

Вопрос **Инфо**

Уважаемые участники!

Олимпиадное задание по направлению «Международные отношения» состоит только из двух частей с задачами, обязательными для выполнения. Это означает, что вам нужно попробовать успешно справиться с обеими частями, чтобы претендовать на призовые места.

**Общая часть** предполагает единое задание для всех участников.

**Специальная часть** состоит из региональных блоков, среди которых нужно выбрать **только один**. Выполнение заданий двух и более блоков **не принесёт** вам дополнительных баллов:

1. Россия: задание № 2
2. Азия: задание № 3
3. Европа: задание № 4
4. Северная Африка и Ближний Восток: задание № 5

**Важно!** При выполнении заданий по более двум и более блокам специальной части к проверке будет принята только одно из них на усмотрение жюри. Апелляции на выбор задания к проверке не принимаются.

При выполнении заданий вы можете пользоваться любыми онлайн-словарями и онлайн-переводчиками для перевода отдельных слов и выражений: переход на другую вкладку/другое окно для перевода не будет считаться нарушением. Использование черновиков и справочных материалов строго запрещено.

Верим в ваш успех!

Вопрос **1**

Балл: 40,00

**I. ОБЩАЯ ЧАСТЬ**

**Прочтите текст, изложите основные идеи автора и дайте их оценку (на русском языке)**

The False Promise of International Institutions Author(s): John J. Mearsheimer

Source: International Security , Winter, 1994-1995

Many policymakers as well as academics believe that institutions hold great promise for promoting international peace. This optimistic assessment of institutions is not warranted, however, mainly because the three institutionalist theories which underpin it are flawed. There are serious problems with the causal logic of each theory, and little empirical evidence for any of them. What is most impressive about institutions, in fact, is how little independent effect they seem to have had on state behavior.

We have an important paradox here: although the world does not work the way institutionalist theories say it does or should, those theories remain highly influential in both the academic and policy worlds. Given the limited impact of institutions on state behavior, one would expect considerable skepticism, even cynicism, when institutions are described as a major force for peace. Instead, they are still routinely described in promising terms by scholars and governing elites.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt a detailed explanation of this paradox. Nevertheless, I would like to close with some speculative comments about this puzzle, focusing on the American context.

The attraction of institutionalist theories for both policymakers and scholars is explained, I believe, not by their intrinsic value, but by their relationship to realism, and especially to core elements of American political ideology. Realism has long been and continues to be an influential theory in the United States. Leading realist thinkers such as George Kennan and Henry Kissinger, for example, occupied key policymaking positions during the Cold War. The impact of realism in the academic world is amply demonstrated in the institutionalist literature, where discussions of realism are pervasive. Yet despite its influence, Americans who think seriously about foreign policy issues tend to dislike realism intensely, mainly because it clashes with their basic values. The theory stands opposed to how most Americans prefer to think about themselves and the wider world.

There are four principal reasons why American elites, as well as the American public, tend to regard realism with hostility. First, realism is a pessimistic theory. It depicts a world of stark and harsh competition, and it holds out little promise of making that world more benign. Realists, as Hans Morgenthau wrote, are resigned to the fact that "there is no escape from the evil of power, regardless of what one does." Such pessimism, of course, runs up against the deep-seated American belief that with time and effort, reasonable individuals can solve important social problems. Americans regard progress as both desirable and possible in politics, and they are therefore uncomfortable with realism's claim that security competition and war will persist despite our best efforts to eliminate them.

Second, realism treats war as an inevitable, and indeed sometimes necessary, form of state activity. For realists, war is an extension of politics by other means. Realists are very cautious in their prescriptions about the use of force: wars should not be fought for idealistic purposes, but instead for balance-of-power reasons. Most Americans, however, tend to think of war as a hideous enterprise that should ultimately be abolished. For the time being, however, it can only justifiably be used for lofty moral goals, like "making the world safe for democracy"; it is morally incorrect to fight wars to change or preserve the balance of power. This makes the realist conception of warfare anathema to many Americans.

Third, as an analytical matter, realism does not distinguish between "good" states and "bad" states, but essentially treats them like billiard balls of varying size. In realist theory, all states are forced to seek the same goal: maximum relative power. A purely realist interpretation of the Cold War, for example, allows for no meaningful difference in the motives behind American and Soviet behavior during that conflict. According to the theory, both sides must have been driven by concerns about the balance of power, and must have done what was necessary to try to achieve a favorable balance. Most Americans would recoil at such a description of the Cold War, because they believe the United States was motivated by good intentions while the Soviet Union was not.

Fourth, America has a rich history of thumbing its nose at realism. For its first 140 years of existence, geography and the British navy allowed the United States to avoid serious involvement in the power politics of Europe. America had an isolationist foreign policy for most of this period, and its rhetoric explicitly emphasized the evils of entangling alliances and balancing behavior. Even as the United States finally entered its first European war in 1917, Woodrow Wilson railed against realist thinking. America has a long tradition of anti-realist rhetoric, which continues to influence us today.

Given that realism is largely alien to American culture, there is a powerful demand in the United States for alternative ways of looking at the world, and especially for theories that square with basic American values. Institutional theories nicely meet these requirements, and that is the main source of their appeal to policymakers and scholars. Whatever else one might say about these theories, they have one undeniable advantage in the eyes of their supporters: they are not realism. Not only do institutional theories offer an alternative to realism, but they explicitly seek to undermine it. Moreover, institutionalists offer arguments that reflect basic American values. For example, they are optimistic about the possibility of greatly reducing, if not eliminating, security competition among states and creating a more peaceful world. They certainly do not accept the realist stricture that war is politics by other means. Institutionalists, in short, purvey a message that Americans long to hear.

There is, however, a downside for policymakers who rely on institutional theories: these theories do not accurately describe the world, hence policies based on them are bound to fail. The international system strongly shapes the behavior of states, limiting the amount of damage that false faith in

institutional theories can cause. The constraints of the system notwithstanding, however, states still have considerable freedom of action, and their policy choices can succeed or fail in protecting American national interests and the interests of vulnerable people around the globe. The failure of the League of Nations to address German and Japanese aggression in the 1930s is a case in point. The failure of institutions to prevent or stop the war in Bosnia offers a more recent example. These cases illustrate that institutions have mattered rather little in the past; they also suggest that the false belief that institutions matter has mattered more, and has had pernicious effects. Unfortunately, misplaced reliance on institutional solutions is likely to lead to more failures in the future.

Вопрос 2

Балл: 60,00

## II. СПЕЦИАЛЬНАЯ ЧАСТЬ

Выберите и выполните **только один** из блоков заданий специальной части

**Блок 1. Россия.** Подготовьте развёрнутое описание двух тем:

1. Крымская война
2. Столыпинские реформы

Вопрос 3

Балл: 60,00

## II. СПЕЦИАЛЬНАЯ ЧАСТЬ

Выберите и выполните **только один** из блоков заданий специальной части

**Блок 2. Азия.** Подготовьте развёрнутое описание двух тем:

1. Объединение Китая под властью Гоминьдана. Гоминьдановские реформы в годы «нанкинского десятилетия» (1927–1937 гг.). Вооруженная оппозиция правительству со стороны Коммунистической партии Китая (КПК).
2. Партийно-политическое строительство в Японии после окончания американской оккупации. Истоки японского «экономического чуда». Причины экономической стагнации Японии на рубеже 1990-х гг.

Вопрос 4

Балл: 60,00

## II. СПЕЦИАЛЬНАЯ ЧАСТЬ

Выберите и выполните **только один** из блоков заданий специальной части

**Блок 3. Европа.** Подготовьте развёрнутое описание двух тем:

1. Тридцатилетняя война и ее итоги. Вестфальская система международных отношений.
2. Оформление блоков в Европе (1870-е – 1900-е гг.). Создание Тройственного союза и Антанты.

Вопрос 5

Балл: 60,00

## II. СПЕЦИАЛЬНАЯ ЧАСТЬ

Выберите и выполните **только один** из блоков заданий специальной части

**Блок 4. Северная Африка и Ближний Восток.** Подготовьте развёрнутое описание двух тем:

1. Политическая идеология панарабизма как основа интеграционных процессов на Ближнем Востоке и в Северной Африке в XX веке
2. Политическая биография Саддама Хусейна. Его роль и место в истории региона Ближний Восток и Северная Африка.