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АНГЛИЙСКИЙ ЯЗЫК

Время выполнения задания – 180 мин., язык – русский.

I. Выберите только одну из предложенных тем и напишите эссе по этой теме:

1. Теории исторической памяти
2. Как работать с архивными материалами XX века
3. История и время

II. Прочитайте предложенную статью на английском языке. Напишите рецензию на русском языке, охарактеризовав цель, которую ставит автор статьи, источники, на которые он опирается, задачи, которые решаются в статье. Кратко охарактеризуйте выводы, к которым приходит автор. Объем рецензии – не более 30-40 строк письменного текста (1 – 1, 5 страницы) на листе формата А4.
Review Article

The Bureaucratic Phenomena of Imperial Russia, 1700–1905

MARC RAEFF

The appearance of the monograph Pravitel'stvennyi apparat samoderzhavnoi Rossi v XIX veke [The Governmental Apparatus of Autocratic Russia in the Nineteenth Century] by P. A. Zaionchkovskii, the distinguished Soviet chronicler of Russian political history of the last century, offers occasion to take stock of recent scholarship dealing with the government of the empire.1 Indeed, since the 1950s in the West and more recently (and increasingly so) in the Soviet Union, substantial work has been done to obtain a comprehensive picture of the workings of imperial institutions and their personnel. Unquestionably, an exhaustive account of that literature cannot be given in an article, particularly since an excellent and quite full survey of the major published studies is available in an earlier review article by Daniel T. Orlovsky.2 Furthermore, many recent contributions, based on extensive archival research, are still unpublished in doctoral dissertations and conference papers. My own modest aim here is to identify and assess the more significant conclusions reached by these studies and raise some questions for future research.

As is the case of most governments, but perhaps to a greater degree in imperial Russia, the working of the state apparatus and its personnel is intimately tied to the country’s social and cultural life. Consequently, the dimension of time—the evolution of society and culture—should always be kept in mind; and, if it has done nothing else, the research of recent decades has graphically revealed the changing governmental structures behind a facade of seemingly immutable forms.3 At least two major periods, dividing from each other somewhere between 1815 and 1848, may now be distinguished.

In the preparation of this essay I have used, along with published books and articles, a number of typescripts that were kindly shown to me. Naturally, the coverage is far from complete, since I am not in direct contact with all of the researchers active in this particular area of Russian history. I wish to thank the authors or editors of the unpublished material for the generosity and collegial spirit with which they have shared their work.

3 For a formal overview of the major institutions of the empire, see Erik Amburger, Geschichte der Behördenorganisation Russlands von Peter dem Großen bis 1917, Studien zur Geschichte Osteuropas, no. 10.

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in the evolution of the imperial regime. These two major epochs may, of course, be further subdivided; the reigns of Catherine II in the eighteenth century and of Nicholas I in the nineteenth were the seminal periods for the gestation of subsequent, far-reaching transformations. The dynamic picture thus obtained is the most significant achievement of recent scholarship, but there is still much dispute as to the basic forces and tensions that compose this dynamics.

A MAJOR REASON FOR THIS LACK OF CONSENSUS is the close connection that Peter the Great's Table of Ranks of 1722 established between the governmental apparatus and the country's social structure. As a result of that connection, much of the research and literature on government personnel gets entangled with the complex questions of the empire's social stratification and economic structure. Russian historians in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (mostly of "liberal" political persuasion), parroting West European bourgeois prejudices, saw in the imperial state apparatus a mechanism for social, economic, and cultural oppression by the nobility. Naturally, Marxism—that quintessential bourgeois ideology—followed suit, further emphasizing the evil, conspiratorial character of the apparatus. Imperial policies were thus easily explained away as measures taken in the interest of the serf- and land-owning nobility. Difficulties did arise, of course, in trying to account for the state's repeated espousal of and resort to policies inimical to the selfish class interests of the nobility, the most dramatic instance of which was the emancipation of the serfs in the reign of Alexander II. In this perspective, a major issue was the effectiveness of the Table of Ranks in tying membership in the imperial administration to noble status and privilege. Scholars have found themselves confronted with the problem of whether rank actually depended on service (as the legislation would have it) or on noble status (whatever that meant in the Russian context—quite a vexing problem in itself). A related issue was the economic status of government officials: Did high rank entail wealth or did great wealth facilitate attainment of high rank? These problems have not been easy to resolve since the available documentation has been spotty and unsatisfactory. Literary evidence and obiter dicta provided the grounds for generalizations that clearly had political implications. But some real progress has recently been made in this area of concern.

Following the pioneer effort of Walter M. Pintner, several scholars—the late Sergei M. Troitskii, M. D. Rabinovich, and Brenda Meehan-Waters for the eighteenth century and Richard S. Wortman, W. Bruce Lincoln, and now P. A. Zaionchkovskii for the nineteenth—have studied the socio-economic
profiles of select groups of Russian government and army officials. Service records found for some institutions have enabled these scholars to reconstruct career patterns and establish the social background and economic circumstances of some officials. We should note, first, that the bulk of this unfortunately spotty evidence pertains to officials in the higher ranks, whose lives and fortunes were naturally better documented than those of their subordinates or "inferiors." These sources, furthermore, are insufficient to trace the antecedents of the officials studied, so that with the exception of very prominent families we rarely have meaningful information for more than one generation. Thus, it is almost impossible to establish whether a given official or group of officials descended from the old Boiars or merely from families recently ennobled through service. The same difficulty arises in connection with property: had it been in the family for several generations or was it newly acquired as a result of service opportunities? The sources rarely tell us. In spite of these limitations, certain broad conclusions do emerge that provide specific data and some statistical information (for those who put greater faith in quantitative over qualitative evidence) to support previous generalizations and to qualify idées reçues.

From these scholars’ findings the officials in the Russian imperial government clearly constituted a distinct social group that expanded in arithmetic progression throughout the eighteenth century and grew in geometric progression in the nineteenth. The groups’ membership was relatively open to newcomers and its status was not exclusively dependent upon birth, family, or wealth. These studies have also conclusively demonstrated that the bulk of the officials owned neither serfs nor land (or owned them in negligible amounts), although the highest dignitaries often were, of course, quite wealthy. To infer therefrom that state service (including favoritism and patronage) provided access to wealth rather than that wealth was a precondition for successful service would be reasonable. On the basis of admittedly fragmentary evidence Zaionchkovskii concluded, incidentally, that Russian officialdom at the end of
the nineteenth century did not get much involved in capitalist forms of wealth (shares, stocks, factories, and the like) and that apparently the regulations against conflicts of interest in this form were rather effective.\footnote{For the situation in the eighteenth century, see Troitskii, \textit{Rosskii absoliutizm i dvorianstvo v XVIII v.}; and, for the end of the nineteenth century, see the data collected in Zaionchkovskii, \textit{Pravitel'stvennyi apparat samoderzhavnoi Rossi v XIX v.}, chap. 4.}

Just as a bottle may be viewed as either half empty or half full, historians can say, on the one hand, that the Petrine legislation was ineffective because so many officials (especially in the upper ranks) were nobles or, on the other, that it was effective because so many other officials (especially in the middle and lower echelons) were of nonnoble backgrounds. Naturally, over several generations members of Russia's officialdom had a better chance for promotion to the upper ranks than did outsiders in entering those ranks and, thus, came to constitute the upper stratum of service, especially since rank (according to the Table of 1722) did entail noble status until the end of the imperial regime in spite of increasingly restrictive patterns of promotion. Nor should it be forgotten, as we are reminded by Helju A. Bennett,\footnote{Bennett, “Chiny, Ordena, Autocracy: Institutions Affecting Officialdom in Russia,” in Pintner and Rowney, \textit{Russian Officialdom from the 17th to the 20th Century}, chap. 7.} that decorations and knightly orders awarded for length of service also conferred noble status; longevity in service in itself could, therefore, be the first step of a successful career pattern for the children and grandchildren of an official. In the eighteenth century the high proportion of nobles in service, despite the “democratic” provisions of the Petrine Table of Ranks, should not be surprising, especially in view of the role of the military in the administration.\footnote{Robert D. Givens, “Eighteenth-Century Nobiliary Career Patterns and Provincial Government,” in Pintner and Rowney, \textit{Russian Officialdom from the 17th to the 20th Century}, chap. 5.} The Russian state had no alternative sources for recruiting its officials; unlike the \textit{anciens régimes} of Prussia and France, Russia did not have a rural or an urban “bourgeoisie,” petty local officials (patrimonial or provincial), learned professions (clerical, legal, or medical), and so forth. This restricted pool for recruitment helps explain the employment of the children of soldiers and clergy along with ethnic outsiders (the Ukrainians, for instance), the common practice of the Russian government from the late eighteenth century onward. Naturally, after 1861 recruitment into the lower ranks of government service was expanded still further to include the new social groups that emerged as a consequence of the empire’s rapid modernization.

Although the tsar’s service in Muscovy had provided land and serfs, after Peter the Great these perquisites were no longer automatic. In the course of the eighteenth century this pattern became even less normal, and it virtually disappeared during the nineteenth. To accept the notion that the imperial service class was representative of the serf- and land-owning nobility is, therefore, difficult. And did officials necessarily have to represent the economic interests of others? Did they have to serve as instruments of another class? This conspiratorial view of government, held by the French liberals and revolutionaries of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, was
taken over by that most representative of bourgeois ideologists Karl Marx, and, couched in general terms, became unquestioned truth for many. But, as Roland Mousnier has effectively argued, economic interests were not necessarily the main motive for group behavior; prior to the development of "modern" economic structures, status and the intangibles of glory and prestige could be just as important.\textsuperscript{10} Status conferred by state service was crucial in the Russian case, for the government was quite parsimonious about material compensation while very generous in providing outward marks of authority that, incidentally, could in turn provide opportunities for graft—a significant item in view of the low salaries.\textsuperscript{11} This consideration justifies the inclusion in officialdom of clerks and other officials below those who comprised the hierarchy in the Table of Ranks; for these more lowly servants of the state shared with their superiors an authority and the extralegal sources of revenue denied anyone outside of officialdom, and their children frequently enjoyed preferential treatment if they followed in their fathers' paths.\textsuperscript{12} Their inclusion received legal recognition and appropriate regulation through the creation of chancery clerkships in the reign of Nicholas I.\textsuperscript{13}

In view of this situation and the rapid expansion of the number of officials, the highest-ranking dignitaries were in a particularly favorable position to perpetuate their pre-eminence. The personal nature of the autocrat's power and the limited circle from which Peter the Great and his successors could draw their servants tended to restrict the candidates for high office to members of those older families whose role in the government had become traditional.\textsuperscript{14} Quite naturally, these officials endeavored to preserve their position by inbreeding and socially discriminating against newcomers.\textsuperscript{15}


\textsuperscript{11} For several illustrations of budgets of individuals and of salary scales, see Zaionchkovskii, \textit{Prawitel'stvennyi apparat samoderzhavnoi Rossii v XIX v.}, 81-90.

\textsuperscript{12} Troitskii, \textit{Russkii absolutizm i dvorianstvo v XVIII v.} For the problem of bureaucratic morality in particular, see Torke, "Das russische Beamtenstum in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts," 224.


\textsuperscript{15} Only a small number of the foreigners taken into imperial service in the reign of Peter the Great were assimilated into the Russian "aristocratic elite" in the first half of the eighteenth century.
of decisive importance at court and in the top echelons of government. These dignitaries, in turn, had their own clienteles and cliques, whose members they tried to place in strategic service positions. The dignitaries' own positions were, however, as often as not determined by the sovereign's favor. The resultant personal insecurity, instability, and rivalry within this group largely explains why it did not constitute an oligarchy sensu stricto—the attempt of 1730 in that direction ended in complete failure. It is the particular merit of Brenda Meehan-Waters to have shown the survival of this pattern from Muscovite to post-Petrine times and of David L. Ransel to have illustrated its operation during the reign of Catherine II. Jean-Pierre LeDonne has rounded out the picture by demonstrating that service with specific cliques of dignitaries substantially influenced the recruitment and appointment of senators and governors. Similar studies are needed to verify the impression that the pattern continued in the nineteenth century, at least at court and among the innermost circles of imperial advisors. Although not necessarily entrusted with administrative positions, those most influential around the ruler not only formed cliques but were themselves members of, or associated through marriage with, clans that had been prominent in this manner. Only occasionally did a complete outsider—like General A. A. Arakcheev or General A. Kh. Benkendorf, for example—reach such an official position of influence; and the general scorn in which such an outsider was held often arose less from his policies than from his status as an upstart or outsider. One might perhaps push the point further and ask whether the well-attested, interdepartmental rivalries (for example, interior versus finance) at the end of the nineteenth century were not an updated form of the clique politics that had dominated the eighteenth century. The events of the last decade of the reign of Nicholas II would seem to provide indirect evidence that such a situation still obtained and that it contributed significantly to the violent end of the imperial regime.

The question of the demise of the imperial regime leads to the often-mentioned, but not well-studied, central problem of Russian political history and thought, that of the nature of the autocrat's power and role. In recent years some work has been done on this facet of the imperial regime, and older

16 For the most recent account of the crisis of 1730, see James Cracraft, "The Succession Crisis of 1730: A View from the Inside," Canadian American Slavic Studies, 12 (Spring 1978): 60–85. Also see Meehan-Waters, Autocracy and Aristocracy: The Russian Elite, 1689–1761, chap. 6.


19 We need a study along these lines of the so-called Unofficial Committee of Alexander I and of the "Senatorial Party" in the same reign as well as of the prominent members of the court and the Ministry of Domains in the reigns of Alexander II and Alexander III. Equally important is a prosopographical investigation of the emperor's fligel' ad'utamity.
The Bureaucratic Phenomena of Imperial Russia

studies exist for the earlier period. The late Michael Cherniavsky made several provocative observations about the image of the ruler and its relationship to the people. Bruce Lincoln, P. A. Zaionchkovskii, and Theodore K. Taranovski have tried to describe and analyze the autocrat’s authority and role in the cases of Nicholas I and Alexander III. So far, however, these efforts have largely focused on specific personalities of rulers and favorites and have tended, as a consequence, to underscore individual subjective traits. Yet, as Taranovski has made clear in his study, the power of the autocrat as an institution remained intact throughout the entire imperial regime. The institutional authority of autocracy proved to be decisive at strategic moments in the regime’s history—for example, during the Decembrist revolt, the emancipation of the serfs, and “counterreforms” of the 1880s, and the aftermath of 1905.

One thing is, however, clear: inasmuch as the officials increasingly depended upon service for their livelihood, responsibility, and status, they were loath to abandon their special personal relationship to the sovereign. Their reluctance is particularly understandable since no regularized system of law and judicial hierarchy protected them in the performance of their duties or safeguarded them from the consequences of even routine actions. Furthermore, as the officials did not represent—or identify with—any social or economic class, they had no power base outside that of the autocrat. They developed their professional ethos and personal system of values entirely in terms of their loyalty to the person of the ruler and their function as his representatives and executors. Until the late eighteenth century this attitude was further reinforced by the great insecurity of person and property to which the dignitaries and their clientele were exposed (without any regard for their “noble” status). As Meehan-Waters has shown so well, confiscation of property, exile, and imprisonment were the ever-present threats (and all too often the lots as well) of the seemingly high and mighty in the first half of the

The sense of insecurity waned in the reign of Catherine II, but it revived under Paul I. With Alexander I and his successors, the life and property of the officials became more secure but their position and status did not; the old syndrome of insecurity was not easily overcome. As Taranovski has shown, concern for one’s position in the hierarchy remained a powerful, even the determining, factor in the behavior and decisions of high officials to the very end of the regime. Manipulation of this situation enabled Alexander II to get the emancipation enacted and Alexander III to implement the policy of counterreforms. The absence of a genuine code and the inadequacies of the judiciary system—even after its thoroughgoing reform in 1864—only served to perpetuate the conditions that permitted the autocrat to preserve the full range of his personal power for intervention and decision, precluding the development of a true Rechtsstaat guaranteeing the security of officials as well as of the subjects.

Among the most important findings of recent scholarship is the changing nature of Russian officialdom, more particularly the seminal role of the transformations in the first half of the nineteenth century. The impression gained, which needs underpinning through further detailed study, is that the groundwork for change was laid in the reign of Alexander I, although the much better-documented reign of Nicholas I logically extended and brought to completion the process begun at the start of the century. First, officialdom separated from the serf- and land-owning class, even from educated “society” tout court. Indeed, an educated elite whose members led private lives independent of the government arose in Russia for the first time during the reign of Alexander I. The most visible signs of that process are the emergence of professional writers (Nikolai Karamzin and Alexander Pushkin, for example), of literary societies (Arzamas, “Friendly Literary Society,” and the like), and of the growing number of public lectures and other academic interests among the upper classes of the two capitals. These manifestations were accom-
panied by a growth in the number of officials and their increasing professionalization. One of the landmarks of this process was the set of acts that made educational achievement (as tested by examinations) a requirement for promotion.\(^{30}\) That this legislation was strenuously resisted and frequently breached is certainly true, but in the long run it proved effective in changing the character of officialdom.\(^{31}\) Education increasingly became a requirement for any member of the elite, most particularly for those who served the state. To make fulfilling these educational requirements possible, new universities and elite schools (such as the lycées of Bezborodko and Tsarskoe Selo) were established and new disciplines (such as public law, statistics, and political economy) were introduced into the curriculum at the same time that academic contacts with the West were intensified and expanded.\(^{32}\)

As Pintner, Lincoln, and Wortman have well documented and the material in Zaionchkovskii’s monograph confirms, the trend was reinforced in the reign of Nicholas I—a reign that, despite its “conservative” or even “reactionary” character and stultifying spiritual atmosphere, was seminal in the development of professional and technical education in Russia.\(^{33}\) During this period the first generation of “liberal” professional bureaucrats was trained and formed. This group was entirely dependent on the state for its livelihood and careers and exclusively devoted to the good and interests of the country, insofar as those bureaucrats conceived that good and these interests.\(^{34}\) Noteworthy also is the training of a group of legal experts (a by-product of Michael Speranskii’s efforts at codification), who subsequently produced the great judiciary reform of 1864 and introduced some of the notions and ideals of a Rechtsstaat into Russian public life after 1861.\(^{35}\) That these legal experts were so few and that they did not take control of the bureaucratic apparatus (largely because codification was not brought to full conclusion) served to preserve the traditional role of the autocrat and to maintain the older ethos and methods intact.\(^{36}\) As a result, additional strain and conflict developed within the ranks of officialdom, and administrative arbitrariness continued to reign unfettered.

This process also resulted in a sharper cleavage between the staffs in the

\(^{30}\) For the best account, see Torke, “Das russische Beamtenkum in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts,” chap. 3.

\(^{31}\) Harold A. McFarlin has an interesting reading of Gogol’s “Overcoat” in light of the legislation on educational requirements for promotion; see his forthcoming article in Canadian American Slavic Studies.


\(^{33}\) In addition to the works of these scholars cited above, see Nicholas Riasanovsky, A Parting of the Ways: Government and the Educated Public in Russia, 1801-1855 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976; pp. viii, 323).


\(^{35}\) Wortman’s The Development of a Russian Legal Consciousness has superseded all previous studies on that subject.

\(^{36}\) For an illuminating analysis of the Polizeistaat and Rechtsstaat orientations within imperial officialdom, see Taranovski, “The Politics of Counter-Reform: Autocracy and Bureaucracy in the Reign of Alexander III,” esp. chap. 3.
central governmental institutions and those in the provincial administrative offices. A functional specialization developed, first among central and local officials and then within departments like finance, interior, and transportation. The "generalist" of the eighteenth century who moved from military to civil duties and from central to local offices and back again became increasingly rare. The results were not necessarily beneficial; in the absence of serious prospects for promotion to the central institutions, the local officials became an inferior category of second raters, stuck in routine and afraid of change. Their shortcomings delayed the "systematization of government," in George L. Yaney's somewhat cumbersome but correct phrase, and the inability of the central government to reach all of its subjects effectively proved to be a serious handicap to the implementation of reforms and to the economic modernization of the country. Richard G. Robbins, Jr., Taranovski, and Zaionchkovskii have shown that the local administrations, especially the governors and their staffs, were the main support of the truly reactionary efforts to undo the reforms of Alexander II and to turn the clock back in the 1880s and 1890s. They exacerbated the conflict between "government" and "society" and dangerously eroded the willingness of the dynamic elements of society to support the regime.

On the basis of studies by Lincoln and Taranovski, which find graphic illustration in the detailed analyses of the emancipation by P. A. Zaionchkovskii, Terence Emmons, and Daniel Field, Russian officialdom from the middle of the nineteenth century divided into "liberal" and reform-minded administrators and conservative, though not necessarily reactionary, officials. Whether the split was fundamentally ideological in nature (as Taranovski has suggested) may be questioned—at least until further evidence is amassed. But a split obviously did occur, and it did interfere with the proper implementation of the great reforms and the smooth functioning of administration and did enable Alexander III to introduce his nefarious counter-

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reforms. That split surely also contributed to the failure of a Rechtsstaat to emerge in Russia. It is indeed arguable that, in the absence of clearly defined administrative rules and fully codified law, a genuine bureaucratic system could not develop, despite the presence of many particular phenomena of bureaucracy. Almost in spite of themselves, both Wortman and Taranovski, who have shown the presence of a legal consciousness among some high officials and who have tried hard to make the judiciary reform of 1864 a major turning point in the history of the imperial system, are led to chronicle and document the ultimate failure of the struggle for a rule of law. Imperial Russia had become a Reglamentsstaat but never became a Rechtsstaat; the emperor's Macht spruch remained an ever-present reality, even if it was not always invoked.

Crucial to the nature and role of government officials in determining the destinies of the country was their relationship to the people. How did this bureaucracy work? How did the various offices and institutions of the government, both local and central, operate? Only the very first steps have been taken so far to answer these questions—and only for the later period of the empire at that. Several dissertations and monographs have been concerned with specific institutions (the ministries of education and interior or the office of the land captain, for example), and some important administrative events have also received monographic treatment (like the governmental response to the famine of 1891). Detailed descriptions of the elaboration of significant legislation have been undertaken and some results are available on the emancipation of the serfs, the establishment of the zemstvos, the reform of the judiciary, the implementation of the counterreforms, the revision of the election rules, and the institution of Peter Stolypin's agrarian reforms. But what is needed are concrete analyses of the relationship between officials and subjects, of the images and perceptions on the part of both administrators and administered, and of the mythology of power. Literature can, of course, be revealing in many respects; but the works of Michael Saltykov-Shchedrin, Vladimir Korolenko, and Alexander Kuprin as well as of Nikolai Gogol and Fedor Dostoevsky (to name but a few) are fraught with polemical and ideological distortions and frequently merely serve to reinforce stereotypes rather than to come to grips with reality.

42 I am, of course, aware of the danger of using Prussia as a yardstick or setting up an ideal type against which to measure historical reality. But for heuristic purposes it can be very suggestive.
43 Jean-Pierre LeDonne's comprehensive study of eighteenth-century administration will, no doubt, fill the gap for the earlier period. In the meantime, we have to rely upon the formal descriptive handbooks. See L. A. Steshenko and K. A. Sofronenko, Gosudarstvennyi stroi Rossii v pervoi chetverti XVIII veka (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1973; pp. 120); and A. V. Chernov, Gosudarstvennye uchrezhdeniia Rossii v XVIII veke (Moscow: Moskovskii gosudarstvenny istoriko-arkhivnyi institut, 1960; pp. 579).
45 Robbins, Famine in Russia, 1891-1892: The Imperial Government Responds to a Crisis.
A significant facet of the interaction between government and population is the relationship between officials and society. Russian historians have assumed that, from the eighteenth century onward, and more particularly since the reign of Nicholas I, government and society starkly opposed one another. This opposition allegedly existed even when officialdom presumably consisted primarily of nobles; yet the nobles of that time perceived the official as an enemy. The conflict between the nobility and officialdom came into the open at the time of the elaboration of the great reforms under Alexander II. The officials—that is, the government—were seen as the enemies of society—that is, the serf- and land-owning nobility. And in the short run most reforms were certainly detrimental to the so-called ruling class of imperial Russia. Little wonder, therefore, that the bureaucracy—the state—came to be viewed as the primary enemy not only by the intelligentsia and revolutionaries but also by educated society, mainly the landowners and professional people. This vast subject still awaits its investigators, though such studies as those by Emmons on the emancipation and Robbins on the famine have done a great deal to bring the topic into focus and to illuminate some of its features. As recent dissertations written under the direction of Leopold H. Haimson have shown, Russian officials (however misguided their actual policies were) by and large were more concerned with peasants and workers than with the bourgeoisie, the landowners, and the nobles.46 A policy pattern that came home to roost began under Stolypin, who endeavored to restructure public life by striking an alliance with the land-owning nobility (at least their economically viable sector).

This situation also lay at the root of the conflicts between local society and local officials and the ambivalences that arose in connection with devising local administrative structures. The unhappy history of the zemstvos and of the various efforts to delegate local administrative functions to truly representative individuals amply illustrate these difficulties. The main cause of these unfortunate developments was that, in contrast to the practices of England, Prussia, and post-Napoleonic France, the Russian imperial regime could not, and did not wish to, draw on the services of local notables. Hence, the officials (both central and local) remained distinct from the elite of society. The realities of government were not those of society, and the languages expressing the two realities were never the same.47 The lack of an adequately codified system of law that would have provided one system of linguistic expression for


common discourse is again a basic cause, as well as a telling illustration, of Russia's peculiar circumstance in this respect.  

Because the bureaucracy, such as it was, remained at the mercy of an autocrat, it could not consistently carry out long-range policies of transformation and reform. That bureaucracy was also separate and distinct from the society it administered. Russia developed almost none of the intervening links that can be identified in Western Europe, nor did Russia possess a common legal language that could serve as a medium of communication between society and the state. Russian officials constituted a class that was in conflict with both the source of its authority and the subjects of its concerns. These are the major conclusions of the historical literature here examined.

The career patterns, economic status, and social origins of the bureaucratic personnel have now been sufficiently elucidated, even adequately quantified; the autonomy of the officials as a separate group has been duly established. We must turn the page and ask new questions. The basic puzzle of how the imperial system functioned so long and so well in preserving the regime, even adapting to changed circumstances, is still a major challenge to historians of Russia. We realize now that the building stones of a bureaucratic edifice were present, but as of 1905 (or even 1917) imperial Russia still did not have a genuine bureaucracy. When the history of Russia is compared to that of Western and Central European nations, a persistent problem arises: why did the distinct elements of a bureaucracy fail to fuse into a structured system? Is not the next assignment to consider the intellectual and cultural dimensions of this phenomenon—to endeavor to understand the significance of power and law in the mentalité collective, both high and low, of the Russian people?

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