”, and “qualifying determinants”. The “core resources and attractors” include the primary elements of destination appeal. It is these “that are the fundamental reasons that prospective visitors choose one destination over another”. The factors included within this component of the model are physiography, culture and history, market ties, activities, special events and the tourism superstructure. Physiography includes landscape and climate, market ties includes linkages with the residents of tourism originating regions, and the tourism superstructure is comprised primarily of accommodation facilities, food services, transportation facilities and major attractions. With the exception of market ties, therefore, these factors are consistent with mainstream destination attractiveness studies (*see Kim 1998 for a comprehensive review*).

The other components of the model, however, extend the determinants of TDC by adding a wider range of factors that help link the destination “attractors” with the factors more usually found in studies of generic business competitiveness. The “supporting factors and resources” are factors that provide the foundation for building a successful tourism industry and include, in particular, the extent and condition of a destination's general infrastructure, a range of facilitating resources such as educational establishments, together with factors influencing the destination's accessibility.

The third component, “destination management”, focuses on activities that can influence the other components, first by enhancing the appeal of the core resources and attractors, secondly by strengthening the quality and effectiveness of the supporting factors and lastly by adapting to constraints imposed by the fourth component, the “qualifying determinants”. Whilst the most researched aspect of management is destination marketing, the authors argue that a much wider set of management activities should be considered, including services, organisation and the maintenance of the key tourism resources and attractors. The final component, the “qualifying determinants”, includes factors that can modify, possibly in a negative sense, the influence of the other three components. Hence, these can possibly limit a destination's capability to attract and satisfy potential tourists and hence affect its competitiveness. This component includes critically important variables, such as location, overall costs, and safety, which are beyond the control of the tourism sector but which play a major role in destination competitiveness.

The present study

Given the relatively recent conceptualisation of such an approach to tourism destination competitiveness it is not surprising that the framework has yet to be tested empirically. This study attempts to fill that gap by operationalising the conceptual approach in order to generate measures of competitiveness across this much broader spectrum, and to consider the usefulness of the approach for tourism practitioners and policy makers. It was therefore necessary to develop a methodology to generate data suggested by the combined frameworks from which to draw implications for the competitiveness of tourism destinations. Given the novelty of this approach, the initial study was restricted to a single destination, an approach that is not uncommon in the emerging literature on the destination product and on the traditional literature on destination attractiveness. Whilst the results from a single destination would not be expected to generate a definitive global statement regarding TDC, the study serves as an initial test of the combined approach, helps demonstrate the value of a broader framework and aims to provide a template for further refinement and research into the broader determinants of TDC.

Hong Kong was chosen for the study as tourism is an important part of its economy; Hong Kong also has been among the leading destinations for international tourism in the East Asia-Pacific region. However, events in the 1990s have heightened concerns about the competitiveness of the region and Hong Kong's competitiveness versus other destinations in the region. Given the importance of tourism to Hong Kong's economy and the recent variations in demand, the destination's tourism competitiveness has become a major economic issue.

Methodology

In order to generate the desired empirical data, a survey instrument was constructed itemising the factors that were postulated to influence TDC. This was done by generating a set of tourism specific items based, in the first instance, on the “core resources and attractors”, and a set of generic business factors. As the business factors are more developed in the competitiveness literature than the tourism literature, greater reliance was placed on the former in developing the specific items in this set.

In developing the set of tourism-specific items, it was recognised that no universal set of items exists, even within the abundant literature on tourism destination attractiveness or image. Kim's (1998) summary of previous research into destination attractiveness indicates clearly the variety of items adopted by researchers in the field, although some items are common to many approaches. The tourism “attractors” derived directly from Crouch and Ritchie's core resources and attractors, and shown in Figure 1, were equally consistent with such approaches. Hong Kong, however, is best classified as an urban destination, following Abe's (1996) taxonomy. Consequently, given the particular nature of the destination selected for this initial study, more detailed items were added from prior studies of specifically urban destinations (*Jansen-Verbeke 1986; Law 1993*) as Figure 1 also shows.

Figure 1

Construction of tourism-specific factors of competitiveness: “Attractors”

Core Resources & Attractors (Crouch & Ritchie, 1999)	Items derived directly from Core Resources and Attractors	Items derived from Core Resources and Attractors but classified within Business-related Factors	Items added from specifically urban tourism studies (Jansen-Verbeke, 1986; Law, 1993)
Physiography	Visual appeal Climate		Interesting architecture Well-known landmarks
Culture & history	Different culture Notable history		Local way of life
Market ties		Ethnic ties Visiting friends and relatives (VFR) Business ties	
Activities			Nightlife Music & performances Museums & galleries Dedicated tourism attractions
Special events	Special events Interesting festivals		
Tourism superstructure	Cuisine	High quality accommodation Transportation facilities	Shopping ¹

¹ Subsequently classified at a business factor

Crouch and Ritchie (1999) recognise that, in the construction of their model, there may be ambiguities in classifying some items. This was particularly so with the “tourism superstructure” where the authors note that such items as accommodation and transportation could equally fall within the “supporting factors”. Following a review of the pilot instrument with practitioners and tourism experts in the region, these two items were classified within the business factors in the instrument. “Market ties” were also considered better classified as business factors, since market demand is a major element of the literature on business competitiveness. Crouch and Ritchie describe “market ties” as ethnic ties, visiting friends and relatives, and business ties. Consequently these were translated for this study as ‘China market potential’, ‘other Asia-Pacific market potential’, and ‘long haul market potential’ given the close links with the Chinese Mainland, the Chinese diaspora throughout the region and Hong Kong's global family and business linkages. Similarly, shopping, which was also added from Jansen–Verbeke's work on urban tourism, was also treated as a business factor, being covered by the item ‘good retail sector’ which was derived from the competitiveness literature. The practitioners in the region also placed great stress, as do Crouch and Ritchie, on the importance of ‘safety’ in determining the competitiveness of a destination and in this item being of especial importance to tourism. As a result, ‘safety’, which appears in the conceptual model as a Qualifying Determinant was classified within the set of tourism specific items.

The six items to be included within the set of generic competitiveness factors were added to a further set of 31 “business-related” items derived from the generic competitiveness frameworks of Porter (1990), Enright et al. (1997) and Enright (2000). Figure 2 shows the items selected for the study, classified according to Enright et al. (1997) framework. The three “market

ties” items were added to the category of “industrial and consumer demand” and the further category of “tourism business superstructure” was added. The two sets of items were listed separately on the final instrument to aid responses and the instrument was again reviewed with industry practitioners and researchers with a view to ensuring face validity (*DeVellis 1991*).

Figure 2

Generic business factors of competitiveness: “Business-related factors”

Major Drivers	Items Derived from Drivers of Competitiveness (Porter, 1990; Enright, Scott, and Dodwell, 1997; Enright, 2000)
Inputs	Internal transportation facilities, Communication facilities, Staff skills, Access to information, Local managerial skills, Banking & financial system, Geographic location, Level of technology, Staff costs, Other infrastructure, Property related costs, Other costs
Industrial & Consumer Demand	China market potential, Long haul market potential, Other Asia Pacific market potential, Local market demand
Inter-firm Competition & Cooperation	Good firm cooperation, Tough local competition
Industrial & Regional Clustering	Support from related industries, Presence of international firms
Internal Organization & Strategy of Firms	Strategies of international firms, Strategies of local firms
Institutions, Social Structures and Agendas	Political stability, Free port status, Government policy, Cleanliness of government ² , Overall economic condition, Transparency in policy making, Investment incentives, Tax regime, Education & training institutions, Regulatory framework, Strong currency, Community institutions
Additional Drivers	Items derived from Figure 1
Tourism Business Superstructure	International access, Good retail sector ³ , High quality accommodation
Market Ties	China market potential, Other Asia-Pacific market potential, Long haul market potential

² A term that is a widely understood euphemism in the Asia Pacific region for “lack of corruption”.

³ “Good Retail Sector” was considered to cover “Shopping”.

Given the addition of the generic business-related factors, the instrument thus differs markedly from the mainstream studies of destination image or attractiveness (*such as Chen 2001*). This raises the question of whether the most common target groups of respondents, namely tourists, are the appropriate respondents for this study. Tourists are well placed to evaluate the normal components of destination attractiveness, including the services that they consume. However, they are less likely to know about, and hence be able to evaluate, those factors that underlie and influence the competitive production of those services, especially because of their status as visitors. Since one of the goals of operationalising the combined framework was to gauge the relative importance of tourism attractors *and* business features, it was necessary to survey individuals who could respond to questions on both the tourism attractors and the business features. Discussions with tourism industry practitioners indicated that industry participants (in this case, managing directors or the most senior person in the organisation otherwise) generally are aware of the overall conditions in both the business features and the tourism attractors, as they see what works and does not work on a daily basis. In addition, most were knowledgeable about the state of the industry in the major competing locations as well. Thus tourism industry practitioners were viewed as the appropriate population to respond to the questions on both sets of determinants.

For the tourism attractors and the business-related factors, respondents were first asked to assess the importance of each factor in contributing to competitiveness in urban tourism in the Asia-Pacific region on a 5-point scale with 1 = very important, 2 = unimportant, 3 = neutral, 4 = important, and 5 = very unimportant. In the second stage, respondents were asked to compare Hong Kong with the relevant competitors and assess Hong Kong's relative competitiveness for each of the factors. The initial question regarding Hong Kong's main

competing locations served to establish in the mind of each respondent, the main competitive set. The objective was not to establish whether Hong Kong was more competitive in a given factor than another specific destination, but rather whether, when compared to the relevant competitive set of its main rivals, Hong Kong was more or less competitive in the given factors. The respondents were asked to rate Hong Kong's relative competitiveness or position versus relevant competitors for each factor on a 5-point scale with 1 = much worse, 2 = worse, 3 = the same, 4 = better, and 5 = much better.

The survey instrument was distributed by fax to practitioners in the travel industry in Hong Kong as identified by their membership in the Hong Kong Tourist Association, (HKTA) which includes a wide cross-section of the service businesses active in tourism. The instrument was addressed to the most senior manager identified in the membership guide and the responses showed that respondents were all at managerial grade. Two mailings in the first quarter of 2000 yielded 183 responses from the 1,116 companies contacted, representing a response rate of 16.4 percent. Of the 183 respondents, 49 were in the hotel industry, 36 were in retailing, with the balance in travel agencies, tour operators, airlines and other similar areas. Around 12% (22 respondents) were engaged in more than one major line of business. Over 43% (79 respondents) identified themselves as part of a multinational firm. Of these, the leading parent nationalities were: the United States (18%), Hong Kong (15%), Japan (10%), and the United Kingdom (10%).

Results and analysis

The survey responses indicate, first, that the leading competitors to Hong Kong in urban tourism in the Asia-Pacific region are Singapore, Bangkok, Tokyo, and Shanghai. Given its comparable role as an economic centre, a gateway for part of the region, and similar size, it was not surprising that Singapore would emerge as Hong Kong's principal competitor. The high ranking of Bangkok might indicate that Hong Kong has some attributes that attract leisure travellers, for whom Bangkok is more of a competitor. The ranking of Tokyo would indicate that the Japanese capital has a mixture of commercial and cultural attributes that rivals Hong Kong. Shanghai is Hong Kong's main tourism rival within China, perhaps reflecting the cities' roles as leading commercial centres in China as well as cultural similarities.

Importance of "attractors" and "business-related factors"

The "attractors" are ranked in terms of their relative importance in determining, in general, the competitiveness of a city destination in Asia-Pacific. The most important attractors, according to respondents, are safety, cuisine, dedicated tourism attractions, visual appeal, and well-known landmarks. Although different culture ranked seventh, some specific attributes of culture, such as local history, museums and galleries, and music and performance, ranked at the bottom. Given the emphasis that many government tourism agencies, including those in Hong Kong, place on such attributes, the low ranking is interesting. One possible explanation is that this is consistent with Gearing et al. (1974) argument that there may be differences between what tourists say and what they do, and that it is surveys of tourists that has stimulated this emphasis. Climate ranked only twelfth, perhaps because climate in city destinations is considered less important than in resort destinations.

The results for the importance of business-related factors in determining urban tourism competitiveness in the Asia-Pacific are the following. Political stability ranked first, consistent with the ranking of safety amongst the tourism-specific factors. Forms of accessibility featured prominently, with international access and internal transportation facilities ranking second and third, as would be expected. However, less expected were the rankings ascribed to costs, which ranked relatively low. The three factors of staff costs, property-related costs, and other costs were ranked, respectively, 28, 31, and 30th out of the 37 factors. Again, as with climate, this could be because of the focus on city tourism, where costs are seen as less of a determinant of competitiveness than in other types of tourism destinations. The least important factor, ranked 37th, was local market demand. In other words, respondents did not think that local demand for tourism related activities was a major contributor to the competitiveness of a city destination.

Hong Kong's relative competitiveness: attractors and business factors

While the first stage generated a ranking of what is important for a destination in general, it left open the question of how a specific destination is performing versus relevant competitors. According to the results, Hong Kong's main strengths lie in cuisine, safety, nightlife, visual appeal, and climate. Its greatest weaknesses are in museums and galleries, music and performances, and notable history.

The results for Hong Kong's relative performance in the business-related factors are the following. The highest rating for competitiveness was identified as China market potential and the lowest rating was ascribed to staff costs. Hong Kong was seen to have substantial advantages in terms of international access, internal transportation facilities, communication facilities, and in its free port status. The factors where Hong Kong was seen to have disadvantages were staff costs, property-related costs, and other costs. This is as would be expected, given Hong Kong's reputation as a high cost centre and the impact of the Asian economic crisis, which resulted in depreciations in the currencies of many competing destinations.

The IPA grid

A standard approach adopted by IPA is to combine measures of importance and performance into a two dimensional grid so as to ease data interpretation and elicit suggestions for action. The overall mean scores of importance and performance are then used to create four quadrants within the plot (Oh 2001). Substituting Hong Kong's relative competitiveness for the concept of performance generates the result shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4. Figure 3 shows the position of the attractors in the four quadrants, and Figure 4 shows the same for the business-related factors.

Figure 3





Figure 4

Importance and relative competitiveness of business-related factors



Key:

- | | |
|---|---------------------------------------|
| 1. Geographic location | 20. Tough local competition |
| 2. International access | 21. Good firm cooperation |
| 3. Internal transportation facilities | 22. Support from related industries |
| 4. Communication facilities | 23. Presence of international firms |
| 5. Other infrastructure | 24. Strategies of local firms |
| 6. High quality accommodation | 25. Strategies of international firms |
| 7. Property related costs | 26. Overall economic condition |
| 8. Staff costs | 27. Free port status |
| 9. Other costs | 28. Government policy |
| 10. Staff skills | 29. Investment incentives |
| 11. Local managerial skills | 30. Political stability |
| 12. Good retail sector | 31. Cleanliness of government |
| 13. Banking & financial system | 32. Transparency in policy making |
| 14. Access to information | 33. Regulatory framework |
| 15. Level of technology | 34. Community insitutions |
| 16. Long haul market potential | 35. Education & training institutions |
| 17. China market potential | 36. Strong currency |
| 18. Other Asia-Pacific market potential | 37. Tax regime |
| 19. Local market demand | |

The Quadrants can be used to generate suggestions for managers in both public and private sectors by differentiating between them. Quadrant I, which includes the high importance and high relative competitiveness factors, identifies the attributes that the destination should strive to maintain or “keep up the good work” (Martilla & James 1977). Quadrant II includes factors that are low in importance but high in relative competitiveness, and thus identifies areas where there may be “wasted effort”, given the low importance. Quadrant III identifies areas of low priority, including factors in which the destination is not particularly competitive but which are low in importance. Quadrant IV, which includes factors that are high in importance but where there is low relative competitiveness, identifies critical areas for improvement where decision makers are recommended to “concentrate here” (Martilla & James 1977).

Hence, Figure 3's Quadrant I shows that Hong Kong rates well versus the competition in some factors, such as cuisine and safety, that are also very important in determining destination competitiveness for urban tourism in the region. This knowledge is much more valuable to industry participants and policy makers than knowing only that Hong Kong rates well on these factors. Similarly, from Quadrant III, knowledge that Hong Kong does not rate as well for museums and galleries, but that this is not nearly as important as the other attractors, is far more valuable to participants and policy makers than knowledge of Hong Kong's relative competitiveness rating alone.

Figure 4 allows a similar interpretation for the business-related factors. As Quadrant I shows, Hong Kong rated well in terms of international access and internal transportation facilities, factors that were deemed to be very important in influencing destination competitiveness. Quadrant IV indicates that Hong Kong rated below average in staff skills and government policy, both of which rated highly in importance. Quadrant II shows that Hong Kong rated highly in tax regime and other infrastructure, but these were rated below average in importance. Quadrant III shows that Hong Kong has a relatively weak position with respect to costs, but according to the respondents, costs are relatively unimportant as determinants of city destination competitiveness. This should be viewed as an interesting result, given concerns in Hong Kong about cost competitiveness relative to other destinations in the region.

The results indicate that Hong Kong should make sure it maintains its strong position in safety and cuisine, and in international access and internal transport facilities, and suggest that the features should be at the heart of Hong Kong's tourism promotion efforts. In addition, Hong Kong should focus on improving the features of dedicated tourism attractions and well-known landmarks, and government policy and staff skills, given their high importance but relatively low competitiveness. On the other hand, Hong Kong should not expend too much effort on features such as music and performances and museums and galleries, and property, staff and other costs, despite their relatively low competitiveness, given their low importance.

Discussion and conclusions

The present study makes a number of contributions to the tourism literature and to the literature on competitiveness. The study fills an important gap in the literature by developing a methodology that has operationalised the concept of destination tourism competitiveness in a manner that is useful for researchers, industry participants, and policy makers. In particular it has demonstrated the value of including business-related factors as well as the more conventional destination image or attractiveness factors in studies of tourism competitiveness.

In applying this methodology, as a first step, to Hong Kong, the study also has shown the practical importance of the identification of relevant competitors and understanding the relative importance of tourism attractors and business-related factors in determining tourism destination competitiveness. It has reinforced the value of the two-stage process that assesses the importance of the determinants of competitiveness as well as their competitiveness relative to those main competing destinations. The use of the IPA Grid offers a method of analysis that is common in tourism destination research but not in the generic competitiveness literature and hence provides a contribution to the latter. The Grid also demonstrates how the resulting analysis may be presented in a readily accessible manner so as to inform practical decisions for action.

However, this is not to suggest that, at this stage of development of the methodology, the current results provide an unambiguous guide to action. Further research will be required in a number of directions, as it would be unwise to rely on a single, initial study if practical changes were contemplated. As an example, it would be valuable to investigate further the low importance ascribed to museums and galleries as determinants of tourism competitiveness, given the, often significant, investments in such facilities. Alternative sources of information, such as the percentage of total tourists visiting such facilities, where available, could be used to check this finding against recorded behaviour. This would also allow the methodology to be further refined should the additional results either contradict the findings derived from practitioner respondents or, alternatively provide support for the argument that practitioners provide an accurate view of tourist behaviour.

A further caveat should be added when considering factors that fall into the IPA quadrants that denote low importance, and again the example of museums and galleries is instructive. Once again there should be a note of caution, given the conclusion that these factors could represent areas of wasted effort. It is possible that these are necessary factors for the overall competitiveness product in that tourists may not actually use them, but if they were not present, then it might generate dissatisfaction. It would be instructive if future research could address this issue.

Despite these caveats, the overall results provide strong support for the combined approach to tourism destination competitiveness suggested by Crouch and Ritchie. A far better picture of a destination's competitiveness in the tourism industry emerges when one combines an analysis of "traditional" tourism attractors with business-related factors based on general models of competitiveness. Some of the business-related factors, in fact, are viewed by industry participants as far more important than some of the tourism attractors. In addition, the approach goes beyond simple list making, often found in generic competitiveness studies, to identify a specific set of competitors in urban tourism in the Asia-Pacific and to suggest a ranking of the importance of various attractors and business-related factors for urban tourism in the region and perhaps more generally.

In summary, therefore, this study has developed a methodology that has operationalised the broader approach to tourism competitiveness suggested in the literature. It has provided a quantitative understanding of the industry and location that can be replicated in other jurisdictions. Finally it has provided a quantitative, theoretically informed empirical analysis that offers a basis for strategy development and policy formulation in the tourism industry.

Вопросы для размышления

1. Какие основные проблемы рассматриваются в статье?
2. Какие методы исследования применялись авторами при изучении затронутой в статье проблематики?
3. Какие из приведенных в статье выводов по результатам исследования представляются вам спорными, недостаточно обоснованными? Аргументируйте свой ответ.
4. Для решения каких практических задач туристической отрасли могут быть использованы результаты исследования?
5. Какие направления дальнейших исследований по данной проблематике вы считаете наиболее приоритетными?
6. Являются ли рассмотренные в статье проблемы актуальными для российской туристической отрасли?

МЕТОДИЧЕСКИЕ РЕКОМЕНДАЦИИ

Олимпиада по направлению «Менеджмент» проводится в рамках отдельных магистерских программ (профилей): «Маркетинг», «Маркетинговые коммуникации и реклама в современном бизнесе», «Стратегическое и корпоративное управление», «Управление проектами: проектный анализ, инвестиции, технологии реализации», «Управление человеческими ресурсами», «Экономика впечатлений: менеджмент в индустрии гостеприимства и туризме».

Участник олимпиады сообщает о своем намерении выполнять работу по профилю конкретной магистерской программы *в момент получения олимпиадного задания*.

Участникам олимпиады предлагается для выполнения одно письменное творческое задание. На выполнение творческого задания отводится 3 (три) астрономических часа (180 минут). Творческое задание оценивается по 100-балльной шкале.

Творческое задание представляет собой *научную статью на английском языке* по профилю конкретной магистерской программы с вопросами для размышления.

В ходе выполнения творческого задания участник олимпиады должен прочитать предложенную научную статью (в том числе, намеренно содержащую спорные суждения, точки зрения, неточные выводы и т.п.) и, на основании сформулированных к статье вопросов для размышления, сделать ее критический анализ, дать свое *обоснованное и аргументированное оценочное суждение в письменном виде на русском языке*.

Важно помнить, что сформулированные к статье вопросы для размышления не являются вопросами-заданиями, на которые участнику олимпиады необходимо ответить. Они именно определяют, но *не ограничивают*, направления для размышления в рамках критического анализа материала и проблем статьи.

Выполнение творческого задания предполагает использование понятий, теорий и концепций, входящих в *Раздел 2 «ОБЩЕПРОФЕССИОНАЛЬНЫЕ И ТЕОРЕТИЧЕСКИЕ ДИСЦИПЛИНЫ»* Программы вступительного экзамена по менеджменту для поступающих в магистратуру факультета менеджмента НИУ-ВШЭ (см. <http://ma.hse.ru/vstupi>).

При подготовке к олимпиаде *особое внимание* следует уделить изучению дисциплин, соответствующих профилю выбранной участником олимпиады магистерской программы (см. таблицу).

Профиль магистерской программы	Дисциплины, соответствующие профилю магистерской программы	Основная ¹⁰ литература
Маркетинг	Маркетинг	1. Котлер Ф., Армстронг Г., Вонг В., Сондерс Дж. Основы маркетинга. – М.: «ИД Вильямс», 2012. 2. Ламбен Ж., Чумпитас Р., Шулинг И. Менеджмент, ориентированный на рынок. – СПб: Питер, 2011. 3. Малхотра Н. Маркетинговые исследования. Практическое руководство. – М.: «Вильямс», 2007.
Маркетинговые коммуникации и	Маркетинговые коммуникации	1. Росситер Дж., Перси Л. Реклама и продвижение товаров. – СПб: Питер, 2001.

¹⁰ Список дополнительной литературы см. в разделах по соответствующим дисциплинам в Программе вступительного экзамена по менеджменту для поступающих в магистратуру факультета менеджмента НИУ ВШЭ (<http://ma.hse.ru/vstupi> 2012).

реклама в современном бизнесе		<p>2. Уэллс У., Бернет Дж., Мориарти С. Реклама: принципы и практика. – СПб: Питер, 2008.</p> <p>3. Перси Л., Элиот Р. Стратегическое планирование рекламных кампаний. – М.: ИД Гребенникова, 2008.</p> <p>4. Музыкант В.Л. Маркетинговые основы управления коммуникациями. – М.: Эксмо, 2008.</p> <p>5. Кутлалиев А., Попов А. Эффективность рекламы. – М.: Эксмо, 2005.</p>
Стратегическое и корпоративное управление	Стратегическое управление Основы корпоративного управления	<p>1. Пособие по корпоративному управлению: в 6 т. – М.: Альпина Бизнес Букс, 2004.</p> <p>2. Томпсон А.А.-мл., Стрикленд А.Дж. III. Стратегический менеджмент. Концепции и ситуации для анализа. 12-е издание. – М.: Вильямс, 2007.</p> <p>3. Аакер Д.А. Стратегическое рыночное управление. – СПб: Питер, 2011.</p>
Управление проектами: проектный анализ, инвестиции, технологии реализации	Управление проектами	<p>1. Мазур И.И., Шапиро В.Д., Ольдерогге Н.Г., Полковников А.В. Управление проектами. – М.: Омега-Л, 2009.</p> <p>2. Милошевич Д. Набор инструментов для управления проектами. – М.: ДМК Пресс, 2006.</p> <p>3. Управление проектами. Основы профессиональных знаний. Национальные требования к компетентности специалистов (National Competence Baseline, NCB SOVNET 3.0). Ассоциация управления проектами СОВНЕТ, 2010.</p> <p>4. Полковников А.В., Дубовик М.Ф. Управление проектами. Полный курс МВА. – М.: Эксмо, 2010.</p>
Управление человеческими ресурсами	Теория организаций Управление персоналом Организационное поведение	<p>1. Дафт Р. Теория организации. – М.: Юнити, 2006.</p> <p>2. Армстронг М. Практика управления человеческими ресурсами. – СПб: Питер, 2012.</p> <p>3. Кибанов А.Я. Основы управления персоналом: Учебник. – М.: ИНФРА-М, 2012.</p> <p>4. Роббинз С.П. Основы организационного поведения. – М.: Вильямс, 2006.</p> <p>5. Лютенс Ф. Организационное поведение. – М.: ИНФРА-М, 1999.</p>
Экономика впечатлений: менеджмент в индустрии гостеприимства и туризме	Исторические основы менеджмента, функции менеджмента, подходы в менеджменте Маркетинг	<p>1. Дафт Р. Менеджмент. – СПб: Питер, 2012.</p> <p>2. Котлер Ф., Армстронг Г., Вонг В., Сондерс Д. Основы маркетинга. – М.: «ИД Вильямс», 2012.</p>

Однако для получения высших оценок за олимпиадное задание *рекомендуется не ограничиваться* изучением только профильных дисциплин.

Например, успешно справиться с олимпиадным заданием, в котором рассматриваются проблемы маркетинговых коммуникаций (дисциплина профиля магистерской программы «Маркетинговые коммуникации и реклама в современном бизнесе»), будет невозможно без знания основ маркетинга (дисциплина профиля

магистерской программы «Маркетинг»), а с заданием, в котором рассматриваются вопросы стратегии и политики управления человеческими ресурсами (дисциплина профиля магистерской программы «Управление человеческими ресурсами»), – без знания основ стратегического управления (дисциплина профиля магистерской программы «Стратегическое и корпоративное управление») и т.д.

Ответ (критический анализ научной статьи) должен быть хорошо структурированным, логически последовательным и аргументированным.

При выполнении творческого задания участники олимпиады должны продемонстрировать не только понимание текста статьи, широту знаний соответствующих понятий, теорий, концепций, практических подходов, методов и технологий, но и глубину их понимания, умение грамотно оперировать ими, анализировать их взаимосвязь, а также логически связано и аргументировано излагать свою точку зрения, делать выводы, давать критическую оценку. Важными характеристиками «отличного» ответа на творческое задание должны являться умение излагать свои мысли в тексте в стилистике научных работ, а также владение методами научной аргументации. Приветствуются ссылки на монографии, профессиональные источники и литературу, их цитирование, а также практические примеры.

Для освоения специальной англоязычной терминологии по менеджменту см. *Сычева Л.В. Словарь менеджера (Manager's vocabulary): пособие для изучающих «деловой английский».* – М.: Издательство ГУ-ВШЭ, 2003.

Также рекомендуется посмотреть научные статьи в англоязычных печатных и электронных изданиях, соответствующих профилю выбранной участником олимпиады магистерской программы. Базы данных зарубежной периодики см. на <http://library.hse.ru/e-resources/e-resources.htm#journals>.

Во время выполнения олимпиадного задания участникам разрешается пользоваться англо-русским словарем (но *только печатным изданием*, а не электронным).

Критерии оценивания

Профиль «Маркетинг»

№ п/п	Критерии	Балл
1	Верное определение основной исследовательской проблемы предложенной статьи	10
2	Анализ методов исследования, выделение спорных и противоречивых подходов	10
3	Выделение ограничений данного исследования	10
4	Оценка полезности и применимости результатов исследования в работе отечественных маркетологов	10
5	Оценка актуальности вопросов исследования для российских компаний	10
6	Отсутствие фактических ошибок в трактовке содержания статьи, маркетинговых терминов и концепций	10
7	Логичность, последовательность и непротиворечивость изложения ответа	10
8	Знание литературы по проблематике статьи (цитирование, сравнение подходов к исследованиям и т.д.)	10
9	Аргументированные предложения автора (в том числе, касающиеся дополнительных методов исследования, критических замечаний по статье, неординарных трактовок проблематики и т.д.)	20
Итого		100

Профиль «Маркетинговые коммуникации и реклама в современном бизнесе»

№ п/п	Критерий	Балл
1	Полнота ответа: Наличие ответов на все вопросы, предложенные к обсуждению в конце текста \ Количество тем, которые автор работы осветил в эссе.	30
2	Понимание проблематики текста. Автор демонстрирует полное понимание прочитанного текста. Ссылается на ключевые положения статьи, апеллирует к спорным пунктам и т.д.	20
3	Квалификация, научная зрелость. Понимание ключевых процессов и механизмов на рынке медиа и рекламы, автор использует накопленный опыт и знания, может самостоятельно делать взвешенные выводы.	10
4	Теоретическая база. Автор демонстрирует знание наиболее значимых дискуссионных вопросов в маркетинге и теории коммуникаций, грамотно владеет терминологией.	10
5	Работа с фактическим материалом. Ссылка на источники, использование имен, привлечение сторонних данных.	10
6	Логика изложения. Автор четко и доступно излагает свои мысли, убедительно аргументирует собственную точку зрения. Части работы не противоречат друг другу.	10
7	Владение русским языком. Работа демонстрирует хороший литературный русский язык, автор владеет стилем научной статьи или эссе. Отсутствуют грубые грамматические и стилистические ошибки.	5
8	Креативное мышление. Автор демонстрирует нестандартный подход в работе с материалом или стилистике.	5
Итого		100

Профиль «Стратегическое и корпоративное управление»

Система оценки 100-балльная с шагом в 5 баллов.

Вопросы для размышления:

1. В чем суть такого инструмента как «Система сбалансированных показателей», ССП (Balanced scorecard, BSC)?
2. Какие основные проблемы рассматриваются в настоящем исследовании?
3. Насколько корректна приведенная методология исследования, каковы границы ее применимости в изучении данной проблемы?
4. Прокомментируйте основные результаты исследования.

Ответ на оценку «отлично» (80 – 100 баллов)

1. Участник олимпиады должен вкратце, но по существу, описать суть Системы Сбалансированных Показателей (ССП). Необходимо пояснить, что означает понятие «сбалансированная», и чем этот инструмент отличается от других, если участнику таковые известны, как минимум от обычной системы ключевых показателей. Исторически, да и сейчас смысл балансирования – это решение проблемы недостаточности только финансовых показателей. Чтобы «сбалансировать эту однобокость», которая приводила к серьезным проблемам на практике (компании показывали хорошую финансовую отчетность, после чего разваливались), было решено выделить дополнительные «перспективы»: «Клиенты», «Процессы», «Развитие» в рамках которых устанавливались свои показатели. Позже, с понятием «стратегической карты», смысл балансировки углубился за счет установления и отслеживания причинно-следственных связей между показателями как внутри, так и между «перспективами». Приветствуются практические примеры стратегических карт.
2. Участник олимпиады должен четко поставить главную задачу исследования: исследование влияния ССП на «мотивированные решения» (motivated reasoning).

Другими словами, насколько внедрение ССП помогает справиться с проблемой «мотивированных решений» в процессе стратегического управления? Авторы статьи приходят к выводу, что причинно-следственная составляющая ССП, вкупе с вовлечением менеджмента в разработку стратегических инициатив и показателей, уменьшает негативный эффект «мотивированных решений» в процессе стратегического управления. Участник олимпиады должен прокомментировать основные гипотезы исследования, сформулированные в статье.

3. Описание методов проведения исследования, приведенное в статье, участник олимпиады должен сопроводить вытекающими отсюда ограничениями (они тоже есть в выводах) и прокомментировать их. Дополнительные плюсы – если участник олимпиады пытается обосновать какие-либо усовершенствования относительно методов исследования.
4. Необходимо более подробно раскрыть основные результаты исследования, включая гипотезы, не нашедшие подтверждения. В частности то, что как таковое оформление причинно-следственных связей в рамках ССП само по себе не уменьшает эффект «мотивированных решений». Поощряется попытка, как объяснить те или иные выводы, так и предложить возможные перспективы применения результатов исследования.

Ответ на оценку «хорошо» (60 – 79 баллов)

1. Общая суть ССП. Необходимо нарисовать элементарный шаблон стратегической карты или просто указать основные «перспективы» и пояснить, зачем они нужны. Приветствуются практические примеры стратегических карт.
2. Участник олимпиады должен четко поставить главную задачу исследования: исследование влияния ССП на «мотивированные решения» (motivated reasoning). Другими словами, насколько внедрение ССП помогает справиться с проблемой «мотивированных решений» в процессе стратегического управления. Участник олимпиады должен назвать основные гипотезы исследования, сформулированные в статье.
3. Краткое описание примененного метода и перечисление основных ограничений.
4. Необходимо более подробно раскрыть основные результаты исследования, включая гипотезы, не нашедшие подтверждения.

Ответ на оценку «удовлетворительно» (40 – 59 баллов)

1. Трудности с объяснением сути ССП. Общие слова без определения таких понятий, как «стратегическая карта», «перспективы стратегической карты», «использование причинно-следственных связей в ССП» и т.п.
2. Неточная постановка задачи исследования, недостаточно верно истолкованные гипотезы исследования. Однако общая проблематика исследования должна быть достаточно точно сформулирована.
3. Краткий пересказ соответствующего раздела статьи без формулирования ограничений.
4. Перечисление результатов исследования из последнего абзаца статьи. Комментарии, которые указывают на то, что участник олимпиады не разбирается в теме статьи.

Оценка «неудовлетворительно» (0 – 39 баллов)

Профиль «Управление проектами: проектный анализ, инвестиции, технологии реализации»

№ п/п	Критерии	Баллы
1	Автор не только понял все нюансы, изложенные в статье, но и предлагает критический анализ излагаемых подходов, причем демонстрирует знание как теоретических подходов в данной области (управление программами и проектами (УПП)), так и практики УПП в России и за рубежом.	90-100
2	Автор понял все нюансы, изложенные в статье, и предлагает критический анализ излагаемых подходов, причем демонстрирует знание теоретических подходов в области УПП, не упомянутых в данной статье.	80-90

	Автор четко осознает различия и нюансы управления проектами и управления программами.	
3	Автор излагает собственное видение проблем управления программами и проектами, не слишком привязываясь к анализу задания, но демонстрирует при этом знание теории и практики вопроса.	70-80
4	Автор излагает собственное видение проблем УПП, не слишком привязываясь к анализу задания, и не демонстрируя при этом знания теории и практики вопроса.	60-70
5	Попытки подробного пересказа приведенных в тексте статьи идей.	50-60
6	Попытки пересказа текста статьи.	40-50
7	Попытки пересказа текста статьи, из которого следует, что автор не понимает сути вопроса.	30-40

Профиль «Управление человеческими ресурсами»

Статья: Barling J., Weber J., Kelloway E.K. (1996) Effects of transformational leadership training on attitudinal and financial outcomes: A field experiment. // *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 81(6): 827-832.

Система оценки 100-балльная. Ответы на каждый вопрос статьи (всего 5 вопросов) оценивались по 20 балльной шкале.

Статья была изначально подобрана таким образом, чтобы участники олимпиады, хорошо владеющие английским языком, могли найти ответы на все поставленные вопросы (кроме № 4 и № 5) непосредственно в статье. При этом, просто нахождение правильных ответов недостаточно для получения отличной оценки за олимпиадное задание. Поэтому, ответы на все вопросы к статье разделены на две группы: те, что имелись в статье (и наличие которых обеспечивает участнику олимпиады 12-16 баллов из 20 баллов за каждый вопрос), и те, которых в статье не было, но наличие которых отделяет отличные работы от хороших, с соответствующей оценкой 17-20 баллов за каждый вопрос. Предполагается, что участники олимпиады, набравшие менее 12 баллов по 20 балльной шкале за вопрос, до конкурсной планки не дотягивают, поэтому распределение баллов менее 12 остается на рассмотрение проверяющего преподавателя.

Вопрос 1. Каковы основные проблемы, рассматриваемые в статье?

Рассматривается одновременно несколько проблем.

Основная:

Влияние тренинга (обучения) по трансформационному лидерству на три разных показателя эффективности менеджеров-управляющих отделениями банка: 1) изменение лидерских качеств (поведения) менеджеров; 2) изменение приверженности подчиненных к организации; 3) улучшение финансовых показателей работы отделения банка.

Каждая из последующих исследуемых проблем строится на основе предыдущих. Слово **тренинг** (обучение) очень важно – рассматривается не само лидерство, а именно тренинг (и это становится важным при ответах на остальные вопросы). Если это слово упущено в ответе, оценка за вопрос снижается до **11 баллов**, даже если все три показателя указаны.

Для получения оценки в **12 баллов** участник олимпиады должен указать, как минимум, основную проблему, со всеми тремя пунктами (показателями). Если основная проблема не указана, то ставится менее 12 баллов, даже если указаны второстепенные.

Дополнительные проблемы статьи:

○ Тренинг не всего трансформационного поведения (лидерства), а особенно его части – интеллектуальной стимуляции. Ставится дополнительно **2 балла** участникам олимпиады, обнаружившим эту деталь.

○ Участникам олимпиады, нашедшим 1, 2 или 3 дополнительные проблемы, приведенные ниже, ставится соответственно **16, 18, 20 баллов**, т.к. выявление этих проблем указывает на способность к синтезу и анализу информации, а не только пересказу прочитанного материала (вне зависимости от порядка указания, т.е. если участник олимпиады указал еще 2 любые дополнительные проблемы, он получает 18 баллов). Другое количество баллов (например, 17 вместо 16) может быть поставлено, если участник олимпиады не только нашел дополнительную проблему, но и детально объяснил её:

- Проблема того, что изменение стиля лидерства практически возможно – то есть, стилю лидерства можно научить.
- Рассматриваются *причинно-следственные взаимоотношения* между интересующими исследователей конструкциями.
- Рассматриваются одновременно «мягкие» (поведенческие) и «жесткие» (напрямую измеряемые, в данном случае – финансовые) показатели эффективности.

Вопрос 2: Какие из приведенных в статье исследовательских методов и выводов по результатам исследования представляются вам спорными, недостаточно обоснованными? Почему?

Проблем с выводами очень много из-за проблем с дизайном самого исследования. Все основные выводы, сделанные авторами статьи, можно легко подвергнуть сомнению. Баллы за ответы на данный вопрос распределяются следующим образом:

За каждую найденную проблему: **+2 балла**. За каждое *правильное* обоснование: **+ 4 дополнительных балла**. Дополнительные баллы (1-4) распределяются в зависимости от того, насколько логичным и аргументированным было объяснение. При правильном изложении проблемы, но не совсем логичном, не совсем правильном обосновании, частичные баллы могут быть начислены по усмотрению проверяющего преподавателя, но не более 6 баллов за каждую проблему. Таким образом, за все три правильно обоснованные проблемы участник олимпиады получает **до 18 баллов**. Еще два начисляются участникам олимпиады, нашедшим проблему в таблице результатов исследования – 1 балл за нахождение проблемы, и еще 1 балл – за объяснение, аргументацию того, почему это проблема.

Проблема 1. Изменение восприятия подчиненными их руководителей в экспериментальной группе, якобы из-за тренинга трансформационного лидерства.

Проблема заключается в том, что, во-первых, эксперимент не был «чистым». Руководителям в экспериментальной группе разрешалось обсуждать детали их тренинга с подчиненными. Таким образом, подчиненные абсолютно точно знали, что они находятся в экспериментальной группе; подчиненным могло стать известно, какие именно качества исследователи пытались «привить», и они оценили эти качества как более высокие (т.н. Hawthorne effect). Во-вторых, при групповом тренинге разбирались различные типы лидерства, в т.ч. транзакционное. Сказать, что менеджеры «обучались» только трансформационному лидерству, и что только этот тренинг имел эффект, нельзя. Возможно, менеджеры использовали все приемы, а не только трансформационное лидерство. В-третьих, в методе четко указывается, что тренировалось особенно интеллектуальное стимулирование, а подчиненные оценили своих менеджеров более

высоко по всем качествам трансформационного лидерства. То есть, налицо явное преувеличение действительных лидерских способностей лидеров подчиненными.

Проблема 2. Увеличение приверженности работника к организации.

Проблема имеет то же теоретическое обоснование, что и проблема № 1 – то есть, Hawthorne effect и отсутствие «чистого» эксперимента. Верить результатам опроса, когда подчиненные точно знали, что обсуждалось, и отвечали на вопросы о приверженности к организации, можно с сомнением. Участники олимпиады могли расписать эту проблему подробно или сослаться на логику проблемы № 1, если она была обсуждена первой.

Проблема 3. Якобы найден эффект влияния тренинга на финансовые показатели.

Проблема заключается в том, что трудно напрямую измерить эффект влияния на финансы. Во-первых, прошло 5 месяцев, а банковский бизнес, как известно, подвергается циклическим изменениям (например, перед новогодними праздниками число заемов и кредитных карт увеличивается в связи с увеличенными расходами). Не принимая во внимание цикличность банковского бизнеса, нельзя с уверенностью сказать, что результаты финансовой деятельности зависели только от тренинга. Во-вторых, результаты указывают, что в обеих группах количество кредитных карт вообще снизилось после эксперимента (*участникам олимпиады, нашедшим эту деталь, с соответствующим объяснением и аргументацией, добавляется 2 балла*). То есть, не сравнивается, насколько финансовые показатели улучшились в этой группе, а смотрится, насколько они не уменьшились. Это уже совершенно другое сравнение, и налицо явное присутствие какого-то третьего фактора (third variable cause), причинно-следственное влияние которого не было учтено. И еще – показатели финансовой эффективности замерялись на уровне банка при том, что не все работники банка (особенно в крупных банках) были задействованы в исследовании.

Вопрос 3: Каковы ограничения проведенного исследования?

В статье перечислено достаточно большое количество проблем и ограничений данного исследования. В дополнение к этому, есть много не указанных, и участники олимпиады могут найти что-то, не перечисленное ниже. Ставится + 2 балла за каждый пункт (ограничение). Если участники олимпиады указали ограничения, не перечисленные ниже, необходимо аргументировать, что это действительно ограничение. 10 главных ограничений исследования:

1. Маленький размер выборки.
2. Небольшое (узкое) количество потенциальных зависимых переменных (outcome variables). Другие переменные (указаны в статье) также важны.
3. Показатели финансовой эффективности замерялись на уровне банка (более эффективным было бы замерять индивидуальные показатели).
4. Hawthorne effect – отмечен самими исследователями.
5. Отсутствие placebo control group – проблема внутренней валидности.
6. Отсутствовало разделение эффекта группового и индивидуального тренинга – какой именно более эффективен, неизвестно.
7. Ограниченный срок исследования – 5 месяцев. Какой эффект был через месяц? Через год?
8. Тренинг заключался, в основном, в увеличении интеллектуальной стимуляции. Неизвестно, поддаются ли другие компоненты трансформационного лидерства (например, харизма) тренингу?
9. Узкий сектор – банковский. Возможно, в других секторах, где контакт с клиентами меньше (или больше), эффект тренинга окажется совершенно другим.

10. Метод статистического анализа – ANOVA – имеет большое количество проблем, и на такой маленькой выборке возможны ошибки как I, так и II типа, не считая других проблем. Существует много других методов сравнения групп, и для исключения ошибок, можно было перепроверить результаты одним из других методов.

Вопрос 4. Каковы направления использования HR-менеджерами результатов этого исследования?

В этом вопросе возможно некоторое расхождение ответов, т.к. ответ непосредственно зависит от эрудиции и креативности участника олимпиады. Баллы за ответы на вопрос распределяются следующим образом:

8-10 баллов – за указание допустимых направлений использования результатов.

10-12 баллов – за логичный и аргументированный ответ.

Разброс в баллах большой, но все зависит от качества ответа. Участник олимпиады может указать только одно направление, но сделать это настолько аргументировано, что при проверке будет понятно, что он хорошо разбирается в теме. А может перечислить 5, но не объяснить, как это вообще связано с темой и проблематикой статьи.

Обязательное условие: перечисленные направления использования результатов исследования должны напрямую относиться к статье. Например, аргументированное обоснование того, что высокая зарплата увеличивает производительность труда, получает оценку 0 баллов, т.к. к теме статьи и исследования не относится.

Допустимые направления использования результатов исследования:

- Использование тренинга трансформационного лидерства для повышения финансовых показателей эффективности труда, приверженности к организации, восприятия лидерских качеств менеджеров подчиненными.

- Развитие навыков трансформационного лидерства у менеджеров.

- Сравнение эффективности транзакционного и трансформационного лидерства в определенной организации, а затем прицельное применение более эффективного типа лидерства в организации.

Вопрос 5: Являются ли рассмотренные в статье проблемы актуальными для российских организаций?

В то время, как исследования именно в области трансформационного лидерства в России пока еще ограничены, не существует никаких теоретических предпосылок, препятствующих отнесению этой проблемы к актуальным в России. В российских компаниях, как и везде, постоянно решается вопрос производительности труда, текучести персонала и др., то есть любые направления, позволяющие решить эти проблемы, будут приветствоваться. Теория трансформационного и транзакционного лидерства получила широкую эмпирическую поддержку за последние 25 лет, и влияние лидерства на эффективность во всех сферах уже не оспаривается. Тем не менее, эффективность любого метода будет зависеть от конкретных обстоятельств, и то, что применимо в одной компании, может быть неприменимо в другой. Участники олимпиады должны понять и аргументированно указать эту разницу, а не слепо отвергать или принимать какой-то метод.

Баллы за ответы на вопрос распределяются следующим образом:

16-20 баллов: логически аргументированный, содержательный ответ со ссылкой на теории (или их отсутствие) относительно применения описанных методов в российской

практике. Ближе к 20 баллам: участником олимпиады используется именно знание теории. Ближе к 16 баллам: используется исключительно материал статьи.

12-15 баллов: ответ аргументирован, но нет ссылок на теорию, то есть налицо исключительно логические заключения автора.

Менее 12 баллов: логическая аргументация отсутствует.

Профиль «Экономика впечатлений: менеджмент в индустрии гостеприимства и туризме»

№ п/п	Критерии	Баллы
1	Автор полностью и аргументировано ответил на все вопросы для размышления, сформулированные в задании. Продемонстрировано понимание проблемного поля статьи и методов исследования; в работе присутствует критический подход к проведенным в статье исследовательским методам и выводам по результатам исследования. Соображения автора относительно практической значимости проведенного исследования и возможных направлений его развития обоснованы. Автором проанализирована актуальность рассмотренных в статье проблем для российской индустрии гостеприимства и туризма.	90-100
2	Автор ответил на все вопросы для размышления, сформулированные в задании. Продемонстрировано понимание проблемного поля статьи и методов исследования. Предпринята успешная попытка критического подхода к приведенным в статье исследовательскими методами и выводам по результатам исследования и возможных направлений его развития. Работа гармонична и логична. При этом соображения автора в отдельных случаях обоснованы в недостаточной степени.	70-89
3	Ответы на все вопросы для размышления, обозначенные в задании, нашли отражение в работе. Работа позволяет сделать вывод о понимании автором основных положений статьи. Однако соображения автора по существенной части вопросов для размышления, сформулированных в задании, недостаточно аргументированы, или аргументация является неверной.	50-69
4	Автор в целом, но не совсем точно, продемонстрировал понимание проблемного поля статьи и использованных методов исследования. В работе предпринята безуспешная попытка раскрытия всех или почти всех сформулированных вопросов для размышления, однако, аргументация в большинстве случаев является неверной или отсутствует. Значительная часть работы посвящена пересказу статьи.	30-49
5	В работе нашли отражение несколько из поставленных в статье вопросов для размышления. Работа носит описательный, а не аналитический характер. Аргументация слаба, ошибочна или отсутствует.	10-29
6	Ответы на вопросы отсутствуют/ответы на некоторые вопросы отражены, но текст работы позволяет сделать вывод о том, что автор неправильно понял основные положения статьи/ответы практически не связаны с поставленными вопросами.	0-9