**Олимпиада НИУ ВШЭ для студентов и выпускников – 2019 г.**

**Направление: «Финансовая экономика»**

**Профиль: «Финансовая экономика/Financial Economics» КОД – 130**

**Время выполнения задания – 180 мин., язык – английский.**

## Examination Guidelines

- The exam consists of 5 tasks. Solve all tasks. Examination time: 180 minutes.
- The exam is graded on a 100-point scale. Numbers in brackets indicate the points awarded for each problem.
- Write your answers in the booklet provided to you by the examiners.
- You can solve the tasks in any order but you must label each task and sub-task clearly and sufficiently. Use a separate page for each task. You are not allowed to detach sheets from the booklet.
- Answer all tasks in English. Graders will ignore any Russian text.
- You may use the last page of your booklet as scrap paper.
- Crossed out writing will not be considered by the grader.
- Use legible hand writing. The grader will ignore any illegible parts of your paper.

## Examination Rules

- You are required to follow all instructions given by the examiners.
- Talking is not allowed under any circumstances.
- Detection of any electronic communication device on you will constitute cheating even if the device is off.
- The proctors of the exam are not authorized to answer any questions.

**Question 1 [20 points]**

Daniil owns 5 litres of beer and 10 kg of chocolate. He knows that he can go to the (perfectly competitive) market and trade beer and chocolate at prices $p_b$(per liter) and $p_c$ (per kg), respectively. Assume that $p_c$=1, and that beer and chocolate are perfectly divisible.

a. [3 pts] Write out the budget constraint. Draw it on a well-labelled graph and highlight the endowment.

b. [4 pts] Daniil's utility is given by $u_D(x_b,x_c)=5+3\ln(x_b) + 3\ln(x_c)$, where $x_b$ and $x_c$ denote the amount of beer and chocolate he consumes (in liter and kg). What is his demand for beer and chocolate?

c. [6 pts] Suppose now that Alexei is the only other person in the market and he owns 15 litres of beer and 10 kg of chocolate. Alexei's preferences are $u_A(x_b,x_c)=4x_b+x_c$. Find the Walrasian (or General) equilibrium and Walrasian equilibrium allocation such that both individuals consume positive amounts of both goods.

d. [4 pts] On the way to the market, Daniil slips on some ice and hits his head. When he gets up he finds that his preferences have changed to be $v_D(x_b,x_c) = x_b^2+x_c^2$. Is the equilibrium price from question 3 still a Walsrasian equilibrium? Prove your answer.

e. [3 pts] Find a Walrasian equilibrium, along with the associated allocations, that is different from your answer to question 3. How many Walrasianequilibria are there?

**Question 2 [20 points]**

**Consider a closed** economy growth (Solow) model where time is continuous. Output in the economy is given by the aggregate production function

$$Y = f(K, L)$$

where $Y$stands for output,$K$ for capital, and $L$ for labor. The function $f$is differentiable, concave and homogeneous of degree 1. The labor factor depends both on the number $N$ of workers and an index $h$ of their quality: $L = hN$. The competitive rate of return of capital and salary rate are denoted $c$and $w$, respectively.

a. [2 pts] Write the first-order conditions of the representative firm.

b. [4 pts] Derive the relationship between the growth rate of $h$, $\frac{dh}{h}$, and Solow residual.

Suppose that we now distinguish between skilled and unskilled labor, with $N = N_u + N_s$, where $N_u$ is the number of unskilled workers and $N_s$ that of skilled workers. We now write $L = hN = G(e_u N_u, e_s N_s)$, with $G$ differentiable, concave and homogeneous of degree 1. The

coefficients $e_u$and $e_s$ capture the differential impact of technical progress on the different types of labor. The corresponding competitive salaries are $w_u$ and $w_s$.

c. [5 pts] Show that $w_u N_u + w_s N_s = L f_L$, where $f_L$ is the partial derivative of $f$ relative to $L$. What does it imply for the weighted average salary $\overline{w}$?

d. [9 pts]i) Derive an expression for $\frac{dh}{h}$ as a function of the growth rates of technical change $\frac{de_u}{e_u} and \frac{de_s}{e_s}$ and the growth rates of the fractions of the different categories of workers$d\left(\frac{N_u}{N}\right)$ and $d\left(\frac{N_s}{N}\right)$. ii) To which extent does the decomposition between skilled and unskilled labor help account for Solow residual? iii) Given the functioning of the labor market, outline a key limitation of the approach used in this exercise.

**Question 3 [20 points]**

A researcher is interested in estimating the effect of education on wages. He also thinks that the gender of the person might have impact on earnings, so he estimates the following two models:

Model A: $\log Wages\_i = \alpha + \beta Educ_i + u_i$,

Model B: $\log Wages\_i = \alpha_1 + \beta_1 Educ_i + \beta_2 MALE_i + \beta_3 MALE_i * Educ_i + \varepsilon_i$,

where *Wages* are hourly wages measured in rubles, log denotes the natural logarithm, education (*Educ*) is the numberof years of schooling, MALE is a dummy variable equal to 1 for males and 0 for females, and MALE*Educ is equal to the product of the variables MALE and Educ. Some estimation results are provided in the table below (in parenthesis are the standard errors):

| | Model A | Model B |
|---|---|---|
| (Intercept) | 5.29 | 5.03 |
| | (0.573) | (0.674) |
| Educ | 0.080 | 0.045 |
| | (0.008) | (0.021) |
| MALE | | 0.215 |
| | | (0.098) |
| MALE*Educ | | 0.052 |
| | | (0.022) |
| $R^2$ | 0.14 | ? |
| N | 240 | 240 |
| RSS | 66.12 | 57.65 |

Here $R^2$ is the coefficient of determination, N is the sample size, and RSS is the residual sum of squares.

a. [4 pts] Interpret the coefficient on education in Model A and the coefficients on MALE and MALE*Educin Model B. If you use approximations in your answer, make sure that you do it only when they are valid.

b. [3 pts] Given the information on $R^2$ and RSS for model A and on RSS for model B, compute the $R^2$ for Model B.

c. [5 pts] Help the researcher to test a hypothesis that education has the same effect on wages for men and women. State this hypothesis in terms of restrictions on coefficients of Model 2, compute the p-value for the test-statistic, and use it to perform the test at 1% significance level. (You can assume that the sample of size N=240 people is a very large sample)

d. [3 pts] The researcher claims that Model B is better than Model A, since the $R^2$ for Model B is higher, and so it better explains the data than Model A. Comment if his comparison is fair and explain using a formal argument which model is better.

e. [5 pts] Test whether the models for wages for men and women are the same.

Statistical tables are available at the end of the document.

**Question 4 [20 points]**

A producer of big ships wants to hire an agent to sell one ship. If the agent manages to sell it, the profit for the producer (before paying the salary of the agent) is $x \geq 9$, otherwise it is 0. The agent can exert low effort $e = 2$ or high effort$e = 6$ and has utility function $w - e$, where $w$ is the compensation he obtains from the producer. The agent has limited liability, so that his compensation can never be negative. If he does not work for the producer, the agent has a utility of 1. In case of low effort, the agent sells the ship with probability 1/3, in case of high effort with probability 2/3.

Suppose that the producer can observe the effort of the agent.

a. [3 pts] Determine the minimum amount the producer must pay for the agent to accept the contract when the agent exerts high effort and when he exerts low effort.
b. [3 pts] Depending on $x$, find the best contract for the producer that the agent can accept.

Suppose now that the producer cannot observe the effort of the agent. Therefore, the compensation can depend only on whether the ship is sold or not. Let $w_s$ and $w_n$ denote the compensation of the agent when he sells and when he does not sell, respectively.

c. [4 pts] Determine the agent's incentives to participate and exert high or low effort. What is the remuneration the producer offers to the agent when he does not sell?

d. [4 pts] Depending on $x$, find the best contract for the producer that the agent can accept.

Suppose now that there are two potential buyers of ships, and the producer wants to sell one ship to each buyer. The producer hires two agents, one dedicated to each buyer. The gains to the buyers from buying a ship are negatively correlated; they operate competing ferry lines. In case both agents exert high effort, clients both accept with probability 1/3 and only one accepts with probability 1/3 each. If an agent exerts low effort while the other exerts high effort, clients both accept with probability 2/9, only one client accepts each with probability 1/9, none of the clients accepts with probability 5/9. If both agents exert low effort, clients both accept with probability 1/18, only one client accepts with probability 1/36 each, none of the clients accepts with probability 7/9.

e. [6 pts] Suppose that the producer cannot observe the effort of the agents. Suppose that the compensation of an agent can depend only on whether he sold the ship or not, and not on whether the other agent sold the ship. Find the best contract for the producer that induces each agent to exert high effort.

**Question 5 [20 points]**

XYZ is currently an all-equity firm. The unlevered free cash-flows of the firm are \$1m per year, starting next year, forever. There are 500 000 shares outstanding. The cost of capital on unlevered assets is 12%. The company plans to issue \$0.8m in perpetual risk-free debt and use the proceeds to pay a dividend to shareholders. The risk-free rate is 5%.

a. [2 pts] Suppose first that there are no taxes. Determine the stock price of the unlevered firm.

b. [5 pts] What is the firm value after the debt issue and the dividend payment? Determine the market value of equity, the stock price, and the rate of return of equity after the dividend payment. Explain your answers.

c. [5 pts] Suppose that instead of paying a dividend, XYZ uses the proceeds of the debt issuance to engage in an open-market repurchase of its own stock. What is the firm value after the share repurchase? What is the value of equity? What happens to the stock price? Explain.

d. [5 pts] Let's now return to the case where the firm uses the debt to pay a dividend to shareholders, and let's introduce taxes. The firm pays taxes on the unlevered free cash-flow, with the tax rate equal to 34%. The cost of capital on unlevered assets remains 12%. Determine the stock price after the transaction. Specify all the steps of your reasoning.

e. [3 pts] Suppose now that the firm is unlevered but must pay a fixed amount of \$0.04M of taxes every year. What happens to the cost of equity?

**Statistical Tables**

**Table** of probabilities of a **standard normal variable** lying to the left from the value of ***z***.

| *z* | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| −0.4 | 0.3446 | 0.3409 | 0.3372 | 0.3336 | 0.3300 | 0.3264 | 0.3228 | 0.3192 | 0.3156 | 0.3121 |
| −0.3 | 0.3821 | 0.3783 | 0.3745 | 0.3707 | 0.3669 | 0.3632 | 0.3594 | 0.3557 | 0.3520 | 0.3483 |
| −0.2 | 0.4207 | 0.4168 | 0.4129 | 0.4090 | 0.4052 | 0.4013 | 0.3974 | 0.3936 | 0.3897 | 0.3859 |
| −0.1 | 0.4602 | 0.4562 | 0.4522 | 0.4483 | 0.4443 | 0.4404 | 0.4364 | 0.4325 | 0.4286 | 0.4247 |
| −0.0 | 0.5000 | 0.4960 | 0.4920 | 0.4880 | 0.4840 | 0.4801 | 0.4761 | 0.4721 | 0.4681 | 0.4641 |
| 0.0 | 0.5000 | 0.5040 | 0.5080 | 0.5120 | 0.5160 | 0.5199 | 0.5239 | 0.5279 | 0.5319 | 0.5359 |
| 0.1 | 0.5398 | 0.5438 | 0.5478 | 0.5517 | 0.5557 | 0.5596 | 0.5636 | 0.5675 | 0.5714 | 0.5753 |
| 0.2 | 0.5793 | 0.5832 | 0.5871 | 0.5910 | 0.5948 | 0.5987 | 0.6026 | 0.6064 | 0.6103 | 0.6141 |
| 0.3 | 0.6179 | 0.6217 | 0.6255 | 0.6293 | 0.6331 | 0.6368 | 0.6406 | 0.6443 | 0.6480 | 0.6517 |
| 0.4 | 0.6554 | 0.6591 | 0.6628 | 0.6664 | 0.6700 | 0.6736 | 0.6772 | 0.6808 | 0.6844 | 0.6879 |
| 0.5 | 0.6915 | 0.6950 | 0.6985 | 0.7019 | 0.7054 | 0.7088 | 0.7123 | 0.7157 | 0.7190 | 0.7224 |
| 0.6 | 0.7257 | 0.7291 | 0.7324 | 0.7357 | 0.7389 | 0.7422 | 0.7454 | 0.7486 | 0.7517 | 0.7549 |
| 0.7 | 0.7580 | 0.7611 | 0.7642 | 0.7673 | 0.7704 | 0.7734 | 0.7764 | 0.7794 | 0.7823 | 0.7852 |
| 0.8 | 0.7881 | 0.7910 | 0.7939 | 0.7967 | 0.7995 | 0.8023 | 0.8051 | 0.8078 | 0.8106 | 0.8133 |
| 0.9 | 0.8159 | 0.8186 | 0.8212 | 0.8238 | 0.8264 | 0.8289 | 0.8315 | 0.8340 | 0.8365 | 0.8389 |
| 1.0 | 0.8413 | 0.8438 | 0.8461 | 0.8485 | 0.8508 | 0.8531 | 0.8554 | 0.8577 | 0.8599 | 0.8621 |
| 1.1 | 0.8643 | 0.8665 | 0.8686 | 0.8708 | 0.8729 | 0.8749 | 0.8770 | 0.8790 | 0.8810 | 0.8830 |
| 1.2 | 0.8849 | 0.8869 | 0.8888 | 0.8907 | 0.8925 | 0.8944 | 0.8962 | 0.8980 | 0.8997 | 0.9015 |
| 1.3 | 0.9032 | 0.9049 | 0.9066 | 0.9082 | 0.9099 | 0.9115 | 0.9131 | 0.9147 | 0.9162 | 0.9177 |
| 1.4 | 0.9192 | 0.9207 | 0.9222 | 0.9236 | 0.9251 | 0.9265 | 0.9279 | 0.9292 | 0.9306 | 0.9319 |
| 1.5 | 0.9332 | 0.9345 | 0.9357 | 0.9370 | 0.9382 | 0.9394 | 0.9406 | 0.9418 | 0.9429 | 0.9441 |
| 1.6 | 0.9452 | 0.9463 | 0.9474 | 0.9484 | 0.9495 | 0.9505 | 0.9515 | 0.9525 | 0.9535 | 0.9545 |
| 1.7 | 0.9554 | 0.9564 | 0.9573 | 0.9582 | 0.9591 | 0.9599 | 0.9608 | 0.9616 | 0.9625 | 0.9633 |
| 1.8 | 0.9641 | 0.9649 | 0.9656 | 0.9664 | 0.9671 | 0.9678 | 0.9686 | 0.9693 | 0.9699 | 0.9706 |
| 1.9 | 0.9713 | 0.9719 | 0.9726 | 0.9732 | 0.9738 | 0.9744 | 0.9750 | 0.9756 | 0.9761 | 0.9767 |
| 2.0 | 0.9772 | 0.9778 | 0.9783 | 0.9788 | 0.9793 | 0.9798 | 0.9803 | 0.9808 | 0.9812 | 0.9817 |
| 2.1 | 0.9821 | 0.9826 | 0.9830 | 0.9834 | 0.9838 | 0.9842 | 0.9846 | 0.9850 | 0.9854 | 0.9857 |
| 2.2 | 0.9861 | 0.9864 | 0.9868 | 0.9871 | 0.9875 | 0.9878 | 0.9881 | 0.9884 | 0.9887 | 0.9890 |
| 2.3 | 0.9893 | 0.9896 | 0.9898 | 0.9901 | 0.9904 | 0.9906 | 0.9909 | 0.9911 | 0.9913 | 0.9916 |
| 2.4 | 0.9918 | 0.9920 | 0.9922 | 0.9925 | 0.9927 | 0.9929 | 0.9931 | 0.9932 | 0.9934 | 0.9936 |
| 2.5 | 0.9938 | 0.9940 | 0.9941 | 0.9943 | 0.9945 | 0.9946 | 0.9948 | 0.9949 | 0.9951 | 0.9952 |
| 2.6 | 0.9953 | 0.9955 | 0.9956 | 0.9957 | 0.9959 | 0.9960 | 0.9961 | 0.9962 | 0.9963 | 0.9964 |
| 2.7 | 0.9965 | 0.9966 | 0.9967 | 0.9968 | 0.9969 | 0.9970 | 0.9971 | 0.9972 | 0.9973 | 0.9974 |
| 2.8 | 0.9974 | 0.9975 | 0.9976 | 0.9977 | 0.9977 | 0.9978 | 0.9979 | 0.9979 | 0.9980 | 0.9981 |
| 2.9 | 0.9981 | 0.9982 | 0.9982 | 0.9983 | 0.9984 | 0.9984 | 0.9985 | 0.9985 | 0.9986 | 0.9986 |
| 3.0 | 0.9987 | 0.9987 | 0.9987 | 0.9988 | 0.9988 | 0.9989 | 0.9989 | 0.9989 | 0.9990 | 0.9990 |

**Tables** of critical values of **F distribution** with different degrees of freedom.

**TABLE G.3a 10% Critical Values of the *F* Distribution**

| Denominator Degrees of Freedom | Numerator Degrees of Freedom | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| 10 | 3.29 | 2.92 | 2.73 | 2.61 | 2.52 | 2.46 | 2.41 | 2.38 | 2.35 | 2.32 |
| 11 | 3.23 | 2.86 | 2.66 | 2.54 | 2.45 | 2.39 | 2.34 | 2.30 | 2.27 | 2.25 |
| 12 | 3.18 | 2.81 | 2.61 | 2.48 | 2.39 | 2.33 | 2.28 | 2.24 | 2.21 | 2.19 |
| 13 | 3.14 | 2.76 | 2.56 | 2.43 | 2.35 | 2.28 | 2.23 | 2.20 | 2.16 | 2.14 |
| 14 | 3.10 | 2.73 | 2.52 | 2.39 | 2.31 | 2.24 | 2.19 | 2.15 | 2.12 | 2.10 |
| 15 | 3.07 | 2.70 | 2.49 | 2.36 | 2.27 | 2.21 | 2.16 | 2.12 | 2.09 | 2.06 |
| 16 | 3.05 | 2.67 | 2.46 | 2.33 | 2.24 | 2.18 | 2.13 | 2.09 | 2.06 | 2.03 |
| 17 | 3.03 | 2.64 | 2.44 | 2.31 | 2.22 | 2.15 | 2.10 | 2.06 | 2.03 | 2.00 |
| 18 | 3.01 | 2.62 | 2.42 | 2.29 | 2.20 | 2.13 | 2.08 | 2.04 | 2.00 | 1.98 |
| 19 | 2.99 | 2.61 | 2.40 | 2.27 | 2.18 | 2.11 | 2.06 | 2.02 | 1.98 | 1.96 |
| 20 | 2.97 | 2.59 | 2.38 | 2.25 | 2.16 | 2.09 | 2.04 | 2.00 | 1.96 | 1.94 |
| 21 | 2.96 | 2.57 | 2.36 | 2.23 | 2.14 | 2.08 | 2.02 | 1.98 | 1.95 | 1.92 |
| 22 | 2.95 | 2.56 | 2.35 | 2.22 | 2.13 | 2.06 | 2.01 | 1.97 | 1.93 | 1.90 |
| 23 | 2.94 | 2.55 | 2.34 | 2.21 | 2.11 | 2.05 | 1.99 | 1.95 | 1.92 | 1.89 |
| 24 | 2.93 | 2.54 | 2.33 | 2.19 | 2.10 | 2.04 | 1.98 | 1.94 | 1.91 | 1.88 |
| 25 | 2.92 | 2.53 | 2.32 | 2.18 | 2.09 | 2.02 | 1.97 | 1.93 | 1.89 | 1.87 |
| 26 | 2.91 | 2.52 | 2.31 | 2.17 | 2.08 | 2.01 | 1.96 | 1.92 | 1.88 | 1.86 |
| 27 | 2.90 | 2.51 | 2.30 | 2.17 | 2.07 | 2.00 | 1.95 | 1.91 | 1.87 | 1.85 |
| 28 | 2.89 | 2.50 | 2.29 | 2.16 | 2.06 | 2.00 | 1.94 | 1.90 | 1.87 | 1.84 |
| 29 | 2.89 | 2.50 | 2.28 | 2.15 | 2.06 | 1.99 | 1.93 | 1.89 | 1.86 | 1.83 |
| 30 | 2.88 | 2.49 | 2.28 | 2.14 | 2.05 | 1.98 | 1.93 | 1.88 | 1.85 | 1.82 |
| 40 | 2.84 | 2.44 | 2.23 | 2.09 | 2.00 | 1.93 | 1.87 | 1.83 | 1.79 | 1.76 |
| 60 | 2.79 | 2.39 | 2.18 | 2.04 | 1.95 | 1.87 | 1.82 | 1.77 | 1.74 | 1.71 |
| 90 | 2.76 | 2.36 | 2.15 | 2.01 | 1.91 | 1.84 | 1.78 | 1.74 | 1.70 | 1.67 |
| 120 | 2.75 | 2.35 | 2.13 | 1.99 | 1.90 | 1.82 | 1.77 | 1.72 | 1.68 | 1.65 |
| ∞ | 2.71 | 2.30 | 2.08 | 1.94 | 1.85 | 1.77 | 1.72 | 1.67 | 1.63 | 1.60 |

**TABLE G.3b 5% Critical Values of the *F* Distribution**

| Denominator Degrees of Freedom | Numerator Degrees of Freedom | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| 10 | 4.96 | 4.10 | 3.71 | 3.48 | 3.33 | 3.22 | 3.14 | 3.07 | 3.02 | 2.98 |
| 11 | 4.84 | 3.98 | 3.59 | 3.36 | 3.20 | 3.09 | 3.01 | 2.95 | 2.90 | 2.85 |
| 12 | 4.75 | 3.89 | 3.49 | 3.26 | 3.11 | 3.00 | 2.91 | 2.85 | 2.80 | 2.75 |
| 13 | 4.67 | 3.81 | 3.41 | 3.18 | 3.03 | 2.92 | 2.83 | 2.77 | 2.71 | 2.67 |
| 14 | 4.60 | 3.74 | 3.34 | 3.11 | 2.96 | 2.85 | 2.76 | 2.70 | 2.65 | 2.60 |
| 15 | 4.54 | 3.68 | 3.29 | 3.06 | 2.90 | 2.79 | 2.71 | 2.64 | 2.59 | 2.54 |
| 16 | 4.49 | 3.63 | 3.24 | 3.01 | 2.85 | 2.74 | 2.66 | 2.59 | 2.54 | 2.49 |
| 17 | 4.45 | 3.59 | 3.20 | 2.96 | 2.81 | 2.70 | 2.61 | 2.55 | 2.49 | 2.45 |
| 18 | 4.41 | 3.55 | 3.16 | 2.93 | 2.77 | 2.66 | 2.58 | 2.51 | 2.46 | 2.41 |
| 19 | 4.38 | 3.52 | 3.13 | 2.90 | 2.74 | 2.63 | 2.54 | 2.48 | 2.42 | 2.38 |
| 20 | 4.35 | 3.49 | 3.10 | 2.87 | 2.71 | 2.60 | 2.51 | 2.45 | 2.39 | 2.35 |
| 21 | 4.32 | 3.47 | 3.07 | 2.84 | 2.68 | 2.57 | 2.49 | 2.42 | 2.37 | 2.32 |
| 22 | 4.30 | 3.44 | 3.05 | 2.82 | 2.66 | 2.55 | 2.46 | 2.40 | 2.34 | 2.30 |
| 23 | 4.28 | 3.42 | 3.03 | 2.80 | 2.64 | 2.53 | 2.44 | 2.37 | 2.32 | 2.27 |
| 24 | 4.26 | 3.40 | 3.01 | 2.78 | 2.62 | 2.51 | 2.42 | 2.36 | 2.30 | 2.25 |
| 25 | 4.24 | 3.39 | 2.99 | 2.76 | 2.60 | 2.49 | 2.40 | 2.34 | 2.28 | 2.24 |
| 26 | 4.23 | 3.37 | 2.98 | 2.74 | 2.59 | 2.47 | 2.39 | 2.32 | 2.27 | 2.22 |
| 27 | 4.21 | 3.35 | 2.96 | 2.73 | 2.57 | 2.46 | 2.37 | 2.31 | 2.25 | 2.20 |
| 28 | 4.20 | 3.34 | 2.95 | 2.71 | 2.56 | 2.45 | 2.36 | 2.29 | 2.24 | 2.19 |
| 29 | 4.18 | 3.33 | 2.93 | 2.70 | 2.55 | 2.43 | 2.35 | 2.28 | 2.22 | 2.18 |
| 30 | 4.17 | 3.32 | 2.92 | 2.69 | 2.53 | 2.42 | 2.33 | 2.27 | 2.21 | 2.16 |
| 40 | 4.08 | 3.23 | 2.84 | 2.61 | 2.45 | 2.34 | 2.25 | 2.18 | 2.12 | 2.08 |
| 60 | 4.00 | 3.15 | 2.76 | 2.53 | 2.37 | 2.25 | 2.17 | 2.10 | 2.04 | 1.99 |
| 90 | 3.95 | 3.10 | 2.71 | 2.47 | 2.32 | 2.20 | 2.11 | 2.04 | 1.99 | 1.94 |
| 120 | 3.92 | 3.07 | 2.68 | 2.45 | 2.29 | 2.17 | 2.09 | 2.02 | 1.96 | 1.91 |
| ∞ | 3.84 | 3.00 | 2.60 | 2.37 | 2.21 | 2.10 | 2.01 | 1.94 | 1.88 | 1.83 |

**TABLE G.3c 1% Critical Values of the *F* Distribution**

| Denominator Degrees of Freedom | Numerator Degrees of Freedom | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| 10 | 10.04 | 7.56 | 6.55 | 5.99 | 5.64 | 5.39 | 5.20 | 5.06 | 4.94 | 4.85 |
| 11 | 9.65 | 7.21 | 6.22 | 5.67 | 5.32 | 5.07 | 4.89 | 4.74 | 4.63 | 4.54 |
| 12 | 9.33 | 6.93 | 5.95 | 5.41 | 5.06 | 4.82 | 4.64 | 4.50 | 4.39 | 4.30 |
| 13 | 9.07 | 6.70 | 5.74 | 5.21 | 4.86 | 4.62 | 4.44 | 4.30 | 4.19 | 4.10 |
| 14 | 8.86 | 6.51 | 5.56 | 5.04 | 4.69 | 4.46 | 4.28 | 4.14 | 4.03 | 3.94 |
| 15 | 8.68 | 6.36 | 5.42 | 4.89 | 4.56 | 4.32 | 4.14 | 4.00 | 3.89 | 3.80 |
| 16 | 8.53 | 6.23 | 5.29 | 4.77 | 4.44 | 4.20 | 4.03 | 3.89 | 3.78 | 3.69 |
| 17 | 8.40 | 6.11 | 5.18 | 4.67 | 4.34 | 4.10 | 3.93 | 3.79 | 3.68 | 3.59 |
| 18 | 8.29 | 6.01 | 5.09 | 4.58 | 4.25 | 4.01 | 3.84 | 3.71 | 3.60 | 3.51 |
| 19 | 8.18 | 5.93 | 5.01 | 4.50 | 4.17 | 3.94 | 3.77 | 3.63 | 3.52 | 3.43 |
| 20 | 8.10 | 5.85 | 4.94 | 4.43 | 4.10 | 3.87 | 3.70 | 3.56 | 3.46 | 3.37 |
| 21 | 8.02 | 5.78 | 4.87 | 4.37 | 4.04 | 3.81 | 3.64 | 3.51 | 3.40 | 3.31 |
| 22 | 7.95 | 5.72 | 4.82 | 4.31 | 3.99 | 3.76 | 3.59 | 3.45 | 3.35 | 3.26 |
| 23 | 7.88 | 5.66 | 4.76 | 4.26 | 3.94 | 3.71 | 3.54 | 3.41 | 3.30 | 3.21 |
| 24 | 7.82 | 5.61 | 4.72 | 4.22 | 3.90 | 3.67 | 3.50 | 3.36 | 3.26 | 3.17 |
| 25 | 7.77 | 5.57 | 4.68 | 4.18 | 3.85 | 3.63 | 3.46 | 3.32 | 3.22 | 3.13 |
| 26 | 7.72 | 5.53 | 4.64 | 4.14 | 3.82 | 3.59 | 3.42 | 3.29 | 3.18 | 3.09 |
| 27 | 7.68 | 5.49 | 4.60 | 4.11 | 3.78 | 3.56 | 3.39 | 3.26 | 3.15 | 3.06 |
| 28 | 7.64 | 5.45 | 4.57 | 4.07 | 3.75 | 3.53 | 3.36 | 3.23 | 3.12 | 3.03 |
| 29 | 7.60 | 5.42 | 4.54 | 4.04 | 3.73 | 3.50 | 3.33 | 3.20 | 3.09 | 3.00 |
| 30 | 7.56 | 5.39 | 4.51 | 4.02 | 3.70 | 3.47 | 3.30 | 3.17 | 3.07 | 2.98 |
| 40 | 7.31 | 5.18 | 4.31 | 3.83 | 3.51 | 3.29 | 3.12 | 2.99 | 2.89 | 2.80 |
| 60 | 7.08 | 4.98 | 4.13 | 3.65 | 3.34 | 3.12 | 2.95 | 2.82 | 2.72 | 2.63 |
| 90 | 6.93 | 4.85 | 4.01 | 3.54 | 3.23 | 3.01 | 2.84 | 2.72 | 2.61 | 2.52 |
| 120 | 6.85 | 4.79 | 3.95 | 3.48 | 3.17 | 2.96 | 2.79 | 2.66 | 2.56 | 2.47 |
| ∞ | 6.63 | 4.61 | 3.78 | 3.32 | 3.02 | 2.80 | 2.64 | 2.51 | 2.41 | 2.32 |