



Вопрос **Инфо**

Уважаемые участники!

Олимпиадное задание по направлению «Современное Востоковедение» состоит **общей и специальной частей**.

Общая часть представлена заданием 1 и оценивается в **50 баллов**. Его необходимо выполнить всем участникам на английском языке.

Специальная часть разделена на региональные блоки, в рамках каждого из которых необходимо ответить на **2 вопроса по 25 баллов**:

- «Социально-политические изменения в Китае (КНР)» (задания 2-3);
- «Социально-политические изменения в Корее (РК, КНДР)» (задания 4-5);
- «Социально-политические изменения в Японии в начале XXI в. » (задания 6-7);
- «Социально-политические изменения в странах Ближнего Востока и Северной Африки в XX-XXI вв.» (задания 8-9).

В рамках специальной части необходимо выбрать задания **только одного** из региональных блоков и выполнить их на английском языке.

Все задания выполняются в системе: решения вносите в специальное поле для ответов.

При выполнении заданий разрешено пользоваться ресурсами для перевода для перевода исключительно отдельных слов и выражений. **Запрещено переводить целые фрагменты текста.** Другими ресурсами и справочными материалами пользоваться запрещено.

Верим в ваш успех!

Вопрос **1**

Балл: 50

Dmitri Trenin. Russia and the Rise of Asia

Global geopolitical shifts and Russia's own obvious needs have pushed Moscow to pay more attention to Asia. While hardly a "pivot," this shift constitutes a measure of internal rebalancing within Russia's domestic and foreign policy. The Russian Government is responding to the challenges and opportunities in rather familiar ways. Domestically, it seeks to re-launch the development of the eastern Russian regions by means of various state-run megaprojects, from the 2012 APEC summit in Vladivostok, to establishing a special federal ministry in Khabarovsk, to planning a state corporation to oversee the development of the Far East and eastern Siberia. Moscow has been placing emphasis on energy and infrastructure projects, such as oil and gas pipelines, LNG, railroads (upgrading the Trans-Siberian) and new ocean lines, such as the Northern Sea Route.

In foreign policy terms, Russia has long been a member of the Six-Party Talks on the North Korean nuclear issue. It has managed to join, in addition to APEC, the East Asia Summit and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). It has also become a partner of ASEAN. Moscow has maintained active ties with India and Vietnam — both countries with complex relations with China — to whom it sells arms (as it also does to China). Russia

has been eager to expand economic relations with the technologically advanced Asian nations, such as Japan and South Korea. It has reached out to Singapore and is discussing free trade area agreements with New Zealand and Vietnam.

Yet, Russia remains largely invisible outside of Northeast Asia. The trouble is, it has little to offer besides energy supplies and arms. The transit routes to Europe, either across Siberia by rail or across the Arctic by sea, are yet to be upgraded to be of real use. The Russians also find it challenging to navigate in an international environment where they are no longer one of the dominant players. Charting a course between Beijing and Washington, Delhi, Tokyo, or Hanoi is certainly not easy. Sensing its relative weakness and the intricacies of Asian geopolitics, top Russian leaders have shunned several important summits of the organizations, such as EAS, which they had fought hard to be admitted to.

This situation should stimulate more and harder thinking. Russia needs to think of itself as a Euro-Pacific power, and act accordingly. It should develop a credible policy to develop its eastern provinces, integrating them both within Russia and into the Asia-Pacific region. It should reach out to the more advanced countries of the region first to secure technology and investment. In particular, it needs to turn the solution of its territorial issue with Japan into an engine for transforming Russo-Japanese relations along the lines of the present Russo-German one. It has to have a long-term strategy of relations with China, so as to use it to its maximum advantage and not to be guided solely by Beijing's preferences. It needs to work for a North Pacific partnership with its direct eastern neighbor, the United States, and with Canada, where climatic conditions approximate Siberia's. It needs to have a long-term policy on the Korean Peninsula way beyond the nuclear issue. And it would help if Russia's leaders chose to make Vladivostok their temporary residence instead of – or at least in addition to – Sochi: this would help both Russia's domestic development and its international integration in Asia-Pacific.

The rise of East and South Asia is universally recognized as the most significant geopolitical development of the early 21st century. It affects virtually all other nations, but probably none so intimately as Russia. The Russian Federation is essentially a European country, but two-thirds of its vast territory – Siberia and the Russian Far East – is located in geographical Asia. There, Russia shares a nearly 4,500 km-long border with China. Russia is also a close – though seemingly distant – neighbor with Japan. Of all Pacific countries, it has the longest, though also probably least developed, ocean coastline. Only the relatively narrow (180 km) Bering Strait – the gateway between the Pacific and the Arctic – separates mainland Russia from Alaska. What happens in Asia and in the Pacific can affect Russia in various ways: economically, through trade and investment flows; militarily, due to geographical proximity, e.g., to the Korean Peninsula; and demographically, in the form of cross-border migration.

New Global Balance

The present Russian Government sees the rise of Asia, above all, in terms of global rebalancing. Over the past two decades Russia has tried, and failed, to fit itself into the enlarged West. Early in their terms, each of Russia's three Presidents – Boris Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin, and Dmitri Medvedev – looked for political and even military alliances with the United States and NATO. Each time, however, they were disappointed. Back in the Kremlin again, from 2012, Vladimir Putin has reasserted Russia's stance as a separate geopolitical unit – a free non-Western agent, standing apart from united Europe and focused on building its own power base in the center of the continent: a Eurasian Union. If successful, this union should give Moscow more leverage vis-à-vis Brussels (and Berlin) in constructing a Greater Europe stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok.

As a self-described pole in an increasingly polycentric world, Moscow insists on maintaining its strategic independence, which is the essence of what the Russian officials mean when they talk of their country as a great power. From the Kremlin's perspective, the most serious perceived threat to Russia's independence comes now in the form of the U.S. global dominance and its interventionist practices. Anything that helps cut the U.S. global role down to size – be it China's GDP, ASEAN's regional diplomacy or India's military power – is thus more than just welcome. It is essential for a new global order to take shape, one which would be based on more or less co-equal relationships among the world's leading nations, some of them Asian. In this context, the Russo-Chinese partnership should, apart from everything else, create checks and balances to reduce U.S. global dominance.

Thus, the rise of Asia broadly agrees with Russia's interests regarding the global order. Asia's surge contrasts with the relative decline of the West, including of the United States. Since the Russians, despite their European origins, do not associate themselves with the West as a whole or even with political Europe for that matter, they view the changing balance of power between the West and the new (Asian) East as a positive process of global leveling at the top. The new situation gives Russian leaders both breathing room and more space to maneuver. There is also a pinch of Schadenfreude involved as the Russians look at the travails of the European Union and the partial retrenchment of the U.S.: the trauma of the break-up of the Soviet Union is

recent, and still aches.

New Challenges

Asia's rise, however, is far from problem-free for Russia. No longer seeking to join the West, the Russians are certainly not becoming Asians. Even though two-thirds of the country's territory is located east of the Urals, only one-sixth of Russia's population lives there. These 25 million people equal, roughly, the population of Shanghai. Russia has a very long coastline in the Pacific, but its ports are tiny compared to those of its neighbors. When one takes the flight from Moscow to Vladivostok, one is impressed by two things, equally powerful. The plane spends 9 hours in the air and lands in the same country, without crossing international borders. And — on a clear day, looking down, one sees very few traces of human activity east of the Urals. The rise of Asia means that the most dynamic part of the world now physically touches the least developed part of Russia. Nothing illustrates it better than the contrast between glitzy and booming cities on the Chinese bank of the Amur River — where until recently primitive villages stood - and the dilapidated, crumbling towns on its Russian side.

This fact is of enormous significance, and carries potentially the highest risks. In a globalized world of instant communication and porous borders, Moscow can only hold on to its Siberian and Far Eastern territories if it manages to successfully develop them. Russia's former internal colony — Siberia — and its former strategic bulwark of the Far East, to stay Russian de facto, not just de jure, need to become attractive to Russians themselves and contributing to the regional economic prosperity. This is a tall order. However, should Russia fail in responding to this challenge, it can see its population-poor but resource-rich territories gravitate to outside magnets, and foreigners coming in to take control of the more lucrative assets, maybe leaving Russian sovereignty intact, but hollowed out. The vision of 21st century Khabarovsk as a latter-day Harbin should concentrate Russian strategic minds in order not to become reality. This concerns, above all, Russia's relations with China.

Based on the text answer the following questions:

1. What domestic and foreign policy measures has Russia undertaken to strengthen its presence in Asia, and what are the key challenges it faces in this geopolitical shift?
2. How does Russia perceive the rise of Asia in the context of global power rebalancing?

Вопрос 2

Балл: 25

What is the supreme organ of the Chinese Communist Party? What other governing bodies of the party do you know?

Вопрос 3

Балл: 25

What is meant by "the revival of the Chinese nation"?

Вопрос 4

Балл: 25

What are the causes and prerequisites of the political crisis in the Republic of Korea 2024?

Вопрос **5**

Балл: 25

What were the key approaches to building an independent national economy on juche principles of self-reliance of Kim Il Sung?

Вопрос **6**

Балл: 25

Which measures does the Japanese government assume to smooth the negative effects of aging population in the economy?

Вопрос **7**

Балл: 25

What are the key ideas of Fumio Kishida's "Grand Design and Action Plan for a New Form of Capitalism"?

Вопрос **8**

Балл: 25

What are the possible scenarios of the influence of the destabilization of the situation in Syria on the security system in the Mediterranean region?

Вопрос 9

Балл: 25

What steps are Arab countries taking to reduce their dependence on oil rent?

Вы зашли под именем ()