

Направление: «Политология»

Профиль: «Прикладная политология»

КОД - 230

Время выполнения задания – 180 минут, язык – русский и английский.

1. Напишите эссе на одну из предложенных тем:

1) Результаты выборов в Государственную Думу 2016 г. показали, что экономический спад последних лет не привел к росту политических протестных настроений в российском обществе. Как Вы можете объяснить этот феномен? Какие возможности и риски несет такая ситуация для российской власти?

2) В последние годы в разных странах мира нередки случаи серьезного расхождения между данными предвыборных опросов общественного мнения и результатами выборов. В чем причины? Как усилить прогностические возможности предвыборной социологии?

3) Как экономический кризис влияет на политическую ситуацию в регионах России?

4) Во многих развивающихся странах признается необходимость институциональных реформ. Тем не менее, реализовать их в полном объеме удается крайне редко. В чем политические причины и механизмы этого явления?

5) В чем сила и в чем слабость гибридных режимов с точки зрения политической стабильности?

2. Прочитайте фрагмент текста на английском языке и ответьте на вопросы по тексту (также на английском языке)

A skeptical reader might scratch his head and ask why dictators and the organizations that launch them have to engage in a power struggle. Why can't the dictator offer to be a benign despot, and the leadership of the launching organization accept his offer?

This benign despot outcome is at the heart of widely cited stationary bandit model of dictatorships. In this framework, dictators are assumed to face no threat to their survival, and thus operate as “stationary bandits.” They therefore have long time horizons, giving them fiscal incentives to enforce property rights universally, invest in public goods, and tax at the long-run revenue-maximizing rate. They then spend all tax revenues in excess of that necessary to enforce property rights and create public goods on conspicuous consumption. Przeworski et al. (2000) advance a similar argument, but make even stronger claims. They agree that a long-lived dictator will have an incentive to defend property rights, but then go on to argue that the real threat to property rights comes from democracies, because organized social groups can vote in favor of income redistribution. They assert, in fact, that most non-communist dictatorships are committed to defending private property, and further claim that the probability that a democracy will fail actually increases investment.

As Acemoglu et al. (2004) have shown, the strong claims made by Przeworski et al. are a product of mis-specified regressions: their econometric results fall apart as soon as researchers control for omitted variables in simple ways, such as adding country fixed effects.

Moreover, as a matter of history, the kind of benign despots/stationary bandits are quite rare. The case study literature about long-lived dictatorships indicates, in fact, that they are highly predatory. For every benign despot like Lee Kuan Yew, there are a dozen predators like Juan Vicente Gómez, Fulgencio Batista, Ferdinand Marcos, Rafael Trujillo, Anastasio Somoza, François and Jean Claude Duvalier, Idi Amin, Mobutu Sese Seko, Suharto, Robert Mugabe, and Blaise Campaore, whose modus operandi is to appropriate everything they can.

There are theoretical reasons why the benign despot/stationary bandit solution occurs so rarely. First, the stationary bandit model assumes that the dictator can see how the exercise of his power in the short run diminishes his long-run accumulation of wealth. Second, it assumes that dictators have infinite time horizons. The problem is, of course, that no one lives forever. The older the dictator grows, the more he will discount the future, and as his discount factor increases the more likely he will be to increase taxes and seize property. Finally, it assumes that the dictator's allies — the leadership of the group that helped bring him to power — are lacking in selfinterest: the dictator may extract social surplus by keeping for himself the difference between what he obtains from taxes and spends on public goods; but his allies seek nothing more than the opportunity to compete on a level playing field against everyone else in the economy. In short, the stationary bandit solution is rare because it has an underlying model of politics in which there are no politics.

- 1) Назовите ключевую характеристику автократа в модели «оседлого» («стационарного») бандита, которая позволяет ему проводить благоприятную для общества политику.
- 2) Кратко поясните смысл словосочетания “to discount the future”.
- 3) Какой статистический метод анализа использовали Пшеворский с соавторами?
- 4) Почему в модели политики, лежащей в основе теории «оседлого» бандита, «нет политики»?

