

Олимпиада для студентов и выпускников – 2015г. – Демонстрационный вариант
Демонстрационный вариант и методические рекомендации
по направлению «Социология»
профиль «Comparative Social Research»/ «Сравнительные социальные исследования»

ДЕМОНСТРАЦИОННЫЙ ВАРИАНТ

Время выполнения задания – 120 мин

1. Short Essay. Sample comparative-historical problem. 30 minutes. Max 36 points.

Students will be presented with a table with countries as rows and country traits as columns. The table cells will contain either '1', meaning that a trait is present in a given country, or '0', that the trait is not present.

Write an essay that identifies the conditions that are necessary and/or sufficient for a '**High Level of State Pacifism Toward Other Countries**' to emerge in a country based on the presence of the other traits. Students should describe their logic for arriving at the given result and assume the cell entries are correct.

	World War 2 Victor	Internal Armed Conflict	Recent Sexual Revolution	Strong Information Economy	High Religiosity	High Level of State Pacifism Toward Other Countries
Germany	0	0	1	1	0	1
India	0	1	0	1	1	0
Italy	0	0	1	0	1	1
Japan	0	0	0	1	0	1
Turkey	0	1	0	0	1	0
China	1	1	0	0	0	1
France	1	0	1	1	0	0
Russia	1	1	0	1	1	0
USA	1	0	1	1	1	0

2. Section 2. Long Essay. Develop a research proposal. 70 minutes. Max 43 points.

Students should first read a short text by Zygmunt Bauman. Then they answer the following question in an essay:

Zygmunt Bauman argues that the Holocaust is a 'normal' outcome of other processes of modernity. In particular, he singles out bureaucratic efficiency, idealism, and passive populations as central both to modernity and to the outcome of the Holocaust.

Sketch out a research proposal that can test some aspect(s) of this idea today across a range of countries. Be sure to define a research question, define your concepts, list hypotheses and the reasoning behind them, describe in detail the method and its details (sampling, data gathering, analysis technique) that you will use to answer your question.

3. Section 3. Analytical reasoning. 20 minutes. Max 21 points.

The following multiple-choice analytical questions are designed to test your ability to accurately and quickly correctly determine the answer to problems. Please answer the following questions below:

Questions 1 to 5 are based on the following:

Five persons are sitting in a line. One of the two persons, at the farthest ends, is sharp, the other one is fair.

An overweight person is sitting to the right of a feeble person. A tall person is to the left of the fair person and the feeble person is sitting between the sharp and overweight persons.

1. Tall person is at which place counting from right?

- (a) First
- (b) Second
- (c) Third
- (d) Fourth
- (e) Cannot be determined

2. Which of the following depicts the person to the left of feeble person?

- (a) Sharp
- (b) Overweight
- (c) Fair
- (d) Tall
- (e) Cannot be determined

3. Which of the following persons is sitting in the middle?

- (a) Fair
- (b) Feeble
- (c) Sharp
- (d) Tall
- (e) Overweight

4. To whose left is the overweight person sitting?

- (a) Fair
- (b) Sharp
- (c) Tall
- (d) Feeble
- (e) Cannot be determined

5. If the fair person and overweight person swap their position, so also tall and feeble, then who will be sitting to the left of the feeble person?

- (a) Tall
- (b) Fair

- (c) Overweight
- (d) Sharp
- (e) Cannot be determined

6. There are 26 steps in a Church. Plato goes one step in the time it takes Sandy to come down two steps. If they start at the same time and keep their speed uniform, then at which step from bottom will they meet?

- (a) 9th
- (b) 12th
- (c) 13th
- (d) 8th
- (e) Cannot be determined

7. Clorida is taller than Ivory. Emily is taller than Lovely. Lovely is taller than Enamol. To determine who among them is the tallest, which of the following further information, if any, is required?

- (a) Clorida is taller than Enamol and Lovely
- (b) No further information is needed
- (c) Emily is taller than Ivory
- (d) Clorida is taller than Lovely
- (e) Enamol is taller than Clorida

МЕТОДИЧЕСКИЕ РЕКОМЕНДАЦИИ

- Предварительные критерии оценивания

Section	Points breakdown	Max points
Section 1. Short essay on Comparative Historical Problem		36
Correctness of answer	16	
Logical thinking	10	
Writing ability	10	
There is no simple solution to this task. However, we looked to make sure students identified relationships between variables and state pacifism empirically. This means they should also note cases that do not fit into the said pattern and look for other variables that could explain that difference. Also, rather than looking at each variable independently, they could look at patterns of variables in relationship to state pacifism. So we looked to see that the student's claims were accurate according to the data, that their logic was explicit, and that the section was well written.		
Section 2. Long Essay. Research Proposal.		43
Precision of Research Question, defined terms	10	
Appropriateness of Methods for Research Question	5	
Precision of Methods description: sampling, data gathering, analysis technique	5	
Clarity of Hypothesis/'Sensitizing Assumptions' and reasons behind them	8	
Feasibility of Proposal	5	
Writing Ability	10	
We looked to see that a specific research question was defined, ideally a refined and limited one. We also looked for a set of expectations and explanations for this. We also wanted to see a detailed description of methods that could be used to answer this question. Regarding the methods, how are cases selected and why? How would data be collected and analyzed? Ultimately, success here depends on precise definitions of the questions, terms, and linking these explicitly to hypotheses and methods.		
Section 3. Analytical reasoning		21
3 points per correct answer	21	
Correct answers are: b, a, e, c, e (Note: Notice that we do not know which step Plato starts on! Nor do we know in which direction he moves. We also have no idea which step Sandy starts on. Therefore, it is impossible to answer this question.), e.		

- Перечь и содержание тем олимпиадных состязаний

1. Comparative-historical method;
2. Comparative sociology;
3. Basic principles of research design and research proposal writing.

- Список рекомендуемой литературы

The participants should note that the Olympiad tasks will be more about comparative, analytical thinking/logic, than about knowing the content of particular authors in advance.

1. Skocpol, T. States and social revolutions. Cambridge [etc.] Cambridge University Press, 2005;

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2. Inglehart, R. Modernization, cultural change, and democracy. Cambridge [etc.] Cambridge University Press, 2010.
3. Inglehart, R. Modernization and postmodernization. Princeton Princeton University Press, 1997.
4. Other works by Ronald Inglehart on cross-country comparisons

Having harnessed them in the service of a single purpose, it also added stimulus to their further specialization and technical perfection. More, however, than the sheer quantity of tools of destruction, and even their technical quality, what mattered was the way in which they were deployed. Their formidable effectiveness, relied mostly on the subjection of their use to purely bureaucratic, technical considerations (which made their use all but totally immune to the countervailing pressures, such as they might have been submitted to if the means of violence were controlled by dispersed and unco-ordinated agents and deployed in a diffuse way). Violence has been turned into a technique. Like all techniques, it is free from emotions and purely rational. It is, in fact, entirely reasonable, if "reason" means instrumental reason, to apply American military force, B-52's, napalm, and all the rest to "communist-dominated" Viet-Nam (clearly an "undesirable object"), as the "operator" to transform it into a "desirable object".¹⁰

Effects of the hierarchical and functional divisions of labour

Use of violence is most efficient and cost-effective when the means are subjected to solely instrumental-rational criteria, and thus dissociated from moral evaluation of the ends. As I pointed out in the first chapter, such dissociation is an operation all bureaucracies are good at. One may even say that it provides the essence of bureaucratic structure and process, and with it the secret of that tremendous growth of mobilizing and co-ordinating potential, and of the rationality and efficiency of action, which modern civilization has achieved thanks to the development of bureaucratic administration. The dissociation is by and large and outcome of two parallel processes, which are both central to the bureaucratic model of action. The first is the *meticulous functional division of labour* (as additional to, and distinct in its consequences, from linear graduation of power and subordination); the second is the *substitution of technical for a moral responsibility*.

All division of labour (also such division as results from the mere hierarchy of command) creates a distance between most of the contributors to the final outcome of collective activity, and the outcome itself. Before the last links in the bureaucratic chain of power (the direct executors) confront their task, most of the preparatory operations which brought about that confrontation have been already performed by persons who had no personal experience, and sometimes not the

knowledge either, of the task in question. Unlike in a pre-modern unit of work, in which all steps of the hierarchy share in the same occupational skills, and the practical knowledge of working operations actually grows towards the top of the ladder (the master knows the same as his journeyman or apprentice, only more and better), persons occupying successive rungs of modern bureaucracy differ sharply in the kind of expertise and professional training their jobs require. They may be able to put themselves imaginatively into their subordinates' position; this may even help in maintaining 'good human relations' inside the office – but it is not the condition of proper performance of the task, nor of the effectiveness of the bureaucracy as a whole. In fact, most bureaucracies do not treat seriously the romantic recipe that requires every bureaucrat, and particularly those who occupy the top, to 'start from the bottom' so that on the way to the summit they should acquire, and memorize, the experience of the entire slope. Mindful of the multiplicity of skills which the managerial jobs of various magnitudes demand, most bureaucracies practise instead separate avenues of recruitment for different levels of the hierarchy. Perhaps it is true that each soldier carries a marshal's baton in his knapsack, but few marshals, and few colonels or captains for that matter, keep soldiers' bayonets in their briefcases.

What such practical and mental distance from the final product means is that most functionaries of the bureaucratic hierarchy may give commands without full knowledge of their effects. In many cases they would find it difficult to visualize those effects. Usually, they only have an abstract, detached awareness of them; the kind of knowledge which is best expressed in statistics, which measure the results without passing any judgement, and certainly not moral ones. In their files and their minds the results are at best diagrammatically represented as curves or sectors of a circle; ideally, they would appear as a column of numbers. Graphically or numerically represented, the final outcomes of their commands are devoid of substance. The graphs measure the *progress* of work, they say nothing about the nature of the operation or its objects. The graphs make tasks of widely different character mutually exchangeable; only the quantifiable success or failure matter, and seen from that point of view, the tasks do not differ.

All these effects of distance created by the hierarchical division of labour are radically magnified once the division becomes functional. Now it is not just the lack of direct, personal experience of the actual execution of the task to which successive command contribute their share, but also the lack of similarity between the task at hand and the

task of the office as a whole (one is not a miniature version, or an icon, of the other), which distances the contributor from the job performed by the bureaucracy of which he is a part. The psychological impact of such distanciation is profound and far-reaching. It is one thing to give a command to load bombs on the plane, but quite different to take care of regular steel supply in a bomb factory. In the first case, the command-giver may have no vivid, visual impression of the devastation the bomb is about to cause. In the second case, however, the supply manager does not, if he chooses to, have to think about the use to which bombs are put at all. Even in abstract, purely notional knowledge of the final outcome is redundant, and certainly irrelevant as far as the success of his own part of the operation goes. In a functional division of labour, everything one does is in principle *multifinal*; that is, it can be combined and integrated into more than one meaning-determining totality. By itself, the function is devoid of meaning, and the meaning which will be eventually bestowed on it is in no way pre-empted by the actions of its perpetrators. It will be 'the others' (in most cases anonymous and out of reach) who will some time, somewhere, decide that meaning. 'Would workers in the chemical plants that produced napalm accept responsibility for burned babies?' ask Kren and Rappoport. 'Would such workers even be aware that others might reasonably think they were responsible?'¹¹ Of course they wouldn't. And there is no bureaucratic reason why they should. The splitting of the baby-burning process in minute functional tasks and then separating the tasks from each other have made such awareness irrelevant – and exceedingly difficult to achieve. Remember as well that it is chemical plants that produce napalm, not any of their individual workers.

The second process responsible for distanciation is closely related to the first. The substitution of technical for moral responsibility would not be conceivable without the meticulous functional dissection and separation of tasks. At least it would not be conceivable to the same extent. The substitution takes place, to a degree, already within the purely linear graduation of control. Each person within the hierarchy of command is accountable to his immediate superior, and thus is naturally interested in his opinion and his approval of the work. However much this approval matter to him, he is still, though only theoretically, aware of what the ultimate outcome of his work is bound to be. And so there is at least an abstract chance of one awareness being measured against the other; benevolence of superiors being confronted with repulsiveness of the effects. And whenever comparison is feasible, so is the choice.

Within a purely linear division of command, technical responsibility remains, at least in theory, vulnerable. It may still be called to justify itself in moral terms and to compete with moral conscience. A functionary may, for instance, decide that by giving a particular command his superior overstepped his terms of reference, as he moved from the domain of purely technical interest to that charged with ethical significance (shooting soldiers is OK; shooting babies is a different matter); and that the duty to obey an authoritative command does not extend so far as to justify what the functionary considers as morally unacceptable deeds. All these theoretical possibilities disappear, however, or are considerably weakened, once the linear hierarchy of command is supplemented, or replaced, by functional division and separation of tasks. The triumph of technical responsibility is then complete, unconditional, and for all practical purposes, unassailable.

Technical responsibility differs from moral responsibility in that it forgets that the action is a means to something other than itself. As outer connections of action are effectively removed from the field of vision, the bureaucrat's own act becomes an end in itself. It can be judged only by its intrinsic criteria of propriety and success. Hand-in-hand with the vaunted relative autonomy of the official conditioned by his functional specialization, comes his remoteness from the overall effects of divided yet co-ordinated labour of the organization as a whole. Once isolated from their distant consequences, most functionally specialized acts either pass moral test easily, or are morally indifferent. When unencumbered by moral worries, the act can be judged on unambiguously rational grounds. What matters then is whether the act has been performed according to the best available technological know-how, and whether its output has been cost-effective. Criteria are clear-cut and easy to operate.

For our topic, two effects of such context of bureaucratic action are most important. First is the fact that the skills, expert knowledge, inventiveness and dedication of actors, complete with their personal motives that prompted them to deploy these qualities in full, can be fully mobilized and put to the service of the overall bureaucratic purpose even if (or perhaps because) the actors retain relative functional autonomy towards this purpose and even if this purpose does not agree with the actors' own moral philosophy. To put it bluntly, *the result is the irrelevance of moral standards for the technical success of the bureaucratic operation*. The instinct of workmanship, which according to Thorstein Veblen is present in every actor, focuses fully on proper

performance of the job in hand. The practical devotion to the task may be further enhanced by the actor's craven character and severity of his superiors, or by the actor's interest in promotion, the actor's ambition or disinterested curiosity, or by many other personal circumstances, motives, or character features – but, on the whole, workmanship will suffice even in their absence. By and large, the actors want to excel; whatever they do, they want to do well. Once, thanks to the complex functional differentiation within bureaucracy, they have been distanced from the ultimate outcomes of the operation to which they contribute, their moral concerns can concentrate fully on the good performance of the job at hand. Morality boils down to the commandment to be a good, efficient and diligent expert and worker.

Dehumanization of bureaucratic objects

Another, equally important effect of bureaucratic context of action is *dehumanization of the objects of bureaucratic operation*; the possibility to express these objects in purely technical, ethically neutral terms.

We associate dehumanization with horrifying pictures of the inmates of concentration camps – humiliated by reducing their action to the most basic level of primitive survival, by preventing them from deploying cultural (both bodily and behavioural) symbols of human dignity, by depriving them even of recognizably human likeness. As Peter Marsh put it, 'Standing by the fence of Auschwitz, looking at these emaciated skeletons with shrunken skin and hollowed eyes – who could believe that these were really people?'¹² These pictures, however, represent only an extreme manifestation of a tendency which may be discovered in all bureaucracies, however benign and innocuous the tasks in which they are currently engaged. I suggest that the discussion of the dehumanizing tendency, rather than being focused on its most sensational and vile, but fortunately uncommon, manifestations, ought to concentrate on the more universal, and for this reason potentially more dangerous, manifestations.

Dehumanization starts at the point when, thanks to the distancing, the objects at which the bureaucratic operation is aimed can, and are, reduced to a set of quantitative measures. For railway managers, the only meaningful articulation of their object is in terms of tonnes per kilometre. They do not deal with humans, sheep, or barbed wire; they only deal with the cargo, and this means an entity consisting entirely of

measurements and devoid of quality. For most bureaucrats, even such a category as cargo would mean too strict a quality-bound restriction. They deal only with the financial effects of their actions. Their object is money. Money is the sole object that appears on both input and output ends, and *pecunia*, as the ancients shrewdly observed, definitely *non olet*. As they grow, bureaucratic companies seldom allow themselves to be confined to one qualitatively distinct area of activity. They spread sideways, guided in their movements by a sort of *lucrotropism* – a sort of gravitational pulling force of the highest returns on their capital. As we remember, the whole operation of the Holocaust was managed by the Economic Administration Section of the *Reichssicherheitshauptamt*. We know that this one assignment, exceptionally, was not intended as a stratagem or a camouflage.

Reduced, like all other objects of bureaucratic management, to pure, quality-free measurements, human objects lose their distinctiveness. They are already dehumanized – in the sense that the language in which things that happen to them (or are done to them) are narrated, safeguards its referents from ethical evaluation. In fact, this language is unfit for normative-moral statements. It is only humans that may be objects of ethical propositions. (True, moral statements do extend sometimes to other, non-human living beings; but they may do so only by expanding from their original anthropomorphic foothold.) Humans lose this capacity once they are reduced to ciphers.

Dehumanization is inextricably related to the most essential, rationalizing tendency of modern bureaucracy. As all bureaucracies affect in some measure some human objects, the adverse impact of dehumanization is much more common than the habit to identify it almost totally with its genocidal effects would suggest. Soldiers are told to shoot *targets*, which *fall* when they are *hit*. Employees of big companies are encouraged to destroy *competition*. Officers of welfare agencies operate *discretionary awards* at one time, *personal credits* at another. Their objects are *supplementary benefit recipients*. It is difficult to perceive and remember the humans behind all such technical terms. The point is that as far as the bureaucratic goals go, they are better not perceived and not remembered.

Once effectively dehumanized, and hence cancelled as potential subjects of moral demands, human objects of bureaucratic task-performance are viewed with ethical indifference, which soon turns into disapprobation and censure when their resistance, or lack of co-operation, slows down the smooth flow of bureaucratic routine.